[Openstack-security] [Bug 1174608] Fix merged to keystone (stable/folsom)
OpenStack Hudson
1174608 at bugs.launchpad.net
Thu May 9 17:54:52 UTC 2013
Reviewed: https://review.openstack.org/28577
Committed: http://github.com/openstack/keystone/commit/24c25b38ed6fc95ed919ab34463cdb10bdcc57fd
Submitter: Jenkins
Branch: stable/folsom
commit 24c25b38ed6fc95ed919ab34463cdb10bdcc57fd
Author: Dolph Mathews <dolph.mathews at gmail.com>
Date: Wed May 8 10:49:20 2013 -0500
Securely create signing_dir (bug 1174608)
Also verifies the security of an existing signing_dir.
Change-Id: I0685b4274a94ad3974a2b2a7ab3f45830d3934bb
(cherry picked from python-keystoneclient 1736e2ffb12f70eeebed019448bc14def48aa036)
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1174608
Title:
Insecure directory creation for signing
Status in OpenStack Identity (Keystone):
Invalid
Status in Keystone folsom series:
Fix Committed
Status in OpenStack Compute (Nova):
Fix Committed
Status in OpenStack Compute (nova) folsom series:
Fix Committed
Status in OpenStack Compute (nova) grizzly series:
Fix Committed
Status in Python client library for Keystone:
Fix Committed
Bug description:
Originally found by Grant Murphy (gmurphy at redhat.com):
The signing directory is used to store the signing certificates
and the default location for this directory is:
signing_dir = /tmp/keystone-signing-nova
In the file:
keystone/middleware/auth_token.py
During the initialization of the AuthMiddleware the following
operations are made for the signing directory:
IF the directory exists but cannot be written to a configuration error is raised.
ELSE IF the directory doesn't exist, create it.
NEXT chmod permisions(stat.S_IRWXU) to the signing_directory
AFAICT The signing certificates used in validation will only be
fetched from the keystone if the cms_verify action raises an exception
because the certificate file is missing from the signing directory.
This means that if an attacker populated the /tmp/keystone-signing-nova
with the appropriate files for signautre verification they could potentially
issue forged tokens which would be validated by the middleware. As:
- The directory location deterministic. (default for glance, nova)
- *If the directory already exists it is reused*
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