[openstack-dev] [Neutron] API list operations are not fast as they could because they're dumb

Salvatore Orlando sorlando at nicira.com
Tue Apr 8 22:16:59 UTC 2014


I have been recently investigating reports of slowness for list responses
in the Neutron API.
This was first reported in [1], and then recently was observed with both
the ML2 and the NSX plugins.
The root cause of this issues is that a policy engine check is performed
for every attribute of every resource returned in a response.
When tenant grow to a lot of ports, or when the API is executed with admin
credentials without filters, this might become a non-negligible scale issue.
This issue is mostly due to three factors:
1) A log statement printing a line in the log for every attribute for which
no policy criterion is defined; this has been treated with [2]
2) The fact that for every check neutron currently checks whether cached
policy rules are still valid [3]
3) The fact that anyway Neutron perform really a lot of policy checks
whether it should not

Despite the improvements [2] and [3] (mostly [2]), neutron for a list
operation still spends for post-plugin operations (ie: policy checks) abotu
50% of the time it spends in the plugin.
Solving this problem is not difficult, but it might require changes which
are worth of a discussion on the mailing list.
Up to the Havana release policy checks were performed in the plugin; this
basically made responses dependent on plugin implementation and was
terrible for API compatibility and portability; we took care of that with
[4], which moved all policy checks to the API layer. However for one fix
that we fixed, another thing was broken (*)

The API layer for list responses puts every item through policy checks to
see which should not be visible to the user at all, which is fine.
However it also puts every attribute through a policy check to exclude
those which should not be visible to the user, such as provider attributes
for regular users.
Doing this for every resource might make sense if an attribute should be
visible or not according to the data in the resource itself.
For instance a policy that shows port binding attributes could be defined
for all the ports whose name is "ernest".
This might appear as great flexibility, but does it make any sense at all?
Does it make sense that an API list operation return a set of attributes
for some items and  a different one for others?
I think not.

For this reason I am thinking we should what technically is a simple
change: use policy cghecks determine the list of attributes to show only
once for list response, and then re-use that list for the whole response.
The limitation here is that we should not have 'attribute-level' policies
(**) which rely on the resource value.
I think this limitation is fair. If you like the approach I have some code
here: http://paste.openstack.org/show/75371/

And this leads me to the second part of the discussion I'd like to start.
The policy engine currently allows me to start a neutron server where, for
instance, port binding are visible by admins only, and another neutron
server where any user can see them.
This kind of makes the API not really portable, as people programming
against the neutron API might encounter unexpected behaviours.
To this aim, one solution would be to 'hardcode' attributes' access rights
into extensions definition. This way port bindings will always be
admin_only regardless of which neutron endpoint one is accessing.
However, there are two drawbacks in this approach:
1 - This could break existing deployment which tweaked default policy, so
the upgrade should be carefully planned
2 - This will make API definitions dependent on entries in policy.json. If
a policy definition states that an attribute is admin_only, one will also
have to ensure such policy is defined in policy.json.

Thanks for reading this email,
Salvatore

[1] https://bugs.launchpad.net/neutron/+bug/1236704
[2] https://bugs.launchpad.net/neutron/+bug/1302467
[3] https://bugs.launchpad.net/neutron/+bug/1302611
[4] https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Neutron/Make-authz-orthogonal
(*) typical behaviour of software 'fixed' by Salvatore
(**) policies such as get_network:provider:network_type.
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