Open Stack

One issue to be aware of is the use of this as a Denial of Service
vector.  Basically an attacker can use this to lock out key accounts
by continuously sending invalid passwords.

Doing this might have unexpected and undesirable results,
particularly in automated tasks.

I think this feature has some definite uses, but we should definitely
think through use and abuse cases, and probably allow a list of
accounts that this should not be active for.


-Travis

On 1/12/16, 3:11 AM, "openstack-dev-request at lists.openstack.org" <openstack-dev-request at lists.openstack.org> wrote:

>I have registered a new bp for keystone with the capability of anti brute force
>
>
>Problem Description:
>the attacks of account are increasing in the cloud
>the attacker steals the account information by guessing the password in brute force.
>therefore, the ability of account in anti brute force is necessary.
>
>proposed Change:
>1. add two configure properties for keystone: threshold for times of password error consecutively, time of locked when password error number reaches the threshold.
>2. add two properties of user information in times of password consecutive errors, and last password error time. when the password of an account error consecutively reaches threshold, the account will be locked with a few time.
>3. locked account will unlock automatically when locked status time out
>4. the APIs of keystone which use user_name and password for authentication, the message of response will add an error description when the account is locked
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