[openstack-dev] [TripleO] FreeIPA integration
Adam Young
ayoung at redhat.com
Sat Apr 2 21:28:57 UTC 2016
I finally have enough understanding of what is going on with Tripleo to
reasonably discuss how to implement solutions for some of the main
security needs of a deployment.
FreeIPA is an identity management solution that can provide support for:
1. TLS on all network communications:
A. HTTPS for web services
B. TLS for the message bus
C. TLS for communication with the Database.
2. Identity for all Actors in the system:
A. API services
B. Message producers and consumers
C. Database consumers
D. Keystone service users
3. Secure DNS DNSSEC
4. Federation Support
5. SSH Access control to Hosts for both undercloud and overcloud
6. SUDO management
7. Single Sign On for Applications running in the overcloud.
The main pieces of FreeIPA are
1. LDAP (the 389 Directory Server)
2. Kerberos
3. DNS (BIND)
4. Certificate Authority (CA) server (Dogtag)
5. WebUI/Web Service Management Interface (HTTPD)
Of these, the CA is the most critical. Without a centralized CA, we
have no reasonable way to do certificate management.
Now, I know a lot of people have an allergic reaction to some, maybe
all, of these technologies. They should not be required to be running in
a development or testbed setup. But we need to make it possible to
secure an end deployment, and FreeIPA was designed explicitly for these
kinds of distributed applications. Here is what I would like to implement.
Assuming that the Undercloud is installed on a physical machine, we want
to treat the FreeIPA server as a managed service of the undercloud that
is then consumed by the rest of the overcloud. Right now, there are
conflicts for some ports (8080 used by both swift and Dogtag) that
prevent a drop-in run of the server on the undercloud controller. Even
if we could deconflict, there is a possible battle between Keystone and
the FreeIPA server on the undercloud. So, while I would like to see the
ability to run the FreeIPA server on the Undercloud machine eventuall, I
think a more realistic deployment is to build a separate virtual
machine, parallel to the overcloud controller, and install FreeIPA
there. I've been able to modify Tripleo Quickstart to provision this VM.
I was also able to run FreeIPA in a container on the undercloud machine,
but this is, I think, not how we want to migrate to a container based
strategy. It should be more deliberate.
While the ideal setup would be to install the IPA layer first, and
create service users in there, this produces a different install path
between with-FreeIPA and without-FreeIPA. Thus, I suspect the right
approach is to run the overcloud deploy, then "harden" the deployment
with the FreeIPA steps.
The IdM team did just this last summer in preparing for the Tokyo
summit, using Ansible and Packstack. The Rippowam project
https://github.com/admiyo/rippowam was able to fully lock down a
Packstack based install. I'd like to reuse as much of Rippowam as
possible, but called from Heat Templates as part of an overcloud
deploy. I do not really want to re implement Rippowam in Puppet.
So, big question: is Heat->ansible (instead of Puppet) for an overcloud
deployment an acceptable path? We are talking Ansible 1.0 Playbooks,
which should be relatively straightforward ports to 2.0 when the time comes.
Thus, the sequence would be:
1. Run existing overcloud deploy steps.
2. Install IPA server on the allocated VM
3. Register the compute nodes and the controller as IPA clients
4. Convert service users over to LDAP backed services, complete with
necessary kerberos steps to do password-less authentication.
5. Register all web services with IPA and allocate X509 certificates for
HTTPS.
6. Set up Host based access control (HBAC) rules for SSH access to
overcloud machines.
When we did the Rippowam demo, we used the Proton driver and Kerberos
for securing the message broker. Since Rabbit seems to be the tool of
choice, we would use X509 authentication and TLS for encryption. ACLs,
for now, would stay in the flat file format. In the future, we might
chose to use the LDAP backed ACLs for Rabbit, as they seem far more
flexible. Rabbit does not currently support Kerberos for either
authentication or encryption, but we can engage the upstream team to
implement it if desired in the future, or we can shift to a Proton based
deployment if Kerberos is essential for a deployment.
There are a couple ongoing efforts that will tie in with this:
1. Designate should be able to use the DNS from FreeIPA. That was the
original implementation.
2. Juan Antonio Osorio has been working on TLS everywhere. The issue
thus far has been Certificate management. This provides a Dogtag server
for Certs.
3. Rob Crittenden has been working on auto-registration of virtual
machines with an Identity Provider upon launch. This gives that efforts
an IdM to use.
4. Keystone can make use of the Identity store for administrative users
in their own domain.
5. Many of the compliance audits have complained about cleartext
passwords in config files. This removes most of them. MySQL supports
X509 based authentication today, and there is Kerberos support in the
works, which should remove the last remaining cleartext Passwords.
I mentioned Centralized SUDO and HBAC. These are both tools that may be
used by administrators if so desired on the install. I would recommend
that they be used, but there is no requirement to do so.
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