Open Stack

Please don't miss the point here. We are seeking a solution that allows a location to place a client side encrypted blob of data (A TLS cert) that multiple magnum-conductor processes on different hosts can reach over the network.

We *already* support using Barbican for this purpose, as well as storage in flat files (not as secure as Barbican, and only works with a single conductor) and are seeking a second alternative for clouds that have not yet adopted Barbican, and want to use multiple conductors. Once Barbican is common in OpenStack clouds, both alternatives are redundant and can be deprecated. If Keystone depends on Barbican, then we have no reason to keep using it. That will mean that Barbican is core to OpenStack.

Our alternative to using Keystone is storing the encrypted blobs in the Magnum database which would cause us to add an API feature in magnum that is the exact functional equivalent of the credential store in Keystone. That is something we are trying to avoid by leveraging existing OpenStack APIs.

--
Adrian

On Apr 12, 2016, at 3:44 PM, Dolph Mathews <dolph.mathews at gmail.com<mailto:dolph.mathews at gmail.com>> wrote:


On Tue, Apr 12, 2016 at 3:27 PM, Lance Bragstad <lbragstad at gmail.com<mailto:lbragstad at gmail.com>> wrote:
Keystone's credential API pre-dates barbican. We started talking about having the credential API back to barbican after it was a thing. I'm not sure if any work has been done to move the credential API in this direction. From a security perspective, I think it would make sense for keystone to back to barbican.

+1

And regarding the "inappropriate use of keystone," I'd agree... without this spec, keystone is entirely useless as any sort of alternative to Barbican:

  https://review.openstack.org/#/c/284950/

I suspect Barbican will forever be a much more mature choice for Magnum.


On Tue, Apr 12, 2016 at 2:43 PM, Hongbin Lu <hongbin.lu at huawei.com<mailto:hongbin.lu at huawei.com>> wrote:
Hi all,

In short, some Magnum team members proposed to store TLS certificates in Keystone credential store. As Magnum PTL, I want to get agreements (or non-disagreement) from OpenStack community in general, Keystone community in particular, before approving the direction.

In details, Magnum leverages TLS to secure the API endpoint of kubernetes/docker swarm. The usage of TLS requires a secure store for storing TLS certificates. Currently, we leverage Barbican for this purpose, but we constantly received requests to decouple Magnum from Barbican (because users normally don't have Barbican installed in their clouds). Some Magnum team members proposed to leverage Keystone credential store as a Barbican alternative [1]. Therefore, I want to confirm what is Keystone team position for this proposal (I remembered someone from Keystone mentioned this is an inappropriate use of Keystone. Would I ask for further clarification?). Thanks in advance.

[1] https://blueprints.launchpad.net/magnum/+spec/barbican-alternative-store

Best regards,
Hongbin

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