Open Stack

I replied to John, but directly. I'm sending the responses I sent to him
but with the intended audience on the thread. Sorry for not catching that
earlier.


On Fri, May 26, 2017 at 2:44 AM, John Garbutt <john at johngarbutt.com> wrote:

> +1 on not forcing Operators to transition to something new twice, even if
> we did go for option 3.
>

The more I think about this, the more it worries me from a developer
perspective. If we ended up going with option 3, then we'd be supporting
both methods of elevating privileges. That means two paths for doing the
same thing in keystone. It also means oslo.context, keystonemiddleware, or
any other library consuming tokens that needs to understand elevated
privileges needs to understand both approaches.


>
> Do we have an agreed non-distruptive upgrade path mapped out yet? (For any
> of the options) We spoke about fallback rules you pass but with a warning
> to give us a smoother transition. I think that's my main objection with the
> existing patches, having to tell all admins to get their token for a
> different project, and give them roles in that project, all before being
> able to upgrade.
>

Thanks for bringing up the upgrade case! You've kinda described an upgrade
for option 1. This is what I was thinking for option 2:

- deployment upgrades to a release that supports global role assignments
- operator creates a set of global roles (i.e. global_admin)
- operator grants global roles to various people that need it (i.e. all
admins)
- operator informs admins to create globally scoped tokens
- operator rolls out necessary policy changes

If I'm thinking about this properly, nothing would change at the
project-scope level for existing users (who don't need a global role
assignment). I'm hoping someone can help firm ^ that up or improve it if
needed.


>
> Thanks,
> johnthetubaguy
>
> On Fri, 26 May 2017 at 08:09, Belmiro Moreira <
> moreira.belmiro.email.lists at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>> thanks for bringing this into discussion in the Operators list.
>>
>> Option 1 and 2 and not complementary but complety different.
>> So, considering "Option 2" and the goal to target it for Queens I would
>> prefer not going into a migration path in
>> Pike and then again in Queens.
>>
>> Belmiro
>>
>> On Fri, May 26, 2017 at 2:52 AM, joehuang <joehuang at huawei.com> wrote:
>>
>>> I think a option 2 is better.
>>>
>>> Best Regards
>>> Chaoyi Huang (joehuang)
>>> ------------------------------
>>> *From:* Lance Bragstad [lbragstad at gmail.com]
>>> *Sent:* 25 May 2017 3:47
>>> *To:* OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions);
>>> openstack-operators at lists.openstack.org
>>> *Subject:* Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][nova][cinder][
>>> glance][neutron][horizon][policy] defining admin-ness
>>>
>>> I'd like to fill in a little more context here. I see three options with
>>> the current two proposals.
>>>
>>> *Option 1*
>>>
>>> Use a special admin project to denote elevated privileges. For those
>>> unfamiliar with the approach, it would rely on every deployment having an
>>> "admin" project defined in configuration [0].
>>>
>>> *How it works:*
>>>
>>> Role assignments on this project represent global scope which is denoted
>>> by a boolean attribute in the token response. A user with an 'admin' role
>>> assignment on this project is equivalent to the global or cloud
>>> administrator. Ideally, if a user has a 'reader' role assignment on the
>>> admin project, they could have access to list everything within the
>>> deployment, pending all the proper changes are made across the various
>>> services. The workflow requires a special project for any sort of elevated
>>> privilege.
>>>
>>> Pros:
>>> - Almost all the work is done to make keystone understand the admin
>>> project, there are already several patches in review to other projects to
>>> consume this
>>> - Operators can create roles and assign them to the admin_project as
>>> needed after the upgrade to give proper global scope to their users
>>>
>>> Cons:
>>> - All global assignments are linked back to a single project
>>> - Describing the flow is confusing because in order to give someone
>>> global access you have to give them a role assignment on a very specific
>>> project, which seems like an anti-pattern
>>> - We currently don't allow some things to exist in the global sense
>>> (i.e. I can't launch instances without tenancy), the admin project could
>>> own resources
>>> - What happens if the admin project disappears?
>>> - Tooling or scripts will be written around the admin project, instead
>>> of treating all projects equally
>>>
>>> *Option 2*
>>>
>>> Implement global role assignments in keystone.
>>>
>>> *How it works:*
>>>
>>> Role assignments in keystone can be scoped to global context. Users can
>>> then ask for a globally scoped token
>>>
>>> Pros:
>>> - This approach represents a more accurate long term vision for role
>>> assignments (at least how we understand it today)
>>> - Operators can create global roles and assign them as needed after the
>>> upgrade to give proper global scope to their users
>>> - It's easier to explain global scope using global role assignments
>>> instead of a special project
>>> - token.is_global = True and token.role = 'reader' is easier to
>>> understand than token.is_admin_project = True and token.role = 'reader'
>>> - A global token can't be associated to a project, making it harder for
>>> operations that require a project to consume a global token (i.e. I
>>> shouldn't be able to launch an instance with a globally scoped token)
>>>
>>> Cons:
>>> - We need to start from scratch implementing global scope in keystone,
>>> steps for this are detailed in the spec
>>>
>>> *Option 3*
>>>
>>> We do option one and then follow it up with option two.
>>>
>>> *How it works:*
>>>
>>> We implement option one and continue solving the admin-ness issues in
>>> Pike by helping projects consume and enforce it. We then target the
>>> implementation of global roles for Queens.
>>>
>>> Pros:
>>> - If we make the interface in oslo.context for global roles consistent,
>>> then consuming projects shouldn't know the difference between using the
>>> admin_project or a global role assignment
>>>
>>> Cons:
>>> - It's more work and we're already strapped for resources
>>> - We've told operators that the admin_project is a thing but after
>>> Queens they will be able to do real global role assignments, so they should
>>> now migrate *again*
>>> - We have to support two paths for solving the same problem in keystone,
>>> more maintenance and more testing to ensure they both behave exactly the
>>> same way
>>>   - This can get more complicated for projects dedicated to testing
>>> policy and RBAC, like Patrole
>>>
>>>
>>> Looking for feedback here as to which one is preferred given timing and
>>> payoff, specifically from operators who would be doing the migrations to
>>> implement and maintain proper scope in their deployments.
>>>
>>> Thanks for reading!
>>>
>>>
>>> [0] https://github.com/openstack/keystone/blob/
>>> 3d033df1c0fdc6cc9d2b02a702efca286371f2bd/etc/keystone.conf.
>>> sample#L2334-L2342
>>>
>>> On Wed, May 24, 2017 at 10:35 AM, Lance Bragstad <lbragstad at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hey all,
>>>>
>>>> To date we have two proposed solutions for tackling the admin-ness
>>>> issue we have across the services. One builds on the existing scope
>>>> concepts by scoping to an admin project [0]. The other introduces global
>>>> role assignments [1] as a way to denote elevated privileges.
>>>>
>>>> I'd like to get some feedback from operators, as well as developers
>>>> from other projects, on each approach. Since work is required in keystone,
>>>> it would be good to get consensus before spec freeze (June 9th). If you
>>>> have specific questions on either approach, feel free to ping me or drop by
>>>> the weekly policy meeting [2].
>>>>
>>>> Thanks!
>>>>
>>>> [0] http://adam.younglogic.com/2017/05/fixing-bug-96869/
>>>> [1] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/464763/
>>>> [2] http://eavesdrop.openstack.org/#Keystone_Policy_Meeting
>>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
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