[Openstack-security] [Bug 1446406] Re: Insecure signing_dir configuration in barbican-api-paste.ini
OpenStack Infra
1446406 at bugs.launchpad.net
Mon Apr 27 08:58:55 UTC 2015
Reviewed: https://review.openstack.org/177378
Committed: https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/barbican/commit/?id=46184bb4b3a81e503a9e4aff4ba9ea0a66061a16
Submitter: Jenkins
Branch: stable/kilo
commit 46184bb4b3a81e503a9e4aff4ba9ea0a66061a16
Author: Charles Neill <charles.neill at rackspace.com>
Date: Tue Apr 21 15:49:20 2015 -0500
Removing signing_dir directive from config
The signing_dir directive defined in barbican-api-paste.ini explicitly
stores Keystone's signing certificates in a known /tmp directory. This
could be exploited by populating the directory with bogus certificates,
potentially allowing a malicious user to generate valid tokens.
Added comment explaining signing_dir, and a reasonable
(commented) default.
Change-Id: I15fda6863e888e3881694ab47a836eee2fb578ee
Closes-Bug: #1446406
** Changed in: barbican/kilo
Status: In Progress => Fix Committed
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1446406
Title:
Insecure signing_dir configuration in barbican-api-paste.ini
Status in OpenStack Key Management (Barbican):
Fix Committed
Status in Barbican kilo series:
Fix Committed
Bug description:
It appears that Barbican sets signing_dir to "/tmp/barbican/cache" in
etc/barbican/barbican-api-paste.ini (Reference:
https://github.com/openstack/barbican/blob/master/etc/barbican
/barbican-api-paste.ini#L42)
A Nova bug from 2013 (https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/1174608) mentions that they had the same basic issue, and it's a security issue because:
"This means that if an attacker populated the /tmp/keystone-signing-nova
with the appropriate files for signautre verification they could potentially
issue forged tokens which would be validated by the middleware. As:
- The directory location deterministic. (default for glance, nova)
- *If the directory already exists it is reused*"
This Nova bug was issued CVE-2013-2030: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-
bin/cvename.cgi?name=2013-2030
This was originally reported to Barbican devs by the user "zigo" in the #openstack-barbican channel on Freenode:
2015-03-23 16:59:15 zigo_ I just saw in barbican-api-paste.ini a "signing_dir" directive. This is a security issue which you guys need to fix.
2015-03-23 16:59:28 zigo_ The signing_dir directive should never be set to /tmp like this.
2015-03-23 16:59:33 zigo_ Best is to simply remove the directive.
2015-03-23 16:59:57 zigo_ I can find the announce for the nova security patch that happened a few years ago if you don't just trust my words… :)
zigo's suggested fix was to remove the directive. It appears Cinder
has taken this approach for their project
(https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1185098)
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