Open Stack

We'll be getting together on Monday around 1700 UTC to work through this
together in a debug session in #openstack-infra (I'm too sick this weekend,
plus we need a time when more infra-root folks with the institutional
knowledge are around).
On Feb 27, 2016 05:37, "Marton Kiss" <marton.kiss at gmail.com> wrote:

> Yeah, the Settings.php was overriden by the latest puppet run. We need to
> wait for some infra guys to approve my patches and make it permanent:
> https://review.openstack.org/285669 Disable standard password based auth
> https://review.openstack.org/285672 Disable mobile frontend
>
> M.
>
> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 2:27 PM JP Maxwell <jp at tipit.net> wrote:
>
>> FYI. Still seeing the mobile view...
>>
>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>> On Feb 27, 2016 6:53 AM, "Marton Kiss" <marton.kiss at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Yes, applied them manually. Let's wait a few hours, and check for new
>>> spam content / user accounts.
>>>
>>> M.
>>> JP Maxwell <jp at tipit.net> (időpont: 2016. febr. 27., Szo, 13:50) ezt
>>> írta:
>>>
>>>> Cool. Are these applied? Any indication it has stopped the spam? Should
>>>> we clear out these non launchpad accounts from the DB?
>>>>
>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>>>> On Feb 27, 2016 6:47 AM, "Marton Kiss" <marton.kiss at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> And the mobile frontend will be disabled permanently with this patch:
>>>>> https://review.openstack.org/285672 Disable mobile frontend
>>>>>
>>>>> M.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 1:39 PM Marton Kiss <marton.kiss at gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> I made some investigation, and it seems to be that the spam pages are
>>>>>> created by accounts registered with password accounts, and the launchpad
>>>>>> openid auth is not affected at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So the spam script is creating accounts like this:
>>>>>> mysql> select * from user where user_name = 'CedricJamieson'\G;
>>>>>> *************************** 1. row ***************************
>>>>>>                  user_id: 7494
>>>>>>                user_name: CedricJamieson
>>>>>>           user_real_name: Cedric Jamieson
>>>>>>            user_password:
>>>>>> :pbkdf2:sha256:10000:128:Mlo9tdaP+38niZrrEka7Ow==:jEVnrTclkwIpE1RzJywDlrSvkY5G3idYwOwYRkv5O0J/MSHjY+gdhtKmArQ53v6/w7o8E1wXb2QOR6HdL5TPfOI1bswS/fYXVVYjPjkEEdxqZ8q9L5p2f3N6rEYpMfT5tk+wDiy+j5aimrHrGSga44hndAHgX9/SnqUyxlutDVY=
>>>>>>         user_newpassword:
>>>>>>        user_newpass_time: NULL
>>>>>>               user_email: balashkina.evdokiya at mail.ru
>>>>>>             user_touched: 20160227052454
>>>>>>               user_token: 7c39e44e849fb0e2bfae8790d6cc1379
>>>>>> user_email_authenticated: NULL
>>>>>>         user_email_token: be963ac3bd43e70ff2f323063c61e320
>>>>>> user_email_token_expires: 20160305052441
>>>>>>        user_registration: 20160227052441
>>>>>>           user_editcount: 2
>>>>>>    user_password_expires: NULL
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The user_password field is always filled with a value, meanwhile this
>>>>>> field of non-infected user accounts with openid logins is empty.
