Open Stack

Hi,

I would like to get back to this discussion and specify the exact syntax 
of ACLs that can be used when removing the global uniqueness constraint on 
user names. I wander whether we really need to prefix both the 
project_name and the username with the domain id? Especially, since on 
ACLs we mainly need to properly identify the user and not the project. So 
the notion of a project may not be required in this context? For example, 
in NFSv4 ACLs (also adopted by CDMI) users are identified by 
username at domain. So I wander whether on ACLs, in V3 we can simply switch 
from tenant_id:username to domain_id:username? This seems to fulfill the 
identification requirements and will give a very simple solution for the 
migration of existing v2 customers to private domains in V3 ? assigning 
the new domain_id to match the old tenant_id will allow preserving all of 
the stored containers without the need to modify the containers' meta 
data.

Best Regards,
Alex. 



From:   "Yee, Guang" <guang.yee at hp.com>
To:     OpenStack Development Mailing List 
<openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org>, 
Date:   11/01/2013 10:31 PM
Subject:        Re: [openstack-dev] [swift] [keystone] Keystone v3 API 
domains in Swift



As long as Swift URL stay the same we should be OK. Frankly, there aren't
any strong arguments for changing it at this point. Whenever we remove the
globally uniqueness constraint on names, new Swift ACLs probably will need
to switch over to using namespacing.

domain_name.project_name:domain_name.username

something like that. Existing Swift ACLs should work fine since if the 
given
domain is the default (migrated) system domain, auth_token middleware 
should
not set the domains headers.


Guang


-----Original Message-----
From: David Chadwick [mailto:d.w.chadwick at kent.ac.uk] 
Sent: Friday, January 11, 2013 8:36 AM
To: OpenStack Development Mailing List
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [swift] [keystone] Keystone v3 API domains in
Swift

Hi Chuck

On 11/01/2013 15:59, Chuck Thier wrote:
> The Tenant_ID is in the URL
> (https://{SWIFT_IP}/v1/AUTH_{TENANT_ID}/{CONTAINER}/{OBJECT})
>
> I think we have beaten this part to death a bit now, as we seem to all
> agree that we can continue this pattern with the V3 API.  The one
> concern that I still have is how the ACLs will work, and weather or
> not that will need to change.
>
> I'm also curious how the Keystone V3 API will work alongside V2 apis.

My opinion (only, I dont speak for anyone else) is as follows:

1. A v2 API system has no problems as it is working OK today
2. A v3 API system only, with domains added, should work OK tomorrow 
otherwise the v3 API has problems
3. So the main point as you say is how do v2 and v3 systems interwork. I 
suggest there is an intercept module, say in the Keystone pipeline, that 
knows it is operating in a v2/v3 environment, and when it receives a v2 
request already containing a tenant_ID it knows it will comprise 
domain:project and it can unpack it, and give the separate elements to 
the rest of the V3 code for processing as in a v3 system. When the 
intercept module receives a v2 request that needs a tenant ID returning 
to it, it will encode up the domain and project as a tenant ID, and 
return this to the v2 client. The v2 client will be blissfully unaware 
that what it thinks is a tenant ID is actually a combination of domain 
and project.

