[Openstack-security] [OSSN] Draft: Nova Baremetal Exposes Previous Tenant Data

Kurt Seifried kseifried at redhat.com
Tue Jul 2 19:15:27 UTC 2013


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On 07/02/2013 01:06 PM, Jeremy Stanley wrote:
> On 2013-07-02 12:53:34 -0600 (-0600), Kurt Seifried wrote:
>> Huh? According to: https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Baremetal
>> 
>> "This driver was added to the Grizzly release, but it should be 
>> considered somewhat experimental at this point. See the Bugs
>> section for information and links to the Launchpad bug
>> listings."
>> 
>> also no mention of any security issues with respect to data not
>> being wiped. Now I get that the software hasn't been officially
>> blessed as production ready, but it has been released publicly.
>> Unless there isa compelling reason not to assign a CVE for this
>> (speak up now!) I'll do so later today.
> 
> I agree it's unfortunate if security precautions weren't spelled
> out in the release notes, so if that qualifies for a CVE then it
> sounds like we probably do need one. In your opinion would it have
> needed a CVE if the situation were spelled out in the release notes
> already?

If the documentation specifically said "WARNING: DATA MAY BE EXPOSED
DUE TO LACK OF WIPING" then no CVE most likely. It's a continuum, but
basically some examples:

=======================
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2013/q1/155

Further note, for example:

A default account/password in a device or service. Is this a security
issue or not? Different scenarios have different outcomes:

1) The default account/password is well documented. The services
forces you to change the password when first run and will refuse to
run until you do change the password. Generally not considered a vuln.

2) The default account/password is well documented. The services does
not force you to change the password when first run. Generally not
considered a vuln as it falls into the "don't do stupid things" class
of issues.

3) The default account/password is not well documented or not
documented at all but can be changed. Generally this would be
considered a vulnerability.

4) The default account/password is not well documented or not
documented at all and can NOT be changed. Generally this would be
considered a vulnerability.

Similar things for other things, is it a security vulnerability or
security hardening, or not a security issue at all? It definitely gets
fuzzy/messy sometimes.
=======================

So this looks like a #4, not documented, not something that can easily
be fixed by the user.

> I suppose this drives to a process question for us as a project, 
> whether we can actually develop work-in-progress/experimental 
> features in-tree with a timed release schedule, knowing that we
> may need to consider either (dangerously) ripping them back out at 
> release time or announcing known security vulnerabilities in them
> at release time instead.

That is a good question. One thing that might be helpful is to mark
such code as experimental/dangerous/may eat all your datas and include
any potential gotchas to warn people about, which is probably a good
idea either way as it would reduce risk, or if not that at least let
people make informed decisions about the risk they are taking.

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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