[Openstack] [Openstack-security] API Security
Clark, Robert Graham
robert.clark at hp.com
Tue Apr 29 15:15:59 UTC 2014
You can terminate SSL anywhere, it doesn’t have to be at the boundary necessarily. Many larger deployments will utilize hardware terminators at the network edge and then internally use software based terminators (like Stunnel).
There’s a growing effort to use SSL everywhere, I can second Rob Crittenden’s comments – check out Nathan Kinders blog entry on the topic https://blog-nkinder.rhcloud.com/?p=7
From: Hao Wang [mailto:hao.1.wang at gmail.com]
Sent: 29 April 2014 16:04
To: Rob Crittenden
Cc: Clark, Robert Graham; openstack-security at lists.openstack.org; openstack; Aaron Knister
Subject: Re: [Openstack-security] [Openstack] API Security
SSL terminator will terminates at the network boundary. I am thinking if the crackers can figure out a way to sneak into the internal network and capture all the sensitive information still. Is this a concern for a private cloud?
On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 10:39 AM, Rob Crittenden <rcritten at redhat.com <mailto:rcritten at redhat.com> > wrote:
Hao Wang wrote:
Thanks. It makes sense. The other questions are, would Heartbleed be a
potential risk? Which solution is being used in OpenStack SSL?
Native SSL services (eventlet) are based on OpenSSL, as is Apache (horizon) so yes, the risk is there if you haven't updated your OpenSSL libraries.
The general consensus however is to use SSL terminators rather than enabling SSL in the endpoints directly. You'd need to investigate the SSL library in the terminator you choose, though it would likely be OpenSSL.
Check this out as well, https://blog-nkinder.rhcloud.com/?p=7
rob
On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 10:07 AM, Clark, Robert Graham
<robert.clark at hp.com <mailto:robert.clark at hp.com> <mailto:robert.clark at hp.com <mailto:robert.clark at hp.com> >> wrote:
This is why any production API servers should all be running TLS/SSL
– to protect the confidentiality of messages in flight.____
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There have been efforts to remove sensitive information from logs,
I’m a little surprised that passwords are logged in Neutron.____
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*From:*Hao Wang [mailto:hao.1.wang at gmail.com <mailto:hao.1.wang at gmail.com>
<mailto:hao.1.wang at gmail.com <mailto:hao.1.wang at gmail.com> >]
*Sent:* 29 April 2014 14:06
*To:* openstack-security at lists.openstack.org <mailto:openstack-security at lists.openstack.org>
<mailto:openstack-security at lists.openstack.org <mailto:openstack-security at lists.openstack.org> >
*Cc:* openstack; Aaron Knister
*Subject:* Re: [Openstack-security] [Openstack] API Security____
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Adding security group...____
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On Sat, Apr 26, 2014 at 4:25 PM, Hao Wang <hao.1.wang at gmail.com <mailto:hao.1.wang at gmail.com>
<mailto:hao.1.wang at gmail.com <mailto:hao.1.wang at gmail.com> >> wrote:____
It is the client. I got this message with DEBUG enabled:____
curl -i 'http://192.168.56.103:35357/v2.0/tokens' -X POST -H
"Content-Type: application/json" -H "Accept: application/json"
-H "User-Agent: python-novaclient" -d '{"auth": {"tenantName":
"admin", "passwordCredentials": {"username": "admin",
"password": "admin"}}}'____
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It can be seen that username and password are right in the
message.____
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Hao____
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On Sat, Apr 26, 2014 at 4:08 PM, Aaron Knister
<aaron.knister at gmail.com <mailto:aaron.knister at gmail.com> <mailto:aaron.knister at gmail.com <mailto:aaron.knister at gmail.com> >>
wrote:____
Was it the client or the server that exposed the credentials?
Sent from my iPhone____
On Apr 26, 2014, at 2:28 PM, Hao Wang <hao.1.wang at gmail.com <mailto:hao.1.wang at gmail.com>
<mailto:hao.1.wang at gmail.com <mailto:hao.1.wang at gmail.com> >> wrote:____
Hi,____
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I am troubleshooting a neutron case. It was just found
that if DEBUG was enabled, neutron would print out JSON
data with username and password. I am wondering what
kind of protocol is used in production environment to
prevent this security risk from happening.____
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Thanks,____
Hao____
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