[openstack-dev] Volume Encryption

Nate Reller rellerreller at yahoo.com
Thu Feb 14 16:23:35 UTC 2013


Malini, I was happy to learn about a key manager discussion at the summit.  Do you know what track this would be under?  I can't decide if this should be in Keystone or maybe a whole new service.  I like the idea of a whole new service myself because I think it helps to have the separation and prevent bloating of functionality for components.  On the other hand, I probably don't want a dozen services.

I like the idea of the key-id.  I think we may end up using that idea.  This will help us to support snapshot operations.

One item we have yet to tackle is cloning.  I think there are a few options for this.

1) Don't support clone operations for encrypted volumes.  This is easy to implement and prevents key reuse, but it limits functionality.

2) Support clone with same key.  This should be easy to implement as well.  We could use the metadata key-id and set it to the same value for the clone.  The drawback to this is that the key has multiple uses, and it could be used to decrypt many different volumes.  I don't like the idea of that.  If the key is compromised then what do you do?
3) Support clone with different key.  You could do this by decrypting the bytes from the original volume and encrypting them with a new key.  If we are going to support cloning then I think I like this approach the best.  The drawback on this is time.

There are similar issues for snapshots, but I am not as opposed to option 2 for snapshots.  Any thoughts on this?

-Nate



________________________________
 From: "Bhandaru, Malini K" <malini.k.bhandaru at intel.com>
To: OpenStack Development Mailing List <openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org> 
Sent: Wednesday, February 13, 2013 4:32 PM
Subject: RE: [openstack-dev] Volume Encryption
 

 
Oleg, just the thought I had earlier in the day!
Suggested a session for key manager  at http://summit.openstack.org/.
To your list of blueprints, I added another one I found.
 
Nate, if your volume meta data included a key-id, it could pull the key-string from the key-manager  (as yet a fuzzy) entity.
 
The keystone token could also capture preferences for encryption algorithm (for Cinder/Glance/Swift) and these default to
strong versions like Caitlin suggests.
 
Regards,
Malini
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