Open Stack

We're aiming for a Spec "Proposal" Freeze deadline for Liberty of June
23rd, but are requiring that specs are approved by our spec reviewers by
that date. The spec [1] is currently pretty straightforward and provides us
several benefits, so I don't expect it to be a complicated process, but is
currently pending a revision from myself. I'm confident in Liberty at this
point.

[1] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/188564/

On Wed, Jun 10, 2015 at 10:35 AM, John Wood <john.wood at rackspace.com> wrote:

>  Hello folks,
>
>  Thanks for the consideration of this feature. Does it seem realistic for
> a Liberty release of Keystone middleware to expose X-Group-Ids, or would
> this be an M and beyond sort of thing?
>
>  Thanks,
> John
>
>
>   From: Henry Nash <henrynash9 at mac.com>
> Reply-To: "OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)" <
> openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org>
> Date: Friday, June 5, 2015 at 12:49 PM
>
> To: "OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)" <
> openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org>
> Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing
> X-Group-xxxx in token validation
>
>   The one proviso is that in single LDAP situations, the cloud provider
> can chose (for backward compatibility reasons) to allow the underlying LDAP
> user/group ID….so we might want to advise this to be disabled (there’s a
> config switch to use the Public ID mapping for even this case).
>
>  Henry
>
> On 5 Jun 2015, at 18:19, Dolph Mathews <dolph.mathews at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 at 11:50 AM, Henry Nash <henry.nash at uk.ibm.com> wrote:
>
>> So I think that GroupID's are actually unique and safe....since in the
>> multi LDAP case we provide an indirection already in Keystone and issue a
>> "Public ID" (this is true for bother users and groups), that we map to the
>> underlying local ID in the particular LDAP backend.
>
>
>  Oh, awesome! I didn't realize we did that for groups as well. So then,
> we're safe exposing X-Group-Ids to services via
> keystonemiddleware.auth_token but still not X-Group-Names (in any trivial
> form).
>
>
>>
>>
>> Henry
>>
>>
>>   From:  Dolph Mathews <dolph.mathews at gmail.com>  To:  "OpenStack
>> Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)" <
>> openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org>, Henry Nash <henryn at linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
>> Henry Nash/UK/IBM at IBMGB   Date:  05/06/2015 15:38   Subject:  Re:
>> [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing X-Group-xxxx in
>> token validation
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 10:17 PM, John Wood <*john.wood at rackspace.com*
>> <john.wood at rackspace.com>> wrote:
>> Hello folks,
>>
>> Regarding option C, if group IDs are unique within a given cloud/context,
>> and these are discoverable by clients that can then set the ACL on a secret
>> in Barbican, then that seems like a viable option to me. As it is now, the
>> user information provided to the ACL is the user ID information as found in
>> X-User-Ids now, not user names.
>>
>> To Kevin’s point though, are these group IDs unique across domains now,
>> or in the future? If not the more complex tuples suggested could be used,
>> but seem more error prone to configure on an ACL.
>>
>> Well, that's a good question, because that depends on the backend, and
>> our backend architecture has recently gotten very complicated in this area.
>>
>> If groups are backed by SQL, then they're going to be globally unique
>> UUIDs, so the answer is always yes.
>>
>> If they're backed by LDAP, then actually it depends on LDAP, but the
>> answer should be yes.
>>
>> But the nightmare scenario we now support is domain-specific identity
>> drivers, where each domain can actually be configured to talk to a
>> different LDAP server. In that case, I don't think you can make any
>> guarantees about group ID uniqueness :( Instead, each domain could provide
>> whatever IDs it wants, and those might conflict with those of other
>> domains. We have a workaround for a similar issue with user IDs, but it
>> hasn't been applied to groups, leaving them quite broken in this scenario.
>> I'd consider this to be an issue we need to solve in Keystone, though, not
>> something other projects need to worry about. I'm hoping Henry Nash can
>> chime in and correct me!
>>
>>
>> Thanks,
>> John
>>
>> *From: *<Fox>, Kevin M <*Kevin.Fox at pnnl.gov* <Kevin.Fox at pnnl.gov>>
>> * Reply-To: *"OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage
>> questions)" <*openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org*
>> <openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org>>
>> * Date: *Thursday, June 4, 2015 at 6:01 PM
>> * To: *"OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)" <
>> *openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org* <openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org>>
>>
>> * Subject: *Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing
>> X-Group-xxxx in token validation
>>
>> In Juno I tried adding a user in Domain A to group in Domain B. That
>> currently is not supported. Would be very handy though.
>>
>> We're getting a ways from the original part of the thread, so I may have
>> lost some context, but I think the original question was, if barbarian can
>> add group names to their resource acls.
>>
>> Since two administrative domains can issue the same group name, its not
>> safe I believe.
