[Openstack-security] [Bug 1649446] Re: Non-Admin Access to Revocation Events
Jeremy Stanley
fungi at yuggoth.org
Wed Jan 11 22:53:07 UTC 2017
Consensus seems to be that this was intentional behavior, but worth
changing (as evidenced by a subsequent fix to master). Given that and
the lack of stable branch backports, I'm going to treat this as a
security hardening opportunity. If there is fierce disagreement favoring
backports and an official advisory, we can revisit the classification at
that time.
** Changed in: ossa
Status: Incomplete => Won't Fix
** Information type changed from Public Security to Public
** Tags added: security
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1649446
Title:
Non-Admin Access to Revocation Events
Status in OpenStack Identity (keystone):
Fix Released
Status in OpenStack Security Advisory:
Won't Fix
Bug description:
With the default Keystone policy any authed user can list all revocation events for the cluster:
https://github.com/openstack/keystone/blob/master/etc/policy.json#L179
This can be done by directly calling the API as such:
curl -g -i -X GET http://localhost/identity/v3/OS-REVOKE/events -H "Accept: application/json" -H "X-Auth-Token: <non_admin_token_goes_here>"
and this will provide you with a normal revocation event list (see
attachment).
This will allow a user to over time collect a list of user_ids and
project_ids. The project_ids aren't particularly useful, but the
user_ids can be used to lock people of of their accounts. Or if rate
limiting is not setup (a bad idea), or somehow bypassed, would allow
someone to brute force access to those ids.
Knowing the ids is no worse than knowing the usernames, but as a non-
admin you shouldn't have access to such a list anyway.
It is also worth noting that OpenStack policy files are rife with
these blank policy rules, not just Keystone. Some are safe and
intended to be accessible by any authed user, others are checked at
the code layer, but there may be other rules that are unsafe to expose
to any authed user and as such should actually default to
"rule:admin_required" or something other than blank.
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