Open Stack

FYI. Still seeing the mobile view...

J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
On Feb 27, 2016 6:53 AM, "Marton Kiss" <marton.kiss at gmail.com> wrote:

> Yes, applied them manually. Let's wait a few hours, and check for new spam
> content / user accounts.
>
> M.
> JP Maxwell <jp at tipit.net> (időpont: 2016. febr. 27., Szo, 13:50) ezt írta:
>
>> Cool. Are these applied? Any indication it has stopped the spam? Should
>> we clear out these non launchpad accounts from the DB?
>>
>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>> On Feb 27, 2016 6:47 AM, "Marton Kiss" <marton.kiss at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> And the mobile frontend will be disabled permanently with this patch:
>>> https://review.openstack.org/285672 Disable mobile frontend
>>>
>>> M.
>>>
>>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 1:39 PM Marton Kiss <marton.kiss at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I made some investigation, and it seems to be that the spam pages are
>>>> created by accounts registered with password accounts, and the launchpad
>>>> openid auth is not affected at all.
>>>>
>>>> So the spam script is creating accounts like this:
>>>> mysql> select * from user where user_name = 'CedricJamieson'\G;
>>>> *************************** 1. row ***************************
>>>>                  user_id: 7494
>>>>                user_name: CedricJamieson
>>>>           user_real_name: Cedric Jamieson
>>>>            user_password:
>>>> :pbkdf2:sha256:10000:128:Mlo9tdaP+38niZrrEka7Ow==:jEVnrTclkwIpE1RzJywDlrSvkY5G3idYwOwYRkv5O0J/MSHjY+gdhtKmArQ53v6/w7o8E1wXb2QOR6HdL5TPfOI1bswS/fYXVVYjPjkEEdxqZ8q9L5p2f3N6rEYpMfT5tk+wDiy+j5aimrHrGSga44hndAHgX9/SnqUyxlutDVY=
>>>>         user_newpassword:
>>>>        user_newpass_time: NULL
>>>>               user_email: balashkina.evdokiya at mail.ru
>>>>             user_touched: 20160227052454
>>>>               user_token: 7c39e44e849fb0e2bfae8790d6cc1379
>>>> user_email_authenticated: NULL
>>>>         user_email_token: be963ac3bd43e70ff2f323063c61e320
>>>> user_email_token_expires: 20160305052441
>>>>        user_registration: 20160227052441
>>>>           user_editcount: 2
>>>>    user_password_expires: NULL
>>>>
>>>> The user_password field is always filled with a value, meanwhile this
>>>> field of non-infected user accounts with openid logins is empty.
>>>> We have 423 total accounts with passwords:
>>>> mysql> select count(*) from user where user_password != '';
>>>> +----------+
>>>> | count(*) |
>>>> +----------+
>>>> |      423 |
>>>> +----------+
>>>> 1 row in set (0.00 sec)
>>>>
>>>> Mediawiki logs-in the newly created users without any preliminary email
>>>> confirmation, right after the registration. I disabled the standard user
>>>> login page, as described here:
>>>> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Manual:Special_pages#Disabling_Special:UserLogin_and_Special:UserLogout_pages
>>>>
>>>> And I made this patch to make it permanent:
>>>> https://review.openstack.org/285669 Disable standard password based
>>>> auth
>>>>
>>>> Just for the record, the last spam user account:
>>>> 7536 | EarthaChester22
>>>>
>>>> Marton
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 8:31 AM Marton Kiss <marton.kiss at gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>
>>>>> I created the following patch, infra cores must approve that:
>>>>> https://review.openstack.org/285641 Add ssh key of JP Maxwell to
>>>>> wiki.o.o
>>>>>
>>>>> Marton
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 6:41 AM JP Maxwell <jp at tipit.net> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Marton has SSH access and applied a patch earlier today.  It appears
>>>>>> the spam continues to flow:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/40_Thoughts_Of_Using_Open_Shelves_On_A_Kitchen
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Marton let me know if you can look at it some more or Infra if you
>>>>>> want to give me SSH I'll do so as well in the morning (public key
>>>>>> attached).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ssh-rsa
>>>>>> AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEA2b5I7Yff9FCrtRmSjpILUePi54Vbc8zqJTbzrIAQZGFLBi3xd2MLlhV5QVgpDBC9H3lGjbdnc81D3aFd3HwHT4dvvvyedT12PR3VDEpftdW84vw3jzdtALcayOQznjbGnScwvX5SgnRhNxuX9Rkh8qNvOsjYPUafRr9azkQoomJFkdNVI4Vb5DbLhTpt18FPeOf0UuqDt/J2tHI4SjZ3kjzr7Nbwpg8xGgANPNE0+2pJbwCA8YDt4g3bzfzvVafQs5o9Gfc9tudkR9ugQG1M+EWCgu42CleOwMTd/rYEB2fgNNPsZAWqwQfdPajVuk70EBKUEQSyoA09eEZX+xJN9Q==
>>>>>> jpmaxman at tipit.net
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 12:09 PM, Jimmy McArthur <jimmy at openstack.org
>>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Super thankful for all the folks that have jumped in over the last
>>>>>>> couple of days to help with the puppetization, etc... I just feel like
>>>>>>> we're taking a very wrong approach here.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Paul Belanger wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Right, and I don't have an issue with that approach.  Based on the work we did
>>>>>>> yesterday, anybody can do that via our workflow. Please submit a patch to
>>>>>>> puppet-mediawiki[1] and ping an infra-root in #openstack-infra IRC.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What I'm proposing is the workflow is really meant for software, not
