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On Sun, Apr 6, 2014 at 10:06 AM, Hopper, Justin <justin.hopper at hp.com>wrote:

> Russell,
>
> At this point the guard that Nova needs to provide around the instance
> does not need to be complex.  It would even suffice to keep those
> instances hidden from such operations as ³nova list² when invoked by
> directly by the user.
>
>
Are you looking for something to prevent accidental manipulation of an
instance created by Trove or intentional changes as well? Whilst doing some
filtering in nova list is simple on the surface, we don't try to keep
server uuids secret in the API, so its likely that sort of information will
leak through other parts of the API say through volume or networking
interfaces. Having to enforce another level of permissions throughout the
API would be a considerable change. Also it would introduce inconsistencies
into the information returned by Nova - eg does quota/usage information
returned to the user include the server that Trove created or is that meant
to be adjusted as well?

If you need a high level of support from the Nova API to hide servers, then
if its possible, as Russell suggests to get what you want by building on
top of the Nova API using additional identities then I think that would be
the way to go. If you're just looking for a simple way to offer to Trove
clients a filtered list of servers, then perhaps Trove could offer a server
list call which is a proxy to Nova and filters out the servers which are
Trove specific since Trove knows which ones it created.

Chris


> Thanks,
>
> Justin Hopper
> Software Engineer - DBaaS
> irc: juice | gpg: EA238CF3 | twt: @justinhopper
>
>
>
>
> On 4/5/14, 14:20, "Russell Bryant" <rbryant at redhat.com> wrote:
>
> >On 04/04/2014 08:12 PM, Hopper, Justin wrote:
> >> Greetings,
> >>
> >> I am trying to address an issue from certain perspectives and I think
> >> some support from Nova may be needed.
> >>
> >> _Problem_
> >> Services like Trove use run in Nova Compute Instances.  These Services
> >> try to provide an integrated and stable platform for which the ³service²
> >> can run in a predictable manner.  Such elements include configuration of
> >> the service, networking, installed packages, etc.  In today¹s world,
> >> when Trove spins up an Instance to deploy a database on, it creates that
> >> Instance with the Users Credentials.  Thus, to Nova, the User has full
> >> access to that Instance through Nova¹s API.  This access can be used in
> >> ways which unintentionally compromise the service.
> >>
> >> _Solution_
> >> A proposal is being formed that would put such Instances in a read-only
> >> or invisible mode from the perspective of Nova.  That is, the Instance
> >> can only be managed from the Service from which it was created.  At this
> >> point, we do not need any granular controls.  A simple lock-down of the
> >> Nova API for these Instances would suffice.  However, Trove would still
> >> need to interact with this Instance via Nova API.
> >>
> >> The basic requirements for Nova would beŠ
> >>
> >>     A way to identify a request originating from a Service vs coming
> >>     directly from an end-user
> >>     A way to Identify which instances are being managed by a Service
> >>     A way to prevent some or all access to the Instance unless the
> >>     Service ID in the request matches that attached to the Instance
> >>
> >> Any feedback on this would be appreciated.
> >
> >The use case makes sense to me.  I'm thinking we should expect an
> >identity to be created in Keystone for trove and have trove use that for
> >managing all of its instances.
> >
> >If that is sufficient, trove would need some changes to use its service
> >credentials instead of the user credentials.  I don't think any changes
> >are needed in Nova.
> >
> >Is there anything missing to support your use case using that approach?
> >
> >--
> >Russell Bryant
> >
> >_______________________________________________
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>
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