>>
>> Simply ensuring the group name is associated with a user and the domain
>> for the user matches the domain for the group wouldn't work because someone
>> with control of their own domain can just make a
>> user and give them the group with the name they want and come take your
>> credentials.
>>
>> What may be safe is for the barbican ACL to contain the group_id if they
>> are uniqueue across all domains, or take a domain_id & group_name pair for
>> the acl.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Kevin
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> *From:* Dolph Mathews [*dolph.mathews at gmail.com*
>> <dolph.mathews at gmail.com>]
>> * Sent:* Thursday, June 04, 2015 1:41 PM
>> * To:* OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
>> * Subject:* Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing
>> X-Group-xxxx in token validation
>>
>> Problem! In writing a spec for this (
>> *https://review.openstack.org/#/c/188564/*
>> <https://review.openstack.org/#/c/188564/> ), I remembered that groups
>> are domain-specific entities, which complicates the problem of providing
>> X-Group-Names via middleware.
>>
>> The problem is that we can't simply expose X-Group-Names to underlying
>> services without either A) making a well-documented assumption about the
>> ONE owning domain scope of ALL included groups, B) passing significantly
>> more data to underlying services than just a list of names (a domain scope
>> for every group), C) passing only globally-unique group IDs (services would
>> then have to retrieve additional details about each from from keystone if
>> they so cared).
>>
>> Option A) More specifically, keystone could opt to enumerate the groups
>> that belong to the same domain as the user. In this case, it'd probably
>> make more sense from an API perspective if the "groups" enumeration were
>> part of the "user" resources in the token response body (the "user" object
>> already has a containing domain ID. That means that IF a user were to be
>> assigned a group membership in another domain (assuming we didn't move to
>> disallowing that behavior at some point), then it would have to be excluded
>> from this list. If that were true, then I'd also follow that X-Group-Names
>> become X-User-Group-Names, so that it might be more clear that they belong
>> to the X-User-Domain-*.
>>
>> Option B) This is probably the most complex solution, but also the most
>> explicit. I have no idea how this interface would look in terms of headers
>> using current conventions. If we're going to break conventions, then I'd
>> want to pass a id+domain_id+name for each group reference. So, rather than
>> including a list of names AND a list of IDs, we'd have some terribly
>> encoded list of group objects (I'm not sure what the HTTP convention is on
>> this sort of use case, and hoping someone can illustrate a better solution
>> given the representation below):
>>
>>   X-Groups:
>> id%3D123%2Cdomain_id%3D456%2Cname%3Dabc,id%3D789%2Cdomain_id%3D357%2Cname%3Ddef
>>
>> Option C) Federated tokens would actually require solution (C) today
>> because they only include group IDs, not names. But the group enumeration
>> in federated tokens was also only intended to be consumed by keystone, so
>> that's not really an issue for that one use case. But option (C) would mean
>> there are no X-Group-Names passed to services, just X-Group-Ids. I'm
>> guessing this won't provide the user experience that Barbican is looking
>> for?
>>
>>
>> I'm leaning towards solution (A), but curious if that'll work for
>> Barbican and/or if anyone has an idea that I'm overlooking.
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 8:18 AM, Dolph Mathews <*dolph.mathews at gmail.com*
>> <dolph.mathews at gmail.com>> wrote:
>> To clarify: we already have to include the groups produced as a result of
>> federation mapping **in the payload** of Fernet tokens so that scoped
>> tokens can be created later:
>>
>>
>> *https://github.com/openstack/keystone/blob/a637ebcbc4a92687d3e80a50cbe88df3b13c79e6/keystone/token/providers/fernet/token_formatters.py#L523*
>> <https://github.com/openstack/keystone/blob/a637ebcbc4a92687d3e80a50cbe88df3b13c79e6/keystone/token/providers/fernet/token_formatters.py#L523>
>>
>> These are OpenStack group IDs, so it's up to the deployer to keep those
>> under control to keep Fernet token sizes down. It's the only place in the
>> current Fernet implementation that's (somewhat alarmingly) unbounded in the
>> real world.
>>
>> But we do **not** have a use case to add groups to *all* Fernet payloads:
>> only to token creation & validation responses.
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 2:36 AM, Morgan Fainberg <
>> *morgan.fainberg at gmail.com* <morgan.fainberg at gmail.com>> wrote:
>> For Fernet, the groups would only be populated on validate as Dolph
>> outlined. They would not be added to the core payload. We do not want to
>> expand the payload in this manner.
>>
>> --Morgan
>>
>> Sent via mobile
>>
>> On Jun 3, 2015, at 21:51, Lance Bragstad <*lbragstad at gmail.com*
>> <lbragstad at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>> I feel if we allowed group ids to be an attribute of the Fernet's core
>> payload, we continue to open up the possibility for tokens to be greater
>> than the initial "acceptable" size limit for a Fernet token (which I
>> believe was 255 bytes?). With this, I think we need to provide guidance on
>> the number of group ids allowed within the token before that size limit is
>> compromised.