regards

david



>
> --
> Chuck
>
> On Thu, Jan 10, 2013 at 4:16 AM, David Chadwick 
<d.w.chadwick at kent.ac.uk>
wrote:
>> You have to ask, where does the Swift client get the tenant_Id from? 
Isnt
it
>> Keystone? So if Keystone returns project_ID:tenant_Id to swift as the
>> project_id string, then Swift can continue to use this as if nothing 
has
>> changed. Its just a string whose content has no meaning to Swift, but
whose
>> content does have meaning to Keystone. The Swift policy simply needs to
>> change the value of the tenant_id in its policy to the new value and it
>> should work the same
>>
>> regards
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>> On 09/01/2013 20:21, heckj wrote:
>>>
>>> Given that domains are a segmentation of projects/tenants, then I
wouldn't
>>> expect to want to change it from a project_id representation to 
anything
>>> else.
>>>
>>> -joe
>>>
>>> On Jan 9, 2013, at 12:13 PM, Chuck Thier <cthier at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Things are always easy, until you start thinking about backwards
>>>> compatibility.  The storage urls for swift with keystone are 
currently
>>>> keyed off of the tenant_id (soon to be project_id), so you end up 
with
>>>> an endpoint url that looks something like
>>>> http://{SWIFT_IP}/v1/AUTH_{TENANT_ID}  if you change that by adding
>>>> the domain, then you break any current users in your system, and you
>>>> can't use v2 and v3 auth contracts simultaneously.
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Chuck
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Jan 9, 2013 at 1:37 PM, David Chadwick
<d.w.chadwick at kent.ac.uk>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I would have thought that the solution is conceptually rather
>>>>> straightforward. If domains can have their own project names and
>>>>> usernames,
>>>>> then you prefix the names with the domain ID or domain name to make
them
>>>>> globally unique again.
>>>>>
>>>>> regards
>>>>>
>>>>> David
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 09/01/2013 19:14, Yee, Guang wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes. Swift ACLs <tenant_id>:<user_name>, <tenant_id>:<user_name>, 
and
>>>>>> *:<user_name> will be impacted if project (formely tenant) name and
>>>>>> user
>>>>>> name are no longer globally unique. We'll need to figure out a
>>>>>> migration
>>>>>> path before relaxing that constraint.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Guang
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>> From: Chuck Thier [mailto:cthier at gmail.com]
>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, January 09, 2013 10:48 AM
>>>>>> To: OpenStack Development Mailing List
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [swift] [keystone] Keystone v3 API
domains
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> Swift
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Se responses inline:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 9, 2013 at 4:01 AM, Henry Nash
<henryn at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So there are a couple of issues intertwined in this thread:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1) Uniqueness of identifiers in Swift given the keystone Identity 
v3
>>>>>>> api.
>>>>>>> This is the issue of whether Swift uses tenant names (now called
>>>>>>> project
>>>>>>> names) at all to uniquely identify any objects - if it did, then 
it
>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>> need to also consider storing a domain name or id.  From the
>>>>>>> discussion,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> sounds like tenant/project ID is used instead, which (from a
>>>>>>> uniqueness
>>>>>>> point of view) is fine.  A separate issue exists needs to be
discussed
>>>>>>> around swift ACLs and whether username potentially becoming unique
>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>> within a domain will have an impact.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For AuthN, you are correct, in that it only relies on 
tenant/project
>>>>>> ID.  So, nothing has to be changed from that perspective.  AuthZ is 
a
>>>>>> little more tricky. For ACLs with keystone, they are set as
>>>>>> TENANT:USER in any of the following patterns:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *:user_name - that user from any tenant has access
>>>>>> tenant_id:user_name - that user from that tenant id has access
>>>>>> tenant_name:user_name - that user from that tenant name has access
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If project_name will not be unique in v3, then the
>>>>>> tenant_name:user_name format may have to be deprecated.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I would be interested to hear from providers that are using 
keystone
>>>>>> with swift and hear which of the above use cases they are using.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2) Given that keystone identity v3 domains are likely to be 
usually
>>>>>>> used
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> represent an enterprise (or "account holder" in common cloud
>>>>>>> terminology)
>>>>>>> and contain the collection of projects owned by that enterprise, 
is
it
>>>>>>> important for Swift to have that domain knowledge?  Will there be
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> operations
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> either within swift (or more likely layered on top of swift) that
need
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> information?  E.g. How would someone layer a billing engine on top
of
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> swift
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> that could collate all the swift containers that were part of one
>>>>>>> domain?
>>>>>>> Obviously that engine could call keystone with each project_id in
turn
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> find the domain_id.....but  that sounds pretty inefficient.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As is, containers can already be collated for a given 
tenant/project
>>>>>> id.  The containers for a domain is then an aggregate of the 
project
>>>>>> ids  associated to that domain.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think the default should be that domains are not mapped in swift.
I
>>>>>> believe that this will also be required to facilitate backwards
>>>>>> compatibility, which brings up another interesting question -- Is
>>>>>> there an expectation that people will be able to run keystone auth
>>>>>> v2.0 and v3.0 side by side?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Chuck
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> OpenStack-dev mailing list
>>>>>> OpenStack-dev at lists.openstack.org
>>>>>> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>>>
>>>>>
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