[openstack-dev] [magnum] High Availability
Fox, Kevin M
Kevin.Fox at pnnl.gov
Fri Mar 18 19:59:50 UTC 2016
+1. We should be encouraging a common way of solving these issues across all the openstack projects and security is a really important thing. spreading it across lots of projects causes more bugs and security related bugs cause security incidents. No one wants those.
I'd also like to know why, if an old cloud is willing to deploy a new magnum, its unreasonable to deploy a new barbican at the same time.
If its a technical reason, lets fix the issue. If its something else, lets discuss it. If its just an operator not wanting to install 2 things instead of just one, I think its a totally understandable, but unreasonable request.
Thanks,
Kevin
________________________________________
From: Douglas Mendizábal [douglas.mendizabal at rackspace.com]
Sent: Friday, March 18, 2016 6:45 AM
To: openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [magnum] High Availability
Hongbin,
I think Adrian makes some excellent points regarding the adoption of
Barbican. As the PTL for Barbican, it's frustrating to me to constantly
hear from other projects that securing their sensitive data is a
requirement but then turn around and say that deploying Barbican is a
problem.
I guess I'm having a hard time understanding the operator persona that
is willing to deploy new services with security features but unwilling
to also deploy the service that is meant to secure sensitive data across
all of OpenStack.
I understand one barrier to entry for Barbican is the high cost of
Hardware Security Modules, which we recommend as the best option for the
Storage and Crypto backends for Barbican. But there are also other
options for securing Barbican using open source software like DogTag or
SoftHSM.
I also expect Barbican adoption to increase in the future, and I was
hoping that Magnum would help drive that adoption. There are also other
projects that are actively developing security features like Swift
Encryption, and DNSSEC support in Desginate. Eventually these features
will also require Barbican, so I agree with Adrian that we as a
community should be encouraging deployers to adopt the best security
practices.
Regarding the Keystone solution, I'd like to hear the Keystone team's
feadback on that. It definitely sounds to me like you're trying to put
a square peg in a round hole.
- Doug
On 3/17/16 8:45 PM, Hongbin Lu wrote:
> Thanks Adrian,
>
>
>
> I think the Keystone approach will work. For others, please speak up if
> it doesn’t work for you.
>
>
>
> Best regards,
>
> Hongbin
>
>
>
> *From:*Adrian Otto [mailto:adrian.otto at rackspace.com]
> *Sent:* March-17-16 9:28 PM
> *To:* OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
> *Subject:* Re: [openstack-dev] [magnum] High Availability
>
>
>
> Hongbin,
>
>
>
> I tweaked the blueprint in accordance with this approach, and approved
> it for Newton:
>
> https://blueprints.launchpad.net/magnum/+spec/barbican-alternative-store
>
>
>
> I think this is something we can all agree on as a middle ground, If
> not, I’m open to revisiting the discussion.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
>
>
> Adrian
>
>
>
> On Mar 17, 2016, at 6:13 PM, Adrian Otto <adrian.otto at rackspace.com
> <mailto:adrian.otto at rackspace.com>> wrote:
>
>
>
> Hongbin,
>
> One alternative we could discuss as an option for operators that
> have a good reason not to use Barbican, is to use Keystone.
>
> Keystone credentials store:
> http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/keystone-specs/api/v3/identity-api-v3.html#credentials-v3-credentials
>
> The contents are stored in plain text in the Keystone DB, so we
> would want to generate an encryption key per bay, encrypt the
> certificate and store it in keystone. We would then use the same key
> to decrypt it upon reading the key back. This might be an acceptable
> middle ground for clouds that will not or can not run Barbican. This
> should work for any OpenStack cloud since Grizzly. The total amount
> of code in Magnum would be small, as the API already exists. We
> would need a library function to encrypt and decrypt the data, and
> ideally a way to select different encryption algorithms in case one
> is judged weak at some point in the future, justifying the use of an
> alternate.
>
> Adrian
>
>
> On Mar 17, 2016, at 4:55 PM, Adrian Otto <adrian.otto at rackspace.com
> <mailto:adrian.otto at rackspace.com>> wrote:
>
> Hongbin,
>
>
> On Mar 17, 2016, at 2:25 PM, Hongbin Lu <hongbin.lu at huawei.com
> <mailto:hongbin.lu at huawei.com>> wrote:
>
> Adrian,
>
> I think we need a boarder set of inputs in this matter, so I moved
> the discussion from whiteboard back to here. Please check my replies
> inline.
>
>
> I would like to get a clear problem statement written for this.
> As I see it, the problem is that there is no safe place to put
> certificates in clouds that do not run Barbican.
> It seems the solution is to make it easy to add Barbican such that
> it's included in the setup for Magnum.
>
> No, the solution is to explore an non-Barbican solution to store
> certificates securely.
>
>
> I am seeking more clarity about why a non-Barbican solution is
> desired. Why is there resistance to adopting both Magnum and
> Barbican together? I think the answer is that people think they can
> make Magnum work with really old clouds that were set up before
> Barbican was introduced. That expectation is simply not reasonable.
> If there were a way to easily add Barbican to older clouds, perhaps
> this reluctance would melt away.
