[openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing X-Group-xxxx in token validation
Steve Martinelli
stevemar at ca.ibm.com
Thu Jun 4 03:19:16 UTC 2015
Dozens to hundreds of roles or endpoints could cause an issue now :)
But yeah, groups are much more likely to number in the dozens than roles
or endpoints. But I think the Fernet token size is so small that it could
probably handle this (since it does so now for the federated workflow).
Thanks,
Steve Martinelli
OpenStack Keystone Core
From: "Fox, Kevin M" <Kevin.Fox at pnnl.gov>
To: "OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)"
<openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org>
Date: 06/03/2015 11:14 PM
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding
exposing X-Group-xxxx in token validation
Will dozens to a hundred groups or so on one user cause issues? :)
Thanks,
Kevin
From: Morgan Fainberg
Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 2015 7:23:22 PM
To: OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing
X-Group-xxxx in token validation
In general I am of the opinion with the move to Fernet there is no good
reason we should avoid adding the group information into the token.
--Morgan
Sent via mobile
On Jun 3, 2015, at 18:44, Dolph Mathews <dolph.mathews at gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 5:58 PM, John Wood <john.wood at rackspace.com> wrote:
Hello folks,
There has been discussion about adding user group support to the
per-secret access control list (ACL) feature in Barbican. Hence secrets
could be marked as accessible by a group on the ACL rather than an
individual user as implemented now.
Our understanding is that Keystone does not pass along a user?s group
information during token validation however (such as in the form of
X-Group-Ids/X-Group-Names headers passed along via Keystone middleware).
The pre-requisite for including that information in the form of headers
would be adding group information to the token validation response. In the
case of UUID, it would be pre-computed and stored in the DB at token
creation time. In the case of PKI, it would be encoded into the PKI token
and further bloat PKI tokens. And in the case of Fernet, it would be
included at token validation time.
Including group information, however, would also let us efficient revoke
tokens using token revocation events when group membership is affected in
any way (user being removed from a group, a group being deleted, or a
group-based role assignment being revoked). The OS-FEDERATION extension is
actually already including groups in tokens today, as a required part of
the federated workflow. We'd effectively be introducing that same behavior
into the core Identity API (see the federated token example):
https://github.com/openstack/keystone-specs/blob/master/api/v3/identity-api-v3-os-federation-ext.rst#request-an-unscoped-os-federation-token
This would allow us to address bugs such as:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1268751
In the past, we shied away from including groups if only to avoid bloating
the size of PKI tokens any further (but now we have Fernet tokens
providing a viable alternative). Are there any other reasons not to add
group information to the token validation response?
Would the community consider this a useful feature? Would the community
consider adding this support to Liberty?
Thank you,
John
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