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What attack does hardcoding a path to a specific executable protect against?

On the downside, It makes the code far less portable, harder to maintain, and less flexible in the face of alternative directory structures and system configurations.


From: Stanislav Pugachev <spugachev at griddynamics.com<mailto:spugachev at griddynamics.com>>
Date: Tuesday, May 14, 2013 12:20 PM
To: Wyllys Ingersoll <wyllys.ingersoll at evault.com<mailto:wyllys.ingersoll at evault.com>>
Cc: "Kevin L. Mitchell" <kevin.mitchell at rackspace.com<mailto:kevin.mitchell at rackspace.com>>, "openstack at lists.launchpad.net<mailto:openstack at lists.launchpad.net>" <openstack at lists.launchpad.net<mailto:openstack at lists.launchpad.net>>
Subject: Re: [Openstack] security blueprint related to os binaries

from the security point of view its not so bad practice


On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 6:57 PM, Wyllys Ingersoll <Wyllys.Ingersoll at evault.com<mailto:Wyllys.Ingersoll at evault.com>> wrote:
Agree.  Hardcoding full pathnames is a bad practice in general.


On 5/14/13 11:50 AM, "Kevin L. Mitchell" <kevin.mitchell at rackspace.com<mailto:kevin.mitchell at rackspace.com>>
wrote:

>On Tue, 2013-05-14 at 18:38 +0300, Vasiliy Khomenko wrote:
>> Attacker can put binary in /usr/local/bin for example. on ubuntu that
>> path located before /usr/bin.
>
>If the attacker has write access to /usr/local/bin, it's already game
>over; I don't see what we can do to nova that can mitigate something
>that disastrous.
>
>--
>Kevin L. Mitchell <kevin.mitchell at rackspace.com<mailto:kevin.mitchell at rackspace.com>>
>
>
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