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I'd have to say that this is expected behavior. I'm not sure what you would
hope to prohibit when these kinds of things are necessary for the
deployment. We also can't prohibit this from being done in a plugin, this
is what the plugin verification is supposed to help combat. If you just go
download a random puppet manifest // script // etc... from the internet,
how do you ensure that it didn't install a root-kit.

On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 9:14 AM Eugene Korekin <ekorekin at mirantis.com> wrote:

> As far as I know this feature is planned for the next releases.
>
> But I think the main problem is: it's not obvious that just by installing
> a plugin, even without enabling the plugin in Fuel user could break or
> somehow alter already existing environments.  It could be done by malicious
> attacker who could compromise plugin or just unintentionally with some bug
> in the plugin code.
>
> Unfortunately, by installing some plugin a user jeopardizes his existing
> environments. And I think we should at least document these risks.
>
>
> On 07.12.2015 19:52, Javeria Khan wrote:
>
> My two cents. It would be useful to have a role that could execute on the
> Fuel Master host itself rather than a container.
>
> --
> Javeria
> On Dec 7, 2015 9:49 PM, "Roman Prykhodchenko" <me at romcheg.me> wrote:
>
>> Alexey,
>>
>> thank you for bringing this up. IMO discussing security problems is
>> better to be done in a special kind of Launchpad bugs.
>>
>> - romcheg
>>
>>
>> > 7 груд. 2015 р. о 17:36 Alexey Elagin <aelagin at mirantis.com>
>> написав(ла):
>> >
>> > Hello all,
>> >
>> > We have a security problem in Fuel 7.0. It's related to plugin
>> > development and allows to execute code in mcollective docker container
>> > on Fuel master node. Any fuel plugin may contains a yaml file with
>> > deployment tasks (tasks.yaml, deployment_tasks.yaml etc) and there is
>> > an ability to run some code on node with role "master". It's also
>> > possible to connect to any target node via ssh without a password from
>> > within the container.
>> >
>> > As i understood, it was made to simplify some deployment cases. I see
>> > some steps for resolving this situation:
>> > 1. Fuel team should disallow
>> > execution of any puppet manifests or bash code on nodes with master
>> > role.
>> > 2. Append the Fuel documentation. Notify users about this
>> > security issue.
>> >
>> > What do you think about it? What deployment cases which require
>> > execution of code on role "master" do you know?
>> >
>> > --
>> > Best regards,
>> > Alexey
>> > Deployment Engineer
>> > Mirantis, Inc
>> > Cell: +7 (968) 880 2288
>> > Skype: shikelbober
>> > Slack: aelagin
>> > mailto:aelagin at mirantis.com
>> >
>> >
>> >
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>
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> --
> Eugene Korekin
> Partner Enablement Team Deployment Engineer
>
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-- 

--

Andrew Woodward

Mirantis

Fuel Community Ambassador

Ceph Community
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