sha512_crypt is insufficient for password hashing ------------------------------------------------- ### Summary ### Use of sha512_crypt for password hashing in versions of Keystone prior to Pike, is insufficient and provides limited protection against brute-forcing of password hashes. ### Affected Services / Software ### OpenStack Identity Service (Keystone). OpenStack Releases Ocata, Newton. ### Discussion ### Keystone uses sha512_crypt for password hashing. This provides insufficient and limited protection, since sha512_crypt algorithm has a low computational cost factor, therefore making it easier to crack passwords offline in a short period of time. The correct mechanism is to use the more secure hashing algorithms with a higher computational cost factor such as bcrypt, scrypt, or pbkdf2_sha512 instead of sha512_crypt. ### Recommended Actions ### It is recommended that operators upgrade to the Pike release where all future passwords would be bcrypt hashed. Operators should also force password changes on all users [1], which will result in the users newly generated passwords being bcrypt hashed. ### Contacts / References ### Author: Luke Hinds <lhinds at redhat.com> [1]: https://docs.openstack.org/keystone/latest/admin/identity-security-compliance.html#force-users-to-change-password-upon-first-use [2] http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63b.pdf This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0081 Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1668503 Mailing List : [Security] tag on openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org OpenStack Security Project : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 488 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack-dev/attachments/20170917/537fbe80/attachment.sig>