[Openstack-security] Fixing errors in issued OSSNs

Clark, Robert Graham robert.clark at hp.com
Fri May 30 17:28:13 UTC 2014


On 30/05/2014 18:15, "Nathan Kinder" <nkinder at redhat.com> wrote:


>
>
>On 05/30/2014 09:36 AM, Bryan D. Payne wrote:
>> I vote for cutting OSSN-0013-1 and then, to the extent possible,
>> ensuring that this new one replaces the old one in all of our
>> publication locations.
>
>+1.  This should replace the original published version everywhere.  The
>only thing we can't do is to strike is the history from the mailing list
>archive, but we can publish the new revision to the mailing lists.
>
>To prevent this situation in the future, we need to test any workarounds
>that we publish in an OSSN.  I added a brief section about testing to
>the Process page after learning about the problems with OSSN-0013
>yesterday:
>
>  https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Security/Security_Note_Process#Testing
>
>Anyone reviewing a pending OSSN should not hesitate to ask if a
>workaround has actually been tested by the author.
>
>I'm working on testing a new workaround for OSSN-0013.
>
>Thanks,
>-NGK
>
>> 
>> -bryan
>> 
>> 
>> On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 9:11 AM, Clark, Robert Graham
>> <robert.clark at hp.com <mailto:robert.clark at hp.com>> wrote:
>> 
>>     Mark Washenberger has pointed out a mistake in OSSN-0013, we should
>>     fire whoever wrote that!
>>     https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1271426
>> 
>>     Anyway, we have a few options.
>>     Cut a completely new OSSN that supersedes 0013 and give it a normal
>>     number and add a reference to the no longer valid 0013
>>     Cut a new OSSN with a number derived from 0013 such as OSSN-0013-1
>> 
>>     Followed up with what would basically be a revised announcement on
>>     ­dev and ­security.
>> 
>>     Thoughts?
>> 
>> 
>>     _______________________________________________
>>     Openstack-security mailing list
>>     Openstack-security at lists.openstack.org
>>     <mailto:Openstack-security at lists.openstack.org>
>>     
>>http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-security
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> Openstack-security mailing list
>> Openstack-security at lists.openstack.org
>> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-security
>> 
>
>_______________________________________________
>Openstack-security mailing list
>Openstack-security at lists.openstack.org
>http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-security

I agree, we need testing to improve the quality of the OSSNs we produce.
However, we probably need guidance on how to do that properly. Many
authors of OSSNs won¹t be used to standing up devstack etc. We¹ve
previously held up OSSNs as a nice way to contribute to OpenStack
security, particularly for those starting up. We now require authors to
understand gerrit and the proposal is to spin up an OpenStack deployment
to perform testing too - I wonder if this will all be a bit too much for
your average author?

I suppose we could create a few reference deployments and
Grizzly,Havana,Icehouse and just try changes on the reference deployments?
After all we are typically only talking about configuration changes rather
than code changes, the reference deployments should stay relatively
stable. Once consideration would be to have someone other than the author
perform the test - thoughts?

-Rob





More information about the Openstack-security mailing list