[openstack-dev] [magnum][keystone][all] Using Keystone /v3/credentials to store TLS certificates

rezroo openstack at roodsari.us
Wed Apr 13 14:26:45 UTC 2016


Hi Kevin,

I understand that this is how it is now. My question is how bad would it 
be to wrap the Barbican client library calls in another class and claim, 
for all practical purposes, that Magnum has no direct dependency on 
Barbican? What is the negative of doing that?

Anyone who wants to use another mechanism should be able to do that with 
a simple change to the Magnum conf file. Nothing more complicated. 
That's the essence of my question.

Appreciate your thoughts and insight.

Reza

On 4/13/2016 6:46 AM, Fox, Kevin M wrote:
> Barbican is the abstraction layer. Its plugable like nova, neutron, 
> cinder, etc.
>
> Thanks,
> Kevin *
> *
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:* rezroo
> *Sent:* Tuesday, April 12, 2016 11:00:30 PM
> *To:* openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org
> *Subject:* Re: [openstack-dev] [magnum][keystone][all] Using Keystone 
> /v3/credentials to store TLS certificates
>
> Interesting conversation, and I think I have more of a question than a 
> comment. With my understanding of OpenStack architecture, I don't 
> understand the point about making "Magnum dependent on Barbican". 
> Wouldn't this issue be completely resolved using a driver model, such 
> as delegating the task to a separate class specified in magnum.conf, 
> with a reference implementation using Barbian API (like the vif driver 
> of nova, or nova chance vs. filter scheduler)? If people want choice, 
> we know how to give them choice - decouple, and have a base 
> implementation. The rest is up to them. That's the framework's 
> architecture. What am I missing?
> Thanks,
> Reza
>
> On 4/12/2016 9:16 PM, Fox, Kevin M wrote:
>> Ops are asking for you to make it easy for them to make their 
>> security weak. And as a user of other folks clouds, i'd have no way 
>> to know the cloud is in that mode. That seems really bad for app 
>> developers/users.
>>
>> Barbican, like some of the other servises, wont become common if 
>> folks keep trying to reimplement it so they dont have to depend on 
>> it. Folks said the same things about Keystone. Ultimately it was 
>> worth making it a dependency.
>>
>> Keystone doesnt support encryption, so you are asking for new 
>> functionality duplicating Barbican either way.
>>
>> And we do understand the point of what you are trying to do. We just 
>> dont see eye to eye on it being a good thing to do. If you are 
>> invested enough in setting up an ha setup where you would need a 
>> clusterd solution, barbicans not that much of an extra lift compared 
>> to the other services you've already had to deploy. Ive deployed both 
>> ha setups and barbican before. Ha is way worse.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Kevin
>>
>> *
>> *
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> *From:* Adrian Otto
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, April 12, 2016 8:06:03 PM
>> *To:* OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
>> *Subject:* Re: [openstack-dev] [magnum][keystone][all] Using Keystone 
>> /v3/credentials to store TLS certificates
>>
>> Please don't miss the point here. We are seeking a solution that 
>> allows a location to place a client side encrypted blob of data (A 
>> TLS cert) that multiple magnum-conductor processes on different hosts 
>> can reach over the network.
>>
>> We *already* support using Barbican for this purpose, as well as 
>> storage in flat files (not as secure as Barbican, and only works with 
>> a single conductor) and are seeking a second alternative for clouds 
>> that have not yet adopted Barbican, and want to use multiple 
>> conductors. Once Barbican is common in OpenStack clouds, both 
>> alternatives are redundant and can be deprecated. If Keystone depends 
>> on Barbican, then we have no reason to keep using it. That will mean 
>> that Barbican is core to OpenStack.
>>
>> Our alternative to using Keystone is storing the encrypted blobs in 
>> the Magnum database which would cause us to add an API feature in 
>> magnum that is the exact functional equivalent of the credential 
>> store in Keystone. That is something we are trying to avoid by 
>> leveraging existing OpenStack APIs.
>>
>> -- 
>> Adrian
>>
>> On Apr 12, 2016, at 3:44 PM, Dolph Mathews <dolph.mathews at gmail.com> 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 12, 2016 at 3:27 PM, Lance Bragstad <lbragstad at gmail.com 
>>> <mailto:lbragstad at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>>     Keystone's credential API pre-dates barbican. We started talking
>>>     about having the credential API back to barbican after it was a
>>>     thing. I'm not sure if any work has been done to move the
>>>     credential API in this direction. From a security perspective, I
>>>     think it would make sense for keystone to back to barbican.
>>>
>>>
>>> +1
>>>
>>> And regarding the "inappropriate use of keystone," I'd agree... 
>>> without this spec, keystone is entirely useless as any sort of 
>>> alternative to Barbican:
>>>
>>> https://review.openstack.org/#/c/284950/
>>>
>>> I suspect Barbican will forever be a much more mature choice for Magnum.
>>>
>>>
>>>     On Tue, Apr 12, 2016 at 2:43 PM, Hongbin Lu
>>>     <hongbin.lu at huawei.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>         Hi all,
>>>
>>>         In short, some Magnum team members proposed to store TLS
>>>         certificates in Keystone credential store. As Magnum PTL, I
>>>         want to get agreements (or non-disagreement) from OpenStack
>>>         community in general, Keystone community in particular,
>>>         before approving the direction.
>>>
>>>         In details, Magnum leverages TLS to secure the API endpoint
>>>         of kubernetes/docker swarm. The usage of TLS requires a
>>>         secure store for storing TLS certificates. Currently, we
>>>         leverage Barbican for this purpose, but we constantly
>>>         received requests to decouple Magnum from Barbican (because
>>>         users normally don’t have Barbican installed in their
>>>         clouds). Some Magnum team members proposed to leverage
>>>         Keystone credential store as a Barbican alternative [1].
>>>         Therefore, I want to confirm what is Keystone team position
>>>         for this proposal (I remembered someone from Keystone
>>>         mentioned this is an inappropriate use of Keystone. Would I
>>>         ask for further clarification?). Thanks in advance.
>>>
>>>         [1]
>>>         <https://blueprints.launchpad.net/magnum/+spec/barbican-alternative-store>https://blueprints.launchpad.net/magnum/+spec/barbican-alternative-store
>>>
>>>
>>>         Best regards,
>>>
>>>         Hongbin
>>>
>>>
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