Open Stack

Tom brings up a good point.   With a clear direction and support from the
foundation/Thierry I'm confident we can make any version of these models
work.  I know in the situation I described if the policy was clear that it
was okay and if I knew we could pull in Thierry to help resolve any
disputes then I'm comfortable we could resolve any issues with a trusting
model.   I do however hope most patches end up being reviewed by multiple
folks coming from different perspectives.  The distrust model helped force
that.  So even if we moved to a more trusting model I'm hoping we see lots
of reviews from folks coming from different perspectives and not lots of
reviews where a single perspective group think prevails.

Happy Thanksgiving!

--Brad


Brad Topol, Ph.D.
IBM Distinguished Engineer
OpenStack
(919) 543-0646
Internet:  btopol at us.ibm.com
Assistant: Kendra Witherspoon (919) 254-0680



From:	Tom Fifield <tom at openstack.org>
To:	openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org
Date:	11/25/2015 01:06 AM
Subject:	Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][all] Move from active
            distrusting model to trusting model



On 24/11/15 19:20, Dolph Mathews wrote:
> Scenarios I've been personally involved with where the
> "distrustful" model either did help or would have helped:
>
> - Employee is reprimanded by management for not positively reviewing &
> approving a coworkers patch.
>
> - A team of employees is pressured to land a feature with as fast as
> possible. Minimal community involvement means a faster path to "merged,"
> right?
>
> - A large group of reviewers from the author's organization repeatedly
> throwing *many* careless +1s at a single patch. (These happened to not
> be cores, but it's a related organizational behavior taken to an
extreme.)
>
> I can actually think of a few more specific examples, but they are
> already described by one of the above.
>
> It's not cores that I do not trust, its the organizations they operate
> within which I have learned not to trust.

I think this is a good summary of people's fears and practical experience.

Though, It seems that those cases above are derived from not
understanding how we work, rather than out of deliberate malice. We can
fix this kind of stuff with education :)

Putting this out there - over at the Foundation, we're here to Protect
and Empower you. So, if you've ever been reprimanded by management for
choosing not to abuse the community process, perhaps we should arrange
an education session with that manager (or their manager) on how
OpenStack works.



> On Monday, November 23, 2015, Morgan Fainberg <morgan.fainberg at gmail.com
> <mailto:morgan.fainberg at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>     Hi everyone,
>
>     This email is being written in the context of Keystone more than any
>     other project but I strongly believe that other projects could
>     benefit from a similar evaluation of the policy.
>
>     Most projects have a policy that prevents the following scenario (it
>     is a social policy not enforced by code):
>
>     * Employee from Company A writes code
>     * Other Employee from Company A reviews code
>     * Third Employee from Company A reviews and approves code.
>
>     This policy has a lot of history as to why it was implemented. I am
>     not going to dive into the depths of this history as that is the
>     past and we should be looking forward. This type of policy is an
>     actively distrustful policy. With exception of a few potentially bad
>     actors (again, not going to point anyone out here), most of the
>     folks in the community who have been given core status on a project
>     are trusted to make good decisions about code and code quality. I
>     would hope that any/all of the Cores would also standup to their
>     management chain if they were asked to "just push code through" if
>     they didn't sincerely think it was a positive addition to the code
base.
>
>     Now within Keystone, we have a fair amount of diversity of core
>     reviewers, but we each have our specialities and in some cases
>     (notably KeystoneAuth and even KeystoneClient) getting the required
>     diversity of reviews has significantly slowed/stagnated a number of
>     reviews.
>
>     What I would like us to do is to move to a trustful policy. I can
>     confidently say that company affiliation means very little to me
>     when I was PTL and nominating someone for core. We should explore
>     making a change to a trustful model, and allow for cores (regardless
>     of company affiliation) review/approve code. I say this since we
>     have clear steps to correct any abuses of this policy change.
>
>     With all that said, here is the proposal I would like to set forth:
>
>     1. Code reviews still need 2x Core Reviewers (no change)
>     2. Code can be developed by a member of the same company as both
>     core reviewers (and approvers).
>     3. If the trust that is being given via this new policy is violated,
>     the code can [if needed], be reverted (we are using git here) and
>     the actors in question can lose core status (PTL discretion) and the
>     policy can be changed back to the "distrustful" model described
above.
>
>     I hope that everyone weighs what it means within the community to
>     start moving to a trusting-of-our-peers model. I think this would be
>     a net win and I'm willing to bet that it will remove noticeable
>     roadblocks [and even make it easier to have an organization work
>     towards stability fixes when they have the resources dedicated to
it].
>
>     Thanks for your time reading this.
>
>     Regards,
>     --Morgan
>     PTL Emeritus, Keystone
>
>
>
>
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