[openstack-dev] [keystone] [tripleo] [deployment] Keystone Fernet keys rotations spec

Davanum Srinivas davanum at gmail.com
Thu Mar 16 18:02:24 UTC 2017


Lance,

in the other thread, we have not been talking about having any kind of
security for the fernet keys. Isn't that a requirement since if we
throw that in etcd it may be vulnerable?

Thanks,
Dims

On Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 12:45 PM, Lance Bragstad <lbragstad at gmail.com> wrote:
> I think the success of this, or a revived fernet-backend spec, is going to
> have a hard requirement on the outcome of the configuration opts discussion
> [0]. When we attempted to introduce an abstraction for fernet keys
> previously, it led down a rabbit hole of duplicated work across
> implementations, which was part of the reason for dropping the spec.
>
>
> [0]
> http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack-dev/2017-March/113941.html
>
> On Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 10:12 AM, Emilien Macchi <emilien at redhat.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Mar 14, 2017 at 1:27 PM, Emilien Macchi <emilien at redhat.com>
>> wrote:
>> > Folks,
>> >
>> > I found useful to share a spec that I started to write this morning:
>> > https://review.openstack.org/445592
>> >
>> > The goal is to do Keystone Fernet keys rotations in a way that scales
>> > and is secure, by using the standard tools and not re-inventing the
>> > wheel.
>> > In other words: if you're working on Keystone or TripleO or any other
>> > deployment tool: please read the spec and give any feedback.
>> >
>> > We would like to find a solution that would work for all OpenStack
>> > deployment tools (Kolla, OSA, Fuel, TripleO, Helm, etc) but I sent the
>> > specs to tripleo project
>> > to get some feedback.
>> >
>> > If you already has THE solution that you think is the best one, then
>> > we would be very happy to learn from it in a comment directly in the
>> > spec.
>> >
>>
>> After 2 days of review from Keystone, TripleO, OSA (and probably some
>> groups I missed), it's pretty clear the problem is already being fixed
>> in different places in different ways and that's bad.
>> IMHO we should engage some work to fix it in Keystone and investigate
>> again a storage backend for Keystone tokens.
>>
>> The Keystone specs that started this investigation was removed for Pike:
>> https://review.openstack.org/#/c/439194/
>>
>> I see 2 options here:
>>
>> - we keep duplicating efforts and let deployers implement their own
>> solutions.
>>
>> - we work with Keystone team to re-enable the spec and move forward to
>> solve the problem in Keystone itself, therefore for all deployments
>> tools in OpenStack (my favorite option).
>>
>>
>> I would like to hear from Keystone folks what are the main blockers
>> for option #2 and if this is only a human resource issue or if there
>> is some technical points we need to solve (in that case, it could be
>> done in the specs).
>>
>>
>> Thanks,
>> --
>> Emilien Macchi
>>
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-- 
Davanum Srinivas :: https://twitter.com/dims



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