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In theory, relaxing the exact match makes us vulnerable to an attack if
this functionality is used with a dashboard that allows unvalidated
redirects.

Could a user spoof this by setting the dashboard URL to something like:
http://dashboard/redirect?url=http://hacked_site ?

And if they can what could they steal?

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1440958

Title:
  loosen validation on matching trusted dashboard

Status in OpenStack Identity (Keystone):
  Fix Committed

Bug description:
  In the current implementation for verifying where the SSO request came
  from, the host is grabbed from the 'origin' query parameter, and
  compared to the list of 'trusted_dashboards' in the config file.

    origin = context['query_string'].get('origin')
    host = urllib.parse.unquote_plus(origin)
    if host in CONF.federation.trusted_dashboard:
      ...

  https://github.com/openstack/keystone/blob/master/keystone/contrib/federation/controllers.py#L278-L287

  This works, but unless the entry is marked perfectly in the config
  file, it won't match. We should loosen the validation that is
  performed, and maybe even use the HTTP Referer instead (and no longer
  require the 'origin' parameter from horizon).

  We should be able to decompose the Refer to figure out the scheme +
  hostname + path, and use that hostname to check against the trusted
  dashboards.

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