Open Stack

1)      Token Caching is not always going to help. It depends on the application.    E.g  A user  writes a cron  job to check the health of swift by listing a  predefined container every 1 minute.    This will obviously create a token every minute.



2)      Also  I like to understand how rate limiting is done for v3 tokens.   Rate limiting involves source ip + request pattern.  In V3 there are so many ways to get the token and the rate limiting becomes too complex



Just for unscoped token,  all the following are equivalent requests.   In case of scoped tokens we have even more combinations.   Rouge clients can easily mess with rate limiting by mixing request patterns. Also rate limiting across regions may not be possible.

a.        UserId/Password

b.       UserName/Password/domainId

c.       UserName/Password/DomainName

Thanks
Haneef

From: Ravi Chunduru [mailto:ravivsn at gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2013 11:02 PM
To: OpenStack Development Mailing List
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] FW: [Keystone][Folsom] Token re-use

I agree we need a way to overcome these rogue clients but by rate limiting genuine requests will get effected. Then one would need retries and some times critical operations gets failed. It beats the whole logic of being available.


About the keyrings, How do we tackle if a service is using JSON API calls and not python clients?

Thanks,
-Ravi.
On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 6:37 PM, Adam Young <ayoung at redhat.com<mailto:ayoung at redhat.com>> wrote:
On 06/18/2013 09:13 PM, Kant, Arun wrote:
The issue with having un-managed number of tokens for same credential is that it can be easily exploited. Getting a token is one of initial step (gateway) to get access to services. A rogue client can keep creating unlimited number of tokens and possibly create denial of service attack on services. If there are somewhat limited number of tokens, then cloud provider can possibly use tokenId based rate-limiting approach.
Better here to rate limit, then.





Extending the expiry to some fixed interval might be okay as that can be considered as continuing user session similar to what is seen when a user keeps browsing an application while logged in.
Tokens are resources created by Keystone.  No reason to ask to create something new if it is not needed.

The caching needs to be done client side.  We have ongoing work using python-keyring to support that.



-Arun


From: Adam Young <ayoung at redhat.com<mailto:ayoung at redhat.com>>
Reply-To: OpenStack Development Mailing List <openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org<mailto:openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org>>
Date: Friday, June 14, 2013 3:33 PM
To: "openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org<mailto:openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org>" <openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org<mailto:openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org>>
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [Keystone][Folsom] Token re-use

On 06/13/2013 07:58 PM, Ravi Chunduru wrote:
Hi,
  We are having Folsom setup and we find that our token table increases a lot. I understand client can re-use the token but why doesnt keystone reuse the token if client asks it with same credentials..
I would like to know if there is any reason for not doing so.

Thanks in advance,
--
Ravi



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You can cache the token on the client side and reuse. Tokens have a an expiry, so if you request a new token, you extend the expiry.


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--
Ravi
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