Hello Zorillas,
I join the list of contributors to thank the infra team for their work in isolating, protecting and fixing the recent vulnerability. I looked through the code changes committed to repositories we maintain and didn't find any malicious code submissions or approvals. If you would like to take a look, here is an Ethercalc with the changes: https://ethercalc.openstack.org/uscp1x7i8ewn Please do respond here in case you notice anything amiss.
Thank you! Goutham
---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Ian Wienand iwienand@redhat.com Date: Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 5:33 PM Subject: [service-announce] October 20 Gerrit Outage Update To: service-announce@lists.opendev.org
As of this mail, Gerrit access has been restored. Please read on for important information, especially around change verification.
Background -----------
On 2020-10-20 at 01:30 a user unexpectedly added a workflow approval to a change that they were not expected to have access to. At 02:06 UTC an alert was raised via IRC. Administrators found the account had added themselves to a core group and made the +W vote. The account was disabled, and removed from the groups it had added itself to by 02:55 UTC. Administrators began to analyse the situation and Gerrit was taken offline at 04:02 UTC to preserve state and allow for analysis.
From this time, administrators were working on log collection and
analysis, along with restoring backups for comparison purposes.
By around 08:45 UTC it was clear that the privilege escalation had been achieved by gaining control of a Launchpad SSO account with Gerrit administrator privileges. By this time, we had ruled out software vulnerabilities. Logs showed the first unauthorized access of the administrator account in Gerrit on 2020-10-06. Communication with Launchpad admins agrees with this analysis. We saw one session opened as the administrator user to StoryBoard on this same day, but logs show no data was modified or hidden stories viewed.
Analysis has been performed on the Gerrit database and git trees from October 1st, pre-dating any known unauthorized access.
Access was restored at around 2020-10-21 00:00 UTC
Outcomes -----------
The following has been verified:
The administrator account used has been disabled and credentials updated
We have verified that all group and user addition/removals since Oct 1 are valid. The only invalid additions were made by the compromised administrator account to add a single user account to the Administrators group; and then that account added itself to another known group.
The account given administrator privilege has been removed from the groups it added itself to and is disabled.
There is no evidence of any unauthorized access via methods other than Gerrit HTTP and Gerrit SSH access.
No commits have been pushed to git trees bypassing code review. Every git tree has been compared to the Oct 1 version and all commits have been correctly inserted via Gerrit changes.
The version of Gerrit we use stores HTTP API passwords in plain-text. We know that a limited number of passwords were gathered via the HTTP API and it is possible passwords were gathered via the database. We thus have assumed that all HTTP API passwords have been disclosed. This password needs to be explicitly enabled by users, and many users do not have it enabled.
Remediation -----------
This leaves us with the following remediation actions:
Users should double-check their Launchpad recent activity at https://login.launchpad.net/activity for any suspicious logins. If found, please notify the OpenDev admins in Freenode #opendev and Launchpad admins in #launchpad immediately.
All HTTP API passwords have been cleared. If you push changes via HTTPS (instead of typical SSH), are a gertty user, or run a CI system or something else that communicates with the Gerrit HTTP API, you will need to regenerate a password.
Any SSH keys added to accounts since 2020-10-01 have been removed. This affects only a limited number of accounts. This is done in an abundance of caution, and we do not believe any accounts had unauthorized SSH keys added
We should audit all changes for projects since 2020-10-01.
We have no evidence that any account had its ssh keys compromised, thus we can rule out any unauthorized changes being uploaded via SSH. However we can not conclusively rule out that compromised HTTP API passwords were used to push a change through Gerrit. For example, a change could be uploaded that looks like it came from a user, or the API key of a core team member may have been used to approve a change without authorization.
Given our extensive analysis we consider it exceedingly unlikely that this vector was used. We have had no notifications of users seeing unexpected changes either uploaded by them, or approved by them in projects they work on. This said, we believe it is important to inform the community of this very unlikely, but still possible, vulnerability of the source code.
To this end, we have prepared a list of all changes from the known affected period which should be audited for correctness. These are available at
https://static.opendev.org/project/opendev.org/gerrit-diffs/
Team members should browse these changes and make sure they were correctly approved in Gerrit. If any change looks suspicious you should notify OpenDev administrators in Freenode #opendev immediately.
Further actions ----------------
We are planning the following for the short term future:
The Opendev administrators will be looking at alternative models for Gerrit admin account management.
We are already well into planning and testing a coming upgrade to a version of Gerrit which does not store plain-text API keys.
Longer term, we've written a spec for replacing Launchpad SSO as our authentication provider.
We thank you for your patience during this trying time, and we look forward to returning to supporting the community doing what it does best -- working together to create great things.
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