>>>>>> We have 423 total accounts with passwords:
>>>>>> mysql> select count(*) from user where user_password != '';
>>>>>> +----------+
>>>>>> | count(*) |
>>>>>> +----------+
>>>>>> |      423 |
>>>>>> +----------+
>>>>>> 1 row in set (0.00 sec)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Mediawiki logs-in the newly created users without any preliminary
>>>>>> email confirmation, right after the registration. I disabled the standard
>>>>>> user login page, as described here:
>>>>>> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Manual:Special_pages#Disabling_Special:UserLogin_and_Special:UserLogout_pages
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And I made this patch to make it permanent:
>>>>>> https://review.openstack.org/285669 Disable standard password based
>>>>>> auth
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Just for the record, the last spam user account:
>>>>>> 7536 | EarthaChester22
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Marton
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 8:31 AM Marton Kiss <marton.kiss at gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I created the following patch, infra cores must approve that:
>>>>>>> https://review.openstack.org/285641 Add ssh key of JP Maxwell to
>>>>>>> wiki.o.o
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Marton
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 6:41 AM JP Maxwell <jp at tipit.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Marton has SSH access and applied a patch earlier today.  It
>>>>>>>> appears the spam continues to flow:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/40_Thoughts_Of_Using_Open_Shelves_On_A_Kitchen
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Marton let me know if you can look at it some more or Infra if you
>>>>>>>> want to give me SSH I'll do so as well in the morning (public key
>>>>>>>> attached).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ssh-rsa
>>>>>>>> AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEA2b5I7Yff9FCrtRmSjpILUePi54Vbc8zqJTbzrIAQZGFLBi3xd2MLlhV5QVgpDBC9H3lGjbdnc81D3aFd3HwHT4dvvvyedT12PR3VDEpftdW84vw3jzdtALcayOQznjbGnScwvX5SgnRhNxuX9Rkh8qNvOsjYPUafRr9azkQoomJFkdNVI4Vb5DbLhTpt18FPeOf0UuqDt/J2tHI4SjZ3kjzr7Nbwpg8xGgANPNE0+2pJbwCA8YDt4g3bzfzvVafQs5o9Gfc9tudkR9ugQG1M+EWCgu42CleOwMTd/rYEB2fgNNPsZAWqwQfdPajVuk70EBKUEQSyoA09eEZX+xJN9Q==
>>>>>>>> jpmaxman at tipit.net
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 12:09 PM, Jimmy McArthur <
>>>>>>>> jimmy at openstack.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Super thankful for all the folks that have jumped in over the last
>>>>>>>>> couple of days to help with the puppetization, etc... I just feel like
>>>>>>>>> we're taking a very wrong approach here.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Paul Belanger wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Right, and I don't have an issue with that approach.  Based on the work we did
>>>>>>>>> yesterday, anybody can do that via our workflow. Please submit a patch to
>>>>>>>>> puppet-mediawiki[1] and ping an infra-root in #openstack-infra IRC.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> What I'm proposing is the workflow is really meant for software,
>>>>>>>>> not for web applications. It's tedious and time consuming when what's
>>>>>>>>> needed here is a set of tests on the server. Submitting a patch, waiting
>>>>>>>>> for a +1, then getting on IRC to find someone with access (and time) to
>>>>>>>>> paste the logs is a pretty time consuming process for what should be a
>>>>>>>>> series of rapid-fire changes/fixes on the server. Especially when we're
>>>>>>>>> dealign with an active attack.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We can then have somebody look at the logs.  I think it is more about scheduling
>>>>>>>>> the task since more infra-root as travling back from the mid-cycle last night
>>>>>>>>> and today.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Right, this is my point. This has been going on for 3 weeks (or
>>>>>>>>> more). Tom Fifeldt was asking for help without response. And here we are
>>>>>>>>> through another week and no closer to stemming the flow.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I'm fully aware what I'm proposing goes against what Infra and the
>>>>>>>>> OpenStack workflow is all about, but I'd ask you all to look at this from a
>>>>>>>>> web development perspective instead of a software development perspective.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Jimmy
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Last email from me, just on a plane.  Will follow up when I land.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> [1] https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack-infra/puppet-mediawiki
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>  J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com
>>>>>>>>> [http://www.fibercove.com]
>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:25 AM, Paul Belanger <pabelanger at redhat.com> <pabelanger at redhat.com>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:08:18AM -0600, Jimmy McArthur wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Given the state of the wiki a the moment, I think taking the quickest path
>>>>>>>>> to get it fixed would be prudent. Is there a way we can get JP root access
>>>>>>>>> to this server, even temporarily? We get 25% of our website traffic (2
>>>>>>>>> million visitors) to the wiki. I realize we're all after the same thing,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> spammers are not going to hit the dev environment, so there's really no
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> way
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> to tell if teh problem is fixed without actually working directly on the
>>>>>>>>> production machine. This should be a 30 minute fix.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I am still unclear what the 30min fix is. If really 30mins, then it
>>>>>>>>> shouldn't be
>>>>>>>>> hard to get the fix into our workflow. Could somebody please elaborate.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If we are talking about deploying new versions of php or mediawiki manually,
>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>> not be in-favor of this. To me, while the attack sucks, we should be working
>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>> 2 fronts. Getting the help needed to mitigate the attack, then adding the
>>>>>>>>> changes into -infra workflow in parallel.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I realize there is a lot of risk in giving ssh access to infra machines,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I think it's worth taking a look at either putting this machine in a place
>>>>>>>>> where a different level of admin could access it without giving away the
>>>>>>>>> keys to the entire OpenStack infrastructure or figuring out a way to set
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> up
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> credentials with varying levels of access.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As a note, all the work I've been doing to help with the attack hasn't
>>>>>>>>> require
