Open Stack

Hi,

I agree that the AutZ should be separated and the service provider should be able to control this based on their model.

For Service VMs who might be serving ~100-~1000 IPs and might use multiple MACs per port, it would be better to turn this off altogether that to have an IPTABLE rules with thousands of entries.
This why I prefer to be able to turn-off IP spoofing and turn-off MAC spoofing altogether.

Still from a logical model / declarative reasons an IP that can migrate between different ports should be declared as such and maybe also from MAC perspective.

Regards,
                -Sam.








From: Salvatore Orlando [mailto:sorlando at nicira.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 21, 2013 9:56 PM
To: OpenStack Development Mailing List
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [Neutron] Chalenges with highly available service VMs - port adn security group options.



On 19 July 2013 13:14, Aaron Rosen <arosen at nicira.com<mailto:arosen at nicira.com>> wrote:


On Fri, Jul 19, 2013 at 1:55 AM, Samuel Bercovici <SamuelB at radware.com<mailto:SamuelB at radware.com>> wrote:

Hi,



I have completely missed this discussion as it does not have quantum/Neutron in the subject (modify it now)

I think that the security group is the right place to control this.

I think that this might be only allowed to admins.


I think this shouldn't be admin only since tenant's have control of their own networks they should be allowed to do this.

I reiterate my point that the authZ model for a feature should always be completely separated by the business logic of the feature itself.
In my opinion there are grounds both for scoping it as admin only and for allowing tenants to use it; it might be better if we just let the policy engine deal with this.


Let me explain what we need which is more than just disable spoofing.

1.       Be able to allow MACs which are not defined on the port level to transmit packets (for example VRRP MACs)== turn off MAC spoofing

For this it seems you would need to implement the port security extension which allows one to enable/disable port spoofing on a port.

This would be one way of doing it. The other would probably be adding a list of allowed VRRP MACs, which should be possible with the blueprint pointed by Aaron.

2.       Be able to allow IPs which are not defined on the port level to transmit packets (for example, IP used for HA service that moves between an HA pair) == turn off IP spoofing

It seems like this would fit your use case perfectly:   https://blueprints.launchpad.net/neutron/+spec/allowed-address-pairs

3.       Be able to allow broadcast message on the port (for example for VRRP broadcast) == allow broadcast.


Quantum does have an abstraction for disabling this so we already allow this by default.



Regards,

                -Sam.





From: Aaron Rosen [mailto:arosen at nicira.com<mailto:arosen at nicira.com>]
Sent: Friday, July 19, 2013 3:26 AM
To: OpenStack Development Mailing List
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] Chalenges with highly available service VMs



Yup:

I'm definitely happy to review and give hints.

Blueprint:  https://docs.google.com/document/d/18trYtq3wb0eJK2CapktN415FRIVasr7UkTpWn9mLq5M/edit

https://review.openstack.org/#/c/19279/  < patch that merged the feature;

Aaron



On Thu, Jul 18, 2013 at 5:15 PM, Ian Wells <ijw.ubuntu at cack.org.uk<mailto:ijw.ubuntu at cack.org.uk>> wrote:

On 18 July 2013 19:48, Aaron Rosen <arosen at nicira.com<mailto:arosen at nicira.com>> wrote:
> Is there something this is missing that could be added to cover your use
> case? I'd be curious to hear where this doesn't work for your case.  One
> would need to implement the port_security extension if they want to
> completely allow all ips/macs to pass and they could state which ones are
> explicitly allowed with the allowed-address-pair extension (at least that is
> my current thought).

Yes - have you got docs on the port security extension?  All I've
found so far are
http://docs.openstack.org/developer/quantum/api/quantum.extensions.portsecurity.html
and the fact that it's only the Nicira plugin that implements it.  I
could implement it for something else, but not without a few hints...
--
Ian.

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