[openstack-dev] [openstack][Magnum] ways to get CA certificate in make-cert.sh from Magnum

Guz Egor guz_egor at yahoo.com
Fri Feb 5 07:14:54 UTC 2016


Wanghua,
Could you elaborate why using token is problem? Provision cluster takes deterministic time and expiration time shouldn't be a problem (e.g. we can always assume that provision shouldn't take more than hour for example). Also we can generate new token every time when we update stack, can't we?   ---  Egor
      From: Corey O'Brien <coreypobrien at gmail.com>
 To: OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) <openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org> 
 Sent: Thursday, February 4, 2016 8:24 PM
 Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [openstack][Magnum] ways to get CA certificate in make-cert.sh from Magnum
   
There currently isn't a way to distinguish between user who creates the bay and the nodes in the bay because the user is root on those nodes. Any credential that the node uses to communicate with Magnum is going to be accessible to the user.
Since we already have the trust, that seems like the best way to proceed for now just to get something working.

Corey
On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 10:53 PM 王华 <wanghua.humble at gmail.com> wrote:

Hi all,
Magnum now use a token to get CA certificate in make-cert.sh. Token has a expiration time. So we should change this method. Here are two proposals.
1. Use trust which I have introduced in [1]. The way has a disadvantage. We can't limit the access to some APIs. For example, if we want to add a limitation that some APIs can only be accessed from Bay and can't be accessed by users outside. We need a way to distinguish these users, fromBay or from outside.
2. We create a user with the role to access Magnum. The way is used in Heat. Heat creates a user for each stack to communicate with Heat. We can add a role to the user which is already introduced in [1]. The user can directly access Magnum for some limited APIs. With trust id, the user can access other services.
[1] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/268852/
Regards,Wanghua__________________________________________________________________________
OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
Unsubscribe: OpenStack-dev-request at lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe
http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev


__________________________________________________________________________
OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
Unsubscribe: OpenStack-dev-request at lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe
http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev


  
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack-dev/attachments/20160205/e9ebeffd/attachment.html>


More information about the OpenStack-dev mailing list