[openstack-dev] [keystone][security] Service User Permissions

Adam Young ayoung at redhat.com
Mon Jun 20 01:51:48 UTC 2016


On 06/16/2016 02:19 AM, Jamie Lennox wrote:
> Thanks everyone for your input.
>
> I generally agree that there is something that doesn't quite feel 
> right about purely trusting this information to be passed from service 
> to service, this is why i was keen for outside input and I have been 
> rethinking the approach.

They really feel like a variation on Trust tokens.

 From the service perspective, they are tokens, just not the one the 
user originally requested.

The "reservation" as I see it is an implicit trust created by the user 
requesting the operation on the initial service.

When the service validates the token, it can get back the,  lets call it 
a "reserved token" in keeping with the term reservation above.  That 
token will have a longer life span than the one the user originally 
requested, but (likely) fewer roles.

When nova calls glance, and then glance calls Swift, we can again 
transition to different reserved tokens if needs be.




>
> To this end i've proposed reservations (a name that doesn't feel 
> right): https://review.openstack.org/#/c/330329/
>
> At a gut feeling level i'm much happier with the concept. I think it 
> will allow us to handle the distinction between user->service and 
> service->service communication much better and has the added bonus of 
> potentially opening up some policy options in future.
>
> Please let me know of any concerns/thoughts on the new approach.
>
> Once again i've only written the proposal part of the spec as there 
> will be a lot of details to figure out if we go forward. It is also 
> fairly rough but it should convey the point.
>
>
> Thanks
>
> Jamie
>
> On 3 June 2016 at 03:06, Shawn McKinney <smckinney at symas.com 
> <mailto:smckinney at symas.com>> wrote:
>
>
>     > On Jun 2, 2016, at 10:58 AM, Adam Young <ayoung at redhat.com
>     <mailto:ayoung at redhat.com>> wrote:
>     >
>     > Any senseible RBAC setup would support this, but we are not
>     using a sensible one, we are using a hand rolled one. Replacing
>     everything with Fortress implies a complete rewrite of what we do
>     now.  Nuke it from orbit type stuff.
>     >
>     > What I would rather focus on is the splitting of the current
>     policy into two parts:
>     >
>     > 1. Scope check done in code
>     > 2. Role check done in middleware
>     >
>     > Role check should be donebased on URL, not on the policy key
>     like identity:create_user
>     >
>     >
>     > Then, yes, a Fortress style query could be done, or it could be
>     done by asking the service itself.
>
>     Mostly in agreement.  I prefer to focus on the model (RBAC) rather
>     than a specific impl like Fortress. That is to say support the
>     model and allow the impl to remain pluggable.  That way you enable
>     many vendors to participate in your ecosystem and more important,
>     one isn’t tied to a specific backend (ldapv3, sql, …)
>     __________________________________________________________________________
>     OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
>     Unsubscribe:
>     OpenStack-dev-request at lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe
>     <http://OpenStack-dev-request@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe>
>     http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev
>
>
>
>
> __________________________________________________________________________
> OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
> Unsubscribe: OpenStack-dev-request at lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe
> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack-dev/attachments/20160619/18b2534f/attachment.html>


More information about the OpenStack-dev mailing list