Open Stack

On 2013-06-27 16:28, Jamie Lennox wrote:
> On Fri, 2013-06-28 at 07:01 +1200, Robert Collins wrote:
>> On 27 June 2013 04:55, Adam Young <ayoung at redhat.com> wrote:
>>> Right now Keystone provides so called bearer tokens: This means that 
>>> whoever
>>> has a token can do whatever the token entitles him to do. If I
>>> manage to get somebody's token I can do whatever this person is able 
>>> to do.
>>> To fix it, the other services that use tokens to:
>>> 
>>> 1. Authenticate the identity
>>> 2. Match the name in the token to the  identity that authenticated 
>>> the
>>> connection.
>> 
>> I am confused: HTTP is a message orientated protocol, connection 
>> based
>> authentication is a terrible antipattern. Do you really mean
>> 'connection' here?
> 
> More the HTTPs handshake i guess, the point is to have for example a
> client certificate or kerberos identity that is used to connect to the
> individual servers.
> 
> When a token is generated from keystone we put into the token a
> reference to the kerberos or cert that was used to generate the token,
> then when this token is used on a server the auth_token middleware
> ensures that the same kerberos principal or certificate is used to 
> make
> that connection as made the original. That means even if you get the
> token unless you have the cert/kerberos id you can't use it.
> 
> The full blueprint is:
> https://blueprints.launchpad.net/keystone/+spec/authentication-tied-to-token
> 

So you need the cert/kerberos ticket to both create and use the token. 
So this means you are really trying to solve the problem of us 
transmitting whole tokens for each request, making them open to 
interception during transmission or theft from backing storage.

>>> If the names match then you can be sure that the user that connected 
>>> to the
>>> service and presented a token is the same user that acquired the 
>>> token from
>>> keystone in the first place.
>> 
>> That would prevent the use case of 'create a token and hand it off'
>> which AIUI Heat depends on/will depend on.
> 
> Yes it would, but this is where heat would need to make use of the
> trusts mechanism that was released with Grizzly, something that i
> understand is planned anyway.
> 

Indeed it is. But right now, the most excellent "make an EC2 keypair 
and sign stuff with it" scheme is working out pretty well. That scheme 
at least eliminates the transmission vulnerability.