>>
>> We've landed patches recently that allow for id strings to be included in
>> the Fernet payload [0], regardless of being uuid format (which can be
>> converted to bytes before packing to save space, this is harder for us to
>> do with non-uuid format id strings). This can also cause the Fernet token
>> size to grow. If we plan to include more information in the Fernet token
>> payload I think we should determine if the original acceptable size limit
>> still applies and regardless of what that size limit is provide some sort
>> of "best practices" for helping deployments keep their token size as small
>> as possible.
>>
>>
>> Keeping the tokens user (and developer) friendly was a big plus in the
>> design of Fernet, and providing resource for deployments to maintain that
>> would be helpful.
>>
>>
>> [0]
>> *https://review.openstack.org/#/q/status:merged+project:openstack/keystone+branch:master+topic:bug/1459382,n,z*
>> <https://review.openstack.org/#/q/status:merged+project:openstack/keystone+branch:master+topic:bug/1459382,n,z>
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 10:19 PM, Steve Martinelli <*stevemar at ca.ibm.com*
>> <stevemar at ca.ibm.com>> wrote:
>> Dozens to hundreds of roles or endpoints could cause an issue now :)
>>
>> But yeah, groups are much more likely to number in the dozens than roles
>> or endpoints. But I think the Fernet token size is so small that it could
>> probably handle this (since it does so now for the federated workflow).
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Steve Martinelli
>> OpenStack Keystone Core
>>
>>
>>
>> From:        "Fox, Kevin M" <*Kevin.Fox at pnnl.gov* <Kevin.Fox at pnnl.gov>>
>> To:        "OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage
>> questions)" <*openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org*
>> <openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org>>
>> Date:        06/03/2015 11:14 PM
>> Subject:        Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding
>>  exposing        X-Group-xxxx in token validation
>>  ------------------------------
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Will dozens to a hundred groups or so on one user cause issues? :)
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Kevin
>>
>>  ------------------------------
>> *From:* Morgan Fainberg
>> * Sent:* Wednesday, June 03, 2015 7:23:22 PM
>> * To:* OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
>> * Subject:* Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing
>> X-Group-xxxx in token validation
>>
>> In general I am of the opinion with the move to Fernet there is no good
>> reason we should avoid adding the group information into the token.
>>
>> --Morgan
>>
>> Sent via mobile
>>
>> On Jun 3, 2015, at 18:44, Dolph Mathews <*dolph.mathews at gmail.com*
>> <dolph.mathews at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 5:58 PM, John Wood <*john.wood at rackspace.com*
>> <john.wood at rackspace.com>> wrote:
>> Hello folks,
>>
>> There has been discussion about adding user group support to the
>> per-secret access control list (ACL) feature in Barbican. Hence secrets
>> could be marked as accessible by a group on the ACL rather than an
>> individual user as implemented now.
>>
>> Our understanding is that Keystone does not pass along a user’s group
>> information during token validation however (such as in the form of
>> X-Group-Ids/X-Group-Names headers passed along via Keystone middleware).
>>
>> The pre-requisite for including that information in the form of headers
>> would be adding group information to the token validation response. In the
>> case of UUID, it would be pre-computed and stored in the DB at token
>> creation time. In the case of PKI, it would be encoded into the PKI token
>> and further bloat PKI tokens. And in the case of Fernet, it would be
>> included at token validation time.
>>
>> Including group information, however, would also let us efficient revoke
>> tokens using token revocation events when group membership is affected in
>> any way (user being removed from a group, a group being deleted, or a
>> group-based role assignment being revoked). The OS-FEDERATION extension is
>> actually already including groups in tokens today, as a required part of
>> the federated workflow. We'd effectively be introducing that same behavior
>> into the core Identity API (see the federated token example):
>>
>>
>> *https://github.com/openstack/keystone-specs/blob/master/api/v3/identity-api-v3-os-federation-ext.rst#request-an-unscoped-os-federation-token*
>> <https://github.com/openstack/keystone-specs/blob/master/api/v3/identity-api-v3-os-federation-ext.rst#request-an-unscoped-os-federation-token>
>>
>> This would allow us to address bugs such as:
>>
>>   *https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1268751*
>> <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1268751>
>>
>> In the past, we shied away from including groups if only to avoid
>> bloating the size of PKI tokens any further (but now we have Fernet tokens
>> providing a viable alternative). Are there any other reasons not to add
>> group information to the token validation response?
>>
>>
>> Would the community consider this a useful feature? Would the community
>> consider adding this support to Liberty?
>>
>> Thank you,
>> John
>>
>>
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