>
>
> Magnum should not be in the business of credential storage when
> there is an existing service focused on that need.
>
> Is there an issue with running Barbican on older clouds?
> Anyone can choose to use the builtin option with Magnum if hey
> don't have Barbican.
> A known limitation of that approach is that certificates are not
> replicated.
>
> I guess the *builtin* option you referred is simply placing the
> certificates to local file system. A few of us had concerns on this
> approach (In particular, Tom Cammann has gave -2 on the review [1])
> because it cannot scale beyond a single conductor. Finally, we made
> a compromise to land this option and use it for testing/debugging
> only. In other words, this option is not for production. As a
> result, Barbican becomes the only option for production which is the
> root of the problem. It basically forces everyone to install
> Barbican in order to use Magnum.
>
> [1] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/212395/
>
>
> It's probably a bad idea to replicate them.
> That's what Barbican is for. --adrian_otto
>
> Frankly, I am surprised that you disagreed here. Back to July 2015,
> we all agreed to have two phases of implementation and the statement
> was made by you [2].
>
> ================================================================
> #agreed Magnum will use Barbican for an initial implementation for
> certificate generation and secure storage/retrieval. We will commit
> to a second phase of development to eliminating the hard requirement
> on Barbican with an alternate implementation that implements the
> functional equivalent implemented in Magnum, which may depend on
> libraries, but not Barbican.
> ================================================================
>
> [2]
> http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack-dev/2015-July/069130.html
>
>
> The context there is important. Barbican was considered for two
> purposes: (1) CA signing capability, and (2) certificate storage. My
> willingness to implement an alternative was based on our need to get
> a certificate generation and signing solution that actually worked,
> as Barbican did not work for that at the time. I have always viewed
> Barbican as a suitable solution for certificate storage, as that was
> what it was first designed for. Since then, we have implemented
> certificate generation and signing logic within a library that does
> not depend on Barbican, and we can use that safely in production use
> cases. What we don’t have built in is what Barbican is best at,
> secure storage for our certificates that will allow multi-conductor
> operation.
>
> I am opposed to the idea that Magnum should re-implement Barbican
> for certificate storage just because operators are reluctant to
> adopt it. If we need to ship a Barbican instance along with each
> Magnum control plane, so be it, but I don’t see the value in
> re-inventing the wheel. I promised the OpenStack community that we
> were out to integrate with and enhance OpenStack not to replace it.
>
> Now, with all that said, I do recognize that not all clouds are
> motivated to use all available security best practices. They may be
> operating in environments that they believe are already secure
> (because of a secure perimeter), and that it’s okay to run
> fundamentally insecure software within those environments. As
> misguided as this viewpoint may be, it’s common. My belief is that
> it’s best to offer the best practice by default, and only allow
> insecure operation when someone deliberately turns of fundamental
> security features.
>
> With all this said, I also care about Magnum adoption as much as all
> of us, so I’d like us to think creatively about how to strike the
> right balance between re-implementing existing technology, and
> making that technology easily accessible.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Adrian
>
>
>
> Best regards,
> Hongbin
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Adrian Otto [mailto:adrian.otto at rackspace.com]
> Sent: March-17-16 4:32 PM
> To: OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
> Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [magnum] High Availability
>
> I have trouble understanding that blueprint. I will put some remarks
> on the whiteboard. Duplicating Barbican sounds like a mistake to me.
>
> --
> Adrian
>
>
> On Mar 17, 2016, at 12:01 PM, Hongbin Lu <hongbin.lu at huawei.com
> <mailto:hongbin.lu at huawei.com>> wrote:
>
> The problem of missing Barbican alternative implementation has been
> raised several times by different people. IMO, this is a very
> serious issue that will hurt Magnum adoption. I created a blueprint
> for that [1] and set the PTL as approver. It will be picked up by a
> contributor once it is approved.
>
> [1]
> https://blueprints.launchpad.net/magnum/+spec/barbican-alternative-sto
> re
>
> Best regards,
> Hongbin
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ricardo Rocha [mailto:rocha.porto at gmail.com]
> Sent: March-17-16 2:39 PM
> To: OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
> Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [magnum] High Availability
>
> Hi.
>
> We're on the way, the API is using haproxy load balancing in the
> same way all openstack services do here - this part seems to work fine.
>
> For the conductor we're stopped due to bay certificates - we don't
> currently have barbican so local was the only option. To get them
> accessible on all nodes we're considering two options:
> - store bay certs in a shared filesystem, meaning a new set of
> credentials in the boxes (and a process to renew fs tokens)
> - deploy barbican (some bits of puppet missing we're sorting out)
>
> More news next week.
>
> Cheers,
> Ricardo
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 6:46 PM, Daneyon Hansen (danehans)
> <danehans at cisco.com <mailto:danehans at cisco.com>> wrote:
> All,
>
> Does anyone have experience deploying Magnum in a highly-available
> fashion?
> If so, I'm interested in learning from your experience. My biggest
> unknown is the Conductor service. Any insight you can provide is
> greatly appreciated.
>
> Regards,
> Daneyon Hansen
>
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