Open Stack

And the mobile frontend will be disabled permanently with this patch:
https://review.openstack.org/285672 Disable mobile frontend

M.

On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 1:39 PM Marton Kiss <marton.kiss at gmail.com> wrote:

> I made some investigation, and it seems to be that the spam pages are
> created by accounts registered with password accounts, and the launchpad
> openid auth is not affected at all.
>
> So the spam script is creating accounts like this:
> mysql> select * from user where user_name = 'CedricJamieson'\G;
> *************************** 1. row ***************************
>                  user_id: 7494
>                user_name: CedricJamieson
>           user_real_name: Cedric Jamieson
>            user_password:
> :pbkdf2:sha256:10000:128:Mlo9tdaP+38niZrrEka7Ow==:jEVnrTclkwIpE1RzJywDlrSvkY5G3idYwOwYRkv5O0J/MSHjY+gdhtKmArQ53v6/w7o8E1wXb2QOR6HdL5TPfOI1bswS/fYXVVYjPjkEEdxqZ8q9L5p2f3N6rEYpMfT5tk+wDiy+j5aimrHrGSga44hndAHgX9/SnqUyxlutDVY=
>         user_newpassword:
>        user_newpass_time: NULL
>               user_email: balashkina.evdokiya at mail.ru
>             user_touched: 20160227052454
>               user_token: 7c39e44e849fb0e2bfae8790d6cc1379
> user_email_authenticated: NULL
>         user_email_token: be963ac3bd43e70ff2f323063c61e320
> user_email_token_expires: 20160305052441
>        user_registration: 20160227052441
>           user_editcount: 2
>    user_password_expires: NULL
>
> The user_password field is always filled with a value, meanwhile this
> field of non-infected user accounts with openid logins is empty.
> We have 423 total accounts with passwords:
> mysql> select count(*) from user where user_password != '';
> +----------+
> | count(*) |
> +----------+
> |      423 |
> +----------+
> 1 row in set (0.00 sec)
>
> Mediawiki logs-in the newly created users without any preliminary email
> confirmation, right after the registration. I disabled the standard user
> login page, as described here:
> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Manual:Special_pages#Disabling_Special:UserLogin_and_Special:UserLogout_pages
>
> And I made this patch to make it permanent:
> https://review.openstack.org/285669 Disable standard password based auth
>
> Just for the record, the last spam user account:
> 7536 | EarthaChester22
>
> Marton
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 8:31 AM Marton Kiss <marton.kiss at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> I created the following patch, infra cores must approve that:
>> https://review.openstack.org/285641 Add ssh key of JP Maxwell to wiki.o.o
>>
>> Marton
>>
>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 6:41 AM JP Maxwell <jp at tipit.net> wrote:
>>
>>> Marton has SSH access and applied a patch earlier today.  It appears the
>>> spam continues to flow:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/40_Thoughts_Of_Using_Open_Shelves_On_A_Kitchen
>>>
>>> Marton let me know if you can look at it some more or Infra if you want
>>> to give me SSH I'll do so as well in the morning (public key attached).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ssh-rsa
>>> AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEA2b5I7Yff9FCrtRmSjpILUePi54Vbc8zqJTbzrIAQZGFLBi3xd2MLlhV5QVgpDBC9H3lGjbdnc81D3aFd3HwHT4dvvvyedT12PR3VDEpftdW84vw3jzdtALcayOQznjbGnScwvX5SgnRhNxuX9Rkh8qNvOsjYPUafRr9azkQoomJFkdNVI4Vb5DbLhTpt18FPeOf0UuqDt/J2tHI4SjZ3kjzr7Nbwpg8xGgANPNE0+2pJbwCA8YDt4g3bzfzvVafQs5o9Gfc9tudkR9ugQG1M+EWCgu42CleOwMTd/rYEB2fgNNPsZAWqwQfdPajVuk70EBKUEQSyoA09eEZX+xJN9Q==
>>> jpmaxman at tipit.net
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 12:09 PM, Jimmy McArthur <jimmy at openstack.org>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Super thankful for all the folks that have jumped in over the last
>>>> couple of days to help with the puppetization, etc... I just feel like
>>>> we're taking a very wrong approach here.
