- openstack-discuss - lists.openstack.org

[horizon][python-openstackclient] Hypervisor listed in dashboard but not in CLI
by Francesco Di Nucci 05 Jul '24

05 Jul '24

Hello, I am having a strange "error" with an hypervisor. It works and it is shown in Horizon under /Admin/System/System Information/Compute Services/, but it is not listed through the CLI with /openstack hypervisor list/ Any suggestion on how to prevent this? Thanks in advance -- Francesco Di Nucci System Administrator Compute & Networking Service, INFN Naples Email:francesco.dinucci@na.infn.it

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Magnum Caracal: how to use the K8s cluster API instead of Heat driver
by Michel Jouvin 05 Jul '24

05 Jul '24

Hi, In our testing of Caracal Magnum, we saw that the cluster upgrade feature is now disabled for clusters using the Heat driver. There are many good reasons for this explained at [1] and [2] in particular. But I don't see any Magnum documentation of this new approach to K8s cluster provisionning. Is https://vexxhost.github.io/magnum-cluster-api/ the authoritative place? I had a quick look to the URL above but I am not sure I understood what configures Magnum to use Cluster API rather than Heat driver. Is Magnum configured to use one or the other for all clusters it manages? Is it a per cluster choice? How it works to transition from Heat driver to Cluster API, ie how it works if you have existing clusters configured with Heat drivers and if you are creating new ones with Cluster API? