[openstack-announce] [OSSN-0091] BMC emulators developed in OpenStack community do not preserve passwords on VMs

Jay Faulkner jay at gr-oss.io
Mon Oct 31 21:13:58 UTC 2022


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## Summary ##
When deploying VirtualBMC or Sushy-Tools in an unsupported, production-like
configuration, it can remove secret data, including VNC passwords, from a
libvirt domain permanently. Operators impacted by this vulnerability must
reconfigure any secret data, including VNC passwords, for the libvirt
domain.

These virtual machine emulators are tools to help emulate a physical
machine's Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) to aid in development and
testing of software that would otherwise require physical machines to
perform integration testing activities. They are not intended or supported
for production or long-term use of any kind.

## Affected Services / Software ##
* Sushy-Tools, <=0.21.0
* VirtualBMC, <=2.2.2

There is no impact to any OpenStack software or services intended for
production use.

## Patches ##
* VirtualBMC: https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/virtualbmc/+/862620
* Sushy-Tools: https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/sushy-tools/+/862625

## Discussion ##
To perform some advanced operations on Libvirt virtual machines, the
underlying XML document describing the virtual machine's domain must be
extracted, modified, and then updated. These specific actions are for
aspects such as "setting a boot device" (VirtualBMC, Sushy-Tools), Setting
a boot mode (Sushy-Tools), and setting a virtual media device
(Sushy-Tools).

This issue is triggered when a VM has any kind of "secure" information
defined in the XML domain definition. If an operator deploys VirtualBMC or
Sushy-Tools to manage one of these libvirt VMs, the first time any action
is performed that requires rewriting of the XML domain definition, all
secure information -- including a VNC console password, if set -- is lost
and removed from the domain definition, leaving the libvirt VM's exposed to
a malicious console user.

## Recommended Actions ##
Operators who may have been impacted by this vulnerability should
immediately remove use of VirtualBMC and/or Sushy-Tools from their
production environment. Then, validate and if necessary, reconfigure
passwords for VNC access or any other impacted secrets.

## Notes ##
The OpenStack team will ensure documentation is updated to clearly state
these software packages are intended for development/CI use only, and are
not safe to run in production.

## Credits ##
Julia Kreger from Red Hat

## References ##
Author: Jay Faulkner, G-Research Open Source Software
This OSSN: https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0091
Original Storyboard bug: https://storyboard.openstack.org/#!/story/2010382
Mailing List : [Security] tag on openstack-discuss at lists.openstack.org
OpenStack Security Project : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg
CVE: CVE-2022-44020
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