>>>>>>>>> SSH access for me to wiki.o.o. I did need infra-root help to expose our
>>>>>>>>> configuration safely. I'd rather take some time to see what the fixes are,
>>>>>>>>> having infra-root apply changes, then move them into puppet.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It also has been discussed to simply disable write access to the wiki if we
>>>>>>>>> really want spamming to stop, obviously that will affect normal usage.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Jimmy
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Paul Belanger wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 10:12:12AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But if you wanted to upgrade everything, remove the mobile view
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> extension,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> test in a dev/staging environment then deploy to production fingers
>>>>>>>>> crossed, I think that would be a valid approach as well.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Current review up[1]. I'll launch a node tonight / tomorrow locally to
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> see
>>>>>>>>> how
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> puppet reacts. I suspect there will be some issues.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If infra-roots are fine with this approach, we can use that box to test
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> against.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> [1] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/285405/
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>>>>>>>>> On Feb 26, 2016 10:08 AM, "JP Maxwell"<jp at tipit.net> <jp at tipit.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Plus one except in this case it is much easier to know if our efforts
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> working on production because the spam either stops or not.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>>>>>>>>> On Feb 26, 2016 9:48 AM, "Paul Belanger"<pabelanger at redhat.com> <pabelanger at redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 09:18:00AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I really think you might consider the option that there is a
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> vulnerability
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> in one of the extensions. If that is the case black listing IPs will
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ongoing wild goose chase.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I think this would be easily proven or disproven by making the questy
>>>>>>>>> question impossible and see if the spam continues.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We'll have to let an infra-root make that call. Since nobody would be
>>>>>>>>> able to
>>>>>>>>> use the wiki. Honestly, I'd rather spend the time standing up a mirror
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> dev
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> instance for us to work on, rather then production.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>>>>>>>>> On Feb 26, 2016 9:12 AM, "Paul Belanger"<pabelanger at redhat.com> <pabelanger at redhat.com>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 08:10:34PM -0800, Elizabeth K. Joseph wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 6:35 AM, Jeremy Stanley<fungi at yuggoth.org> <fungi at yuggoth.org>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 2016-02-25 02:46:13 -0600 (-0600), JP Maxwell wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Please be aware that you can now create accounts under the mobile
>>>>>>>>> view in the wiki native user table. I just created an account for
>>>>>>>>> JpMaxMan. Not sure if this matters but wanted to make sure you
>>>>>>>>> were aware.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Oh, yes I think having a random garbage question/answer was in
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> fact
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> previously preventing account creation under the mobile view. We
>>>>>>>>> probably need a way to disable mobile view account creation as it
>>>>>>>>> bypasses OpenID authentication entirely.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So that's what it was doing! We'll have to tackle the mobile view
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> issue.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Otherwise, quick update here:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The captcha didn't appear to help stem the spam tide. We'll want to
>>>>>>>>> explore and start implementing some of the other solutions.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I did some database poking around today and it does seem like all
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> users do have launchpad accounts and email addresses.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So, I have a few hours before jumping on my plane and checked into
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> this.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We are
>>>>>>>>> using QuestyCaptcha which according to docs, should almost be
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> impossible
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>> spammers to by pass in an automated fashion. So, either our captcha
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> is too
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> easy, or we didn't set it up properly. I don't have SSH on wiki.o.o
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> so
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> others
>>>>>>>>> will have to check logs. I did test new pages and edits, and was
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> promoted
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> by
>>>>>>>>> captcha.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As a next step, we might need to add additional apache2
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> configuration
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> blacklist IPs. I am reading up on that now.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>> Elizabeth Krumbach Joseph || Lyz || pleia2
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> OpenStack-Infra mailing listOpenStack-Infra at lists.openstack.org
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> OpenStack-Infra mailing listOpenStack-Infra at lists.openstack.org
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> OpenStack-Infra mailing listOpenStack-Infra at lists.openstack.orghttp://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> OpenStack-Infra mailing listOpenStack-Infra at lists.openstack.orghttp://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> OpenStack-Infra mailing listOpenStack-Infra at lists.openstack.orghttp://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> OpenStack-Infra mailing list
>>>>>>>> OpenStack-Infra at lists.openstack.org
>>>>>>>> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-infra
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
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