[Openstack-security] [Bug 1456228] Re: Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host
Malini Bhandaru
malini.k.bhandaru at intel.com
Wed Sep 9 03:45:03 UTC 2015
As I originally mentioned, the scenario described in this bug is very
unlikely in a production environment, a host being compromised in a way
detectable by secure boot or trusted boot requires a reboot, at which
time those VMs would be down, most likely something that Heat along with
some monitoring system would have detected and acted upon, such as
restarting the VMs in a new location meeting their original trust
requirements.
Yet another alternative would be a VM aware of its trust needs, able to
test that it is running on a trusted host else emit an alarm message
and shutdown. Congress or some other OpenStack project could detect the
alarm and migrate the VM. Or Heat and a monitoring application as
described in the previous paragraph.
Another approach is to combine secure boot with trusted boot. In this
scenario, if the boot routines are not signed and certified the host
will fail to launch. Trusted boot would then capture the launch
measurements.
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1456228
Title:
Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host
Status in OpenStack Compute (nova):
Invalid
Status in OpenStack Security Advisory:
Won't Fix
Status in OpenStack Security Notes:
Confirmed
Bug description:
This is related to the trusted compute.
I recently setup trusted compute pool in my company and have observed
that although new trusted vm is not able to be launched from an
untrusted host, but if an trusted vm that have launched earlier on a
trusted host which is compromised later on, that VM can still be
powered on.
1. Exact version of Nova/Openstack:
[root at grunt2 ~]# rpm -qa | grep nova
python-nova-2014.1.2-100+45c2cbc.fc20.noarch
openstack-nova-network-2014.1.2-100+45c2cbc.fc20.noarch
openstack-nova-compute-2014.1.2-100+45c2cbc.fc20.noarch
openstack-nova-conductor-2014.1.2-100+45c2cbc.fc20.noarch
openstack-nova-2014.1.2-100+45c2cbc.fc20.noarch
openstack-nova-cells-2014.1.2-100+45c2cbc.fc20.noarch
openstack-nova-api-2014.1.2-100+45c2cbc.fc20.noarch
openstack-nova-console-2014.1.2-100+45c2cbc.fc20.noarch
python-novaclient-2.17.0-2.fc21.noarch
openstack-nova-cert-2014.1.2-100+45c2cbc.fc20.noarch
openstack-nova-scheduler-2014.1.2-100+45c2cbc.fc20.noarch
openstack-nova-objectstore-2014.1.2-100+45c2cbc.fc20.noarch
openstack-nova-common-2014.1.2-100+45c2cbc.fc20.noarch
openstack-nova-novncproxy-2014.1.2-100+45c2cbc.fc20.noarch
openstack-nova-doc-2014.1.2-100+45c2cbc.fc20.noarch
2. Relevant log files:
this is not a error, don't think logs will help..
3. Reproduce steps:
* create trusted compute pool with only one compute node
* create an trusted VM on that compute node
* compromise the trusted compute node by changing the boot order
* power on the trusted Vm created earlier.
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