Circling back on this topic. I marked all the patches that incorporate system-scope support as WIP [0]. I think we can come back to these after we have a chance to decouple project IDs from cinder's API in Xena. I imagine that's going to be a pretty big change so we can push those reviews to the back burner for now. In the meantime, I reproposed all patches that touch the ADMIN_OR_OWNER rule and updated them to use the member and reader roles [1]. I also removed any system-scope policies from those patches. The surface area of these changes is a lot less than what we were originally expecting to get done for Wallaby. These changes should at least allow operators to use the member and reader roles on projects consistently with cinder when Wallaby goes out the door. To recap, this would mean anyone with the admin role on a project is still considered a system administrator in cinder (we can try and fix this in Xena). Operators can now use the member role to denote owners and give users the reader role on a project and those users shouldn't be able to make writable changes within cinder. [0] https://review.opendev.org/q/project:openstack/cinder+topic:secure-rbac+labe... [1] https://review.opendev.org/q/project:openstack/cinder+topic:secure-rbac+labe... On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 11:24 AM Gorka Eguileor <geguileo@redhat.com> wrote:
Hey folks,
As I'm sure some of the cinder folks are aware, I'm updating cinder policies to include support for some default personas keystone ships with. Some of those personas use system-scope (e.g., system-reader and system-admin) and I've already proposed a series of patches that describe what those changes look like from a policy perspective [0].
The question now is how we test those changes. To help guide that decision, I worked on three different testing approaches. The first was to continue testing policy using unit tests in cinder with mocked context objects. The second was to use DDT with keystonemiddleware mocked to remove a dependency on keystone. The third also used DDT, but included changes to update NoAuthMiddleware so that it wasn't as opinionated about authentication or authorization. I brought each approach in the cinder meeting this week where we discussed a fourth approach, doing everything in tempest. I summarized all of this in an etherpad [1]
Up to yesterday morning, the only approach I hadn't tinkered with manually was tempest. I spent some time today figuring that out, resulting in a patch to cinderlib [2] to enable a protection test job, and cinder_tempest_plugin [3] that adds the plumbing and some example tests.
In the process of implementing support for tempest testing, I noticed
service catalogs for system-scoped tokens don't contain cinder endpoints [4]. This is because the cinder endpoint contains endpoint templating in the URL [5], which keystone will substitute with the project ID of the token, if and only if the catalog is built for a project-scoped token. System and domain-scoped tokens do not have a reasonable project ID to use in this case, so the templating is skipped, resulting in a cinder service in the catalog without endpoints [6].
This cascades in the client, specifically tempest's volume client, because it can't find a suitable endpoint for request to the volume service [7].
Initially, my testing approaches were to provide examples for cinder developers to assess the viability of each approach before committing to a protection testing strategy. But, the tempest approach highlighted a larger issue for how we integrate system-scope support into cinder because of
On 28/01, Lance Bragstad wrote: that the
assumption there will always be a project ID in the path (for the majority of the cinder API). I can think of two ways to approach the problem, but I'm hoping others have more.
Hi Lance,
Sorry to hear that the Cinder is giving you such trouble.
First, we remove project IDs from cinder's API path.
This would be similar to how nova (and I assume other services) moved away from project-specific URLs (e.g., /v3/%{project_id}s/volumes would become /v3/volumes). This would obviously require refactoring to remove any assumptions cinder has about project IDs being supplied on the request path. But, this would force all authorization information to come from the context object. Once a deployer removes the endpoint URL templating, the endpoints will populate in the cinder entry of the service catalog. Brian's been helping me understand this and we're unsure if this is something we could even do with a microversion. I think nova did it moving from /v2/ to /v2.0/, which was technically classified as a major bump? This feels like a moon shot.
In my opinion such a change should not be treated as a microversion and would require us to go into v4, which is not something that is feasible in the short term.
Second, we update cinder's clients, including tempest, to put the project ID on the URL.
After we update the clients to append the project ID for cinder endpoints, we should be able to remove the URL templating in keystone, allowing cinder endpoints to appear in system-scoped service catalogs (just like the first approach). Clients can use the base URL from the catalog and append the
I'm not familiar with keystone catalog entries, so maybe I'm saying something stupid, but couldn't we have multiple entries? A project-specific URL and another one for the project and system scoped requests?
I know it sounds kind of hackish, but if we add them in the right order, first the project one and then the new one, it would probably be backward compatible, as older clients would get the first endpoint and new clients would be able to select the right one.
admin project ID before putting the request on the wire. Even though the request has a project ID in the path, cinder would ignore it for system-specific APIs. This is already true for users with an admin role on a project because cinder will allow you to get volumes in one project if you have a token scoped to another with the admin role [8]. One potential side-effect is that cinder clients would need *a* project ID to build a request, potentially requiring another roundtrip to keystone.
What would happen in this additional roundtrip? Would we be converting provided project's name into its UUID?
If that's the case then it wouldn't happen when UUIDs are being provided, so for cases where this extra request means a performance problem they could just provide the UUID.
Thoughts?
Truth is that I would love to see the Cinder API move into URLs without the project id as well as move out everything from contrib, but that doesn't seem like a realistic piece of work we can bite right now.
So I think your second proposal is the way to go.
Thanks for all the work you are putting into this.
Cheers, Gorka.
[0]
https://review.opendev.org/q/project:openstack/cinder+topic:secure-rbac
[1] https://etherpad.opendev.org/p/cinder-secure-rbac-protection-testing [2] https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/cinderlib/+/772770 [3] https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/cinder-tempest-plugin/+/772915 [4] http://paste.openstack.org/show/802117/ [5] http://paste.openstack.org/show/802097/ [6]
https://opendev.org/openstack/keystone/src/commit/c239cc66615b41a0c09e031b3e...
[7] http://paste.openstack.org/show/802092/ [8] http://paste.openstack.org/show/802118/