>>>>>>> for web applications. It's tedious and time consuming when what's needed
>>>>>>> here is a set of tests on the server. Submitting a patch, waiting for a +1,
>>>>>>> then getting on IRC to find someone with access (and time) to paste the
>>>>>>> logs is a pretty time consuming process for what should be a series of
>>>>>>> rapid-fire changes/fixes on the server. Especially when we're dealign with
>>>>>>> an active attack.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We can then have somebody look at the logs.  I think it is more about scheduling
>>>>>>> the task since more infra-root as travling back from the mid-cycle last night
>>>>>>> and today.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Right, this is my point. This has been going on for 3 weeks (or
>>>>>>> more). Tom Fifeldt was asking for help without response. And here we are
>>>>>>> through another week and no closer to stemming the flow.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'm fully aware what I'm proposing goes against what Infra and the
>>>>>>> OpenStack workflow is all about, but I'd ask you all to look at this from a
>>>>>>> web development perspective instead of a software development perspective.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Jimmy
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Last email from me, just on a plane.  Will follow up when I land.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [1] https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack-infra/puppet-mediawiki
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com
>>>>>>> [http://www.fibercove.com]
>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:25 AM, Paul Belanger <pabelanger at redhat.com> <pabelanger at redhat.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:08:18AM -0600, Jimmy McArthur wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Given the state of the wiki a the moment, I think taking the quickest path
>>>>>>> to get it fixed would be prudent. Is there a way we can get JP root access
>>>>>>> to this server, even temporarily? We get 25% of our website traffic (2
>>>>>>> million visitors) to the wiki. I realize we're all after the same thing,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> spammers are not going to hit the dev environment, so there's really no
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> way
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> to tell if teh problem is fixed without actually working directly on the
>>>>>>> production machine. This should be a 30 minute fix.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I am still unclear what the 30min fix is. If really 30mins, then it
>>>>>>> shouldn't be
>>>>>>> hard to get the fix into our workflow. Could somebody please elaborate.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If we are talking about deploying new versions of php or mediawiki manually,
>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>> not be in-favor of this. To me, while the attack sucks, we should be working
>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>> 2 fronts. Getting the help needed to mitigate the attack, then adding the
>>>>>>> changes into -infra workflow in parallel.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I realize there is a lot of risk in giving ssh access to infra machines,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think it's worth taking a look at either putting this machine in a place
>>>>>>> where a different level of admin could access it without giving away the
>>>>>>> keys to the entire OpenStack infrastructure or figuring out a way to set
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> up
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> credentials with varying levels of access.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As a note, all the work I've been doing to help with the attack hasn't
>>>>>>> require
>>>>>>> SSH access for me to wiki.o.o. I did need infra-root help to expose our
>>>>>>> configuration safely. I'd rather take some time to see what the fixes are,
>>>>>>> having infra-root apply changes, then move them into puppet.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It also has been discussed to simply disable write access to the wiki if we
>>>>>>> really want spamming to stop, obviously that will affect normal usage.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Jimmy
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Paul Belanger wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 10:12:12AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But if you wanted to upgrade everything, remove the mobile view
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> extension,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> test in a dev/staging environment then deploy to production fingers
>>>>>>> crossed, I think that would be a valid approach as well.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Current review up[1]. I'll launch a node tonight / tomorrow locally to
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> see
>>>>>>> how