>>>>
>>>> Paul Belanger wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Right, and I don't have an issue with that approach.  Based on the work we did
>>>> yesterday, anybody can do that via our workflow. Please submit a patch to
>>>> puppet-mediawiki[1] and ping an infra-root in #openstack-infra IRC.
>>>>
>>>> What I'm proposing is the workflow is really meant for software, not
>>>> for web applications. It's tedious and time consuming when what's needed
>>>> here is a set of tests on the server. Submitting a patch, waiting for a +1,
>>>> then getting on IRC to find someone with access (and time) to paste the
>>>> logs is a pretty time consuming process for what should be a series of
>>>> rapid-fire changes/fixes on the server. Especially when we're dealign with
>>>> an active attack.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> We can then have somebody look at the logs.  I think it is more about scheduling
>>>> the task since more infra-root as travling back from the mid-cycle last night
>>>> and today.
>>>>
>>>> Right, this is my point. This has been going on for 3 weeks (or more).
>>>> Tom Fifeldt was asking for help without response. And here we are through
>>>> another week and no closer to stemming the flow.
>>>>
>>>> I'm fully aware what I'm proposing goes against what Infra and the
>>>> OpenStack workflow is all about, but I'd ask you all to look at this from a
>>>> web development perspective instead of a software development perspective.
>>>>
>>>> Jimmy
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Last email from me, just on a plane.  Will follow up when I land.
>>>>
>>>> [1] https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack-infra/puppet-mediawiki
>>>>
>>>>  J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com
>>>> [http://www.fibercove.com]
>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:25 AM, Paul Belanger <pabelanger at redhat.com> <pabelanger at redhat.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:08:18AM -0600, Jimmy McArthur wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Given the state of the wiki a the moment, I think taking the quickest path
>>>> to get it fixed would be prudent. Is there a way we can get JP root access
>>>> to this server, even temporarily? We get 25% of our website traffic (2
>>>> million visitors) to the wiki. I realize we're all after the same thing,
>>>>
>>>> but
>>>>
>>>> spammers are not going to hit the dev environment, so there's really no
>>>>
>>>> way
>>>>
>>>> to tell if teh problem is fixed without actually working directly on the
>>>> production machine. This should be a 30 minute fix.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am still unclear what the 30min fix is. If really 30mins, then it
>>>> shouldn't be
>>>> hard to get the fix into our workflow. Could somebody please elaborate.
>>>>
>>>> If we are talking about deploying new versions of php or mediawiki manually,
>>>> I
>>>> not be in-favor of this. To me, while the attack sucks, we should be working
>>>> on
>>>> 2 fronts. Getting the help needed to mitigate the attack, then adding the
>>>> changes into -infra workflow in parallel.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I realize there is a lot of risk in giving ssh access to infra machines,
>>>>
>>>> but
>>>>
>>>> I think it's worth taking a look at either putting this machine in a place
>>>> where a different level of admin could access it without giving away the
>>>> keys to the entire OpenStack infrastructure or figuring out a way to set
>>>>
>>>> up
>>>>
>>>> credentials with varying levels of access.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> As a note, all the work I've been doing to help with the attack hasn't
>>>> require
>>>> SSH access for me to wiki.o.o. I did need infra-root help to expose our
>>>> configuration safely. I'd rather take some time to see what the fixes are,
>>>> having infra-root apply changes, then move them into puppet.
