Open Stack

Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> FWIW, if you've got libguestfs available, the file injection code does
> not require any rootwrap usage. Ironically the config drive stuff now
> does require root if you configure it to use FAT instead of ISO9660 :-(

My issue is that we enable a very permissive compute.filters just to
care for the case where you use localfs-style injection. We generally
hurt the security model to care for a specific less-secure deploy option.

What we /could/ do is split compute.filters so that you have a specific
filters file for localfs-style injection commands. Deployers would
enable that specific file in the case they use localfs-style injection.

It's tricky because you can't really trust nova to tell you which option
it runs with, so you have to rely on deployers enabling the
localfs-option to also enable that specific filters file, which is a bit
of a configuration nightmare and very error-prone.

Alternatively we could rip out localfs-style injection altogether.

> I have a general desire to make it such that you can run with KVM and
> Nova without requiring rootwrap for anything. last time I looked the
> three general areas where we required root wrap were networking, storage
> and file injection. My recent refactoring of file injection addressed
> the latter by using libguestfs APIs instead of libguestfs FUSE. Networking
> is mostly solved if using newest libvirt + Quantum instead of Nova's
> own networking. Storage is something that cna be addressed by using
> libvirt's storage APIs instead of running commands directly.

That's my goal too. Ideally devs would think twice before adding any new
run_as_root=True command. Every command we add lowers the security model
around openstack. It's very easy to add one, and very difficult to
remove one once it's in.

-- 
Thierry Carrez (ttx)
Release Manager, OpenStack