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> puppet reacts. I suspect there will be some issues.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If infra-roots are fine with this approach, we can use that box to test
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> against.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [1] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/285405/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>>>>>>> On Feb 26, 2016 10:08 AM, "JP Maxwell"<jp at tipit.net> <jp at tipit.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Plus one except in this case it is much easier to know if our efforts
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> working on production because the spam either stops or not.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>>>>>>> On Feb 26, 2016 9:48 AM, "Paul Belanger"<pabelanger at redhat.com> <pabelanger at redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 09:18:00AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I really think you might consider the option that there is a
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> vulnerability
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> in one of the extensions. If that is the case black listing IPs will
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ongoing wild goose chase.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think this would be easily proven or disproven by making the questy
>>>>>>> question impossible and see if the spam continues.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We'll have to let an infra-root make that call. Since nobody would be
>>>>>>> able to
>>>>>>> use the wiki. Honestly, I'd rather spend the time standing up a mirror
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> dev
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> instance for us to work on, rather then production.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>>>>>>> On Feb 26, 2016 9:12 AM, "Paul Belanger"<pabelanger at redhat.com> <pabelanger at redhat.com>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 08:10:34PM -0800, Elizabeth K. Joseph wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 6:35 AM, Jeremy Stanley<fungi at yuggoth.org> <fungi at yuggoth.org>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 2016-02-25 02:46:13 -0600 (-0600), JP Maxwell wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Please be aware that you can now create accounts under the mobile
>>>>>>> view in the wiki native user table. I just created an account for
>>>>>>> JpMaxMan. Not sure if this matters but wanted to make sure you
>>>>>>> were aware.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Oh, yes I think having a random garbage question/answer was in
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> fact
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> previously preventing account creation under the mobile view. We
>>>>>>> probably need a way to disable mobile view account creation as it
>>>>>>> bypasses OpenID authentication entirely.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So that's what it was doing! We'll have to tackle the mobile view
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> issue.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Otherwise, quick update here:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The captcha didn't appear to help stem the spam tide. We'll want to
>>>>>>> explore and start implementing some of the other solutions.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I did some database poking around today and it does seem like all
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> users do have launchpad accounts and email addresses.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, I have a few hours before jumping on my plane and checked into
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> this.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We are
>>>>>>> using QuestyCaptcha which according to docs, should almost be
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> impossible
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>> spammers to by pass in an automated fashion. So, either our captcha
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> is too
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> easy, or we didn't set it up properly. I don't have SSH on wiki.o.o
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> so
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> others
>>>>>>> will have to check logs. I did test new pages and edits, and was
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> promoted
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> by
>>>>>>> captcha.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As a next step, we might need to add additional apache2
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> configuration
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> blacklist IPs. I am reading up on that now.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> Elizabeth Krumbach Joseph || Lyz || pleia2
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> OpenStack-Infra mailing listOpenStack-Infra at lists.openstack.org
>>>>>>>
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>>>>>>>
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