>>>>
>>>> It also has been discussed to simply disable write access to the wiki if we
>>>> really want spamming to stop, obviously that will affect normal usage.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Jimmy
>>>>
>>>> Paul Belanger wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 10:12:12AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote:
>>>>
>>>> But if you wanted to upgrade everything, remove the mobile view
>>>>
>>>> extension,
>>>>
>>>> test in a dev/staging environment then deploy to production fingers
>>>> crossed, I think that would be a valid approach as well.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Current review up[1]. I'll launch a node tonight / tomorrow locally to
>>>>
>>>> see
>>>> how
>>>>
>>>> puppet reacts. I suspect there will be some issues.
>>>>
>>>> If infra-roots are fine with this approach, we can use that box to test
>>>>
>>>> against.
>>>>
>>>> [1] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/285405/
>>>>
>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>>>> On Feb 26, 2016 10:08 AM, "JP Maxwell"<jp at tipit.net> <jp at tipit.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Plus one except in this case it is much easier to know if our efforts
>>>>
>>>> are
>>>>
>>>> working on production because the spam either stops or not.
>>>>
>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>>>> On Feb 26, 2016 9:48 AM, "Paul Belanger"<pabelanger at redhat.com> <pabelanger at redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 09:18:00AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I really think you might consider the option that there is a
>>>>
>>>> vulnerability
>>>>
>>>> in one of the extensions. If that is the case black listing IPs will
>>>>
>>>> be
>>>>
>>>> an
>>>>
>>>> ongoing wild goose chase.
>>>>
>>>> I think this would be easily proven or disproven by making the questy
>>>> question impossible and see if the spam continues.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> We'll have to let an infra-root make that call. Since nobody would be
>>>> able to
>>>> use the wiki. Honestly, I'd rather spend the time standing up a mirror
>>>>
>>>> dev
>>>>
>>>> instance for us to work on, rather then production.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>>>> On Feb 26, 2016 9:12 AM, "Paul Belanger"<pabelanger at redhat.com> <pabelanger at redhat.com>
>>>>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 08:10:34PM -0800, Elizabeth K. Joseph wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 6:35 AM, Jeremy Stanley<fungi at yuggoth.org> <fungi at yuggoth.org>
>>>>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 2016-02-25 02:46:13 -0600 (-0600), JP Maxwell wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Please be aware that you can now create accounts under the mobile
>>>> view in the wiki native user table. I just created an account for
>>>> JpMaxMan. Not sure if this matters but wanted to make sure you
>>>> were aware.
>>>>
>>>> Oh, yes I think having a random garbage question/answer was in
>>>>
>>>> fact
>>>>
>>>> previously preventing account creation under the mobile view. We
>>>> probably need a way to disable mobile view account creation as it
>>>> bypasses OpenID authentication entirely.
>>>>
>>>> So that's what it was doing! We'll have to tackle the mobile view
>>>>
>>>> issue.
>>>>
>>>> Otherwise, quick update here:
>>>>
>>>> The captcha didn't appear to help stem the spam tide. We'll want to
>>>> explore and start implementing some of the other solutions.
>>>>
>>>> I did some database poking around today and it does seem like all
>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>
>>>> users do have launchpad accounts and email addresses.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So, I have a few hours before jumping on my plane and checked into
>>>>
>>>> this.
>>>>
>>>> We are
>>>> using QuestyCaptcha which according to docs, should almost be
>>>>
>>>> impossible
>>>>
>>>> for
>>>> spammers to by pass in an automated fashion. So, either our captcha
>>>>
>>>> is too
>>>>
>>>> easy, or we didn't set it up properly. I don't have SSH on wiki.o.o
>>>>
>>>> so
>>>>
>>>> others
>>>> will have to check logs. I did test new pages and edits, and was
>>>>
>>>> promoted
>>>>
>>>> by
>>>> captcha.
>>>>
>>>> As a next step, we might need to add additional apache2
>>>>
>>>> configuration
>>>>
>>>> to
>>>>
>>>> blacklist IPs. I am reading up on that now.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Elizabeth Krumbach Joseph || Lyz || pleia2
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>
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