[openstack-dev] [Neutron] Chalenges with highly available service VMs - port adn security group options.
SamuelB at Radware.com
Fri Jul 19 08:55:02 UTC 2013
I have completely missed this discussion as it does not have quantum/Neutron in the subject (modify it now)
I think that the security group is the right place to control this.
I think that this might be only allowed to admins.
Let me explain what we need which is more than just disable spoofing.
1. Be able to allow MACs which are not defined on the port level to transmit packets (for example VRRP MACs)== turn off MAC spoofing
2. Be able to allow IPs which are not defined on the port level to transmit packets (for example, IP used for HA service that moves between an HA pair) == turn off IP spoofing
3. Be able to allow broadcast message on the port (for example for VRRP broadcast) == allow broadcast.
From: Aaron Rosen [mailto:arosen at nicira.com]
Sent: Friday, July 19, 2013 3:26 AM
To: OpenStack Development Mailing List
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] Chalenges with highly available service VMs
I'm definitely happy to review and give hints.
https://review.openstack.org/#/c/19279/ < patch that merged the feature;
On Thu, Jul 18, 2013 at 5:15 PM, Ian Wells <ijw.ubuntu at cack.org.uk<mailto:ijw.ubuntu at cack.org.uk>> wrote:
On 18 July 2013 19:48, Aaron Rosen <arosen at nicira.com<mailto:arosen at nicira.com>> wrote:
> Is there something this is missing that could be added to cover your use
> case? I'd be curious to hear where this doesn't work for your case. One
> would need to implement the port_security extension if they want to
> completely allow all ips/macs to pass and they could state which ones are
> explicitly allowed with the allowed-address-pair extension (at least that is
> my current thought).
Yes - have you got docs on the port security extension? All I've
found so far are
and the fact that it's only the Nicira plugin that implements it. I
could implement it for something else, but not without a few hints...
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