[Openstack-security] [Bug 1668503] Re: sha512_crypt is insufficient, use pbkdf2_sha512 for password hashing
Morgan Fainberg
morgan.fainberg at gmail.com
Tue Feb 28 21:46:00 UTC 2017
As an update based upon the comments and discussion in keystone here is
the course of action:
* No backports
* Pike will be updated to support pbkfd2_sha512, bcrypt, and scrypt
(configurable) - default will be bcrypt
* For rolling upgrade purposes, keystone will still write sha512_crypt
passwords to the old column, new column will be created for the new
password hashes. This old crypt hash will be disable-able from being
written via configuration option.
* IN Q release, keystone will cease to write sha512_crypt and the
configuration option will be deprecated for removal/removed (that
toggles sha512_crypt writing).
This means OSSA can be closed, OSSN task can be opened if OSSG would
like to issue an OSSN for this.
While sha512_crypt and sha256_crypt are used in many cases, these are in
places that are typically more secure than web-facing applications
(shadow file) where pbkfd2, bcrypt, and scrypt really shine and start
providing significantly more protection against off-line brute force
especially since databases are more likely to be breached as they are
more often accessible from more locations than the shadow/filesystem
is).
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1668503
Title:
sha512_crypt is insufficient, use pbkdf2_sha512 for password hashing
Status in OpenStack Identity (keystone):
In Progress
Status in OpenStack Identity (keystone) mitaka series:
New
Status in OpenStack Identity (keystone) newton series:
New
Status in OpenStack Identity (keystone) ocata series:
New
Status in OpenStack Identity (keystone) pike series:
In Progress
Status in OpenStack Security Advisory:
Incomplete
Bug description:
Keystone uses sha512_crypt for password hashing. This is insufficient
and provides limited protection (even with 10,000 rounds) against
brute-forcing of the password hashes (especially with FPGAs and/or GPU
processing).
The correct mechanism is to use bcrypt, scrypt, or pbkdf2_sha512
instead of sha512_crypt.
This bug is marked as public security as bug #1543048 has already
highlighted this issue.
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