Open Stack

Thanks for your feedbacks and comments, guys
This is a proposal for modified SNI management part for next RST patch:

“
For SNI functionality, tenant will supply list of TLS containers in specific
Order.
In case when specific back-end is not able to support SNI capabilities,
its driver should throw an exception. The exception message should state
that this specific back-end (provider) does not support SNI capability.
The clear sign of listener's requirement for SNI capability is
a none empty SNI container ids list.
However, reference implementation must support SNI capability.

New separate module will be developed in Neutron LBaaS for Barbican TLS containers interactions.
The module will have API for:

1.      Ensuring Barbican TLS container existence (used by LBaaS front-end API)

2.      Validating Barbican TLS container (used by LBaaS front-end API)

3.      Extracting SubjectCommonName and SubjecAlternativetNames from certificates’ X509 (used by LBaaS front-end API)

4.      Extracting certificate’s data from Barbican TLS container (used by provider/driver code)
The module will use pyOpenSSL and PyASN1 packages.
Only this new common module should be used by Neutron LBaaS code for Barbican containers interactions.

Front-end LBaaS API (plugin) code will use a new developed module for validating Barbican TLS containers and extracting SubjectCommonName and SubjecAlternativetNames from certificates’ X509.
When SNI settings are forwarded to the driver, this SubjectCommonName and SubjecAlternativetNames info will be attached along with each SNI container id.
Driver, in its turn, can use this info for its specific SNI implementation.
Any specific driver implementation may extract host names info from certificates using the mentioned above common module only, if needed.

The order of SNI containers list may be used by specific back-end code,
like Radware's, for specifying priorities among certificates.
In case when two or more uploaded certificates are valid for the same DNS name
and the tenant has specific requirements around which one wins this collision,
certificate ordering provides a mechanism to define which cert wins in the
event of a collision.
Employing the order of certificates list is not a common requirement for
all back-end implementations.
“
Other parts of the RST document will be modified according to this approach.

Please post your thoughts.
If this is acceptable by all, I will push a new patch.
Thank you,
Evg


From: Stephen Balukoff [mailto:sbalukoff at bluebox.net]
Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2014 8:35 PM
To: OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [Neutron][LBaaS] TLS capability - SNI - Extracting SubjectCommonName and/or SubjectAlternativeNames from X509

+1 to German's and  Carlos' comments.

It's also worth pointing out that some UIs will definitely want to show SAN information and the like, so either having this available as part of the API, or as a standard library we write which then gets used by multiple drivers is going to be necessary.

If we're extracting the Subject Common Name in any place in the code then we also need to be extracting the Subject Alternative Names at the same place. From the perspective of the SNI standard, there's no difference in how these fields should be treated, and if we were to treat SANs differently then we're both breaking the standard and setting a bad precedent.

Stephen

On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Carlos Garza <carlos.garza at rackspace.com<mailto:carlos.garza at rackspace.com>> wrote:

On Jul 15, 2014, at 10:55 AM, Samuel Bercovici <SamuelB at Radware.com<mailto:SamuelB at Radware.com>>
 wrote:

> Hi,
>
>
> Obtaining the domain name from the x509 is probably more of a driver/backend/device capability, it would make sense to have a library that could be used by anyone wishing to do so in their driver code.
    You can do what ever you want in *your* driver. The code to extract this information will be apart of the API and needs to be mentioned in the spec now. PyOpenSSL with PyASN1 are the most likely candidates.

Carlos D. Garza
>
> -Sam.
>
>
>
> From: Eichberger, German [mailto:german.eichberger at hp.com<mailto:german.eichberger at hp.com>]
> Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2014 6:43 PM
> To: OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
> Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [Neutron][LBaaS] TLS capability - SNI - Extracting SubjectCommonName and/or SubjectAlternativeNames from X509
>
> Hi,
>
> My impression was that the frontend would extract the names and hand them to the driver.  This has the following advantages:
>
> ·         We can be sure all drivers can extract the same names
> ·         No duplicate code to maintain
> ·         If we ever allow the user to specify the names on UI rather in the certificate the driver doesn’t need to change.
>
> I think I saw Adam say something similar in a comment to the code.
>
> Thanks,
> German
>
> From: Evgeny Fedoruk [mailto:EvgenyF at Radware.com<mailto:EvgenyF at Radware.com>]
> Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2014 7:24 AM
> To: OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)
> Subject: [openstack-dev] [Neutron][LBaaS] TLS capability - SNI - Extracting SubjectCommonName and/or SubjectAlternativeNames from X509
>
> Hi All,
>
> Since this issue came up from TLS capabilities RST doc review, I opened a ML thread for it to make the decision.
> Currently, the document says:
>
> “
> For SNI functionality, tenant will supply list of TLS containers in specific
> Order.
> In case when specific back-end is not able to support SNI capabilities,
> its driver should throw an exception. The exception message should state
> that this specific back-end (provider) does not support SNI capability.
> The clear sign of listener's requirement for SNI capability is
> a none empty SNI container ids list.
> However, reference implementation must support SNI capability.
>
> Specific back-end code may retrieve SubjectCommonName and/or altSubjectNames
> from the certificate which will determine the hostname(s) the certificate
> is associated with.
>
> The order of SNI containers list may be used by specific back-end code,
> like Radware's, for specifying priorities among certificates.
> In case when two or more uploaded certificates are valid for the same DNS name
> and the tenant has specific requirements around which one wins this collision,
> certificate ordering provides a mechanism to define which cert wins in the
> event of a collision.
> Employing the order of certificates list is not a common requirement for
> all back-end implementations.
> “
>
> The question is about SCN and SAN extraction from X509.
> 1.       Extraction of SCN/ SAN should be done while provisioning and not during TLS handshake
> 2.       Every back-end code/driver must(?) extract SCN and(?) SAN and use it for certificate determination for host
>
> Please give your feedback
>
> Thanks,
> Evg
> _______________________________________________
> OpenStack-dev mailing list
> OpenStack-dev at lists.openstack.org<mailto:OpenStack-dev at lists.openstack.org>
> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev


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--
Stephen Balukoff
Blue Box Group, LLC
(800)613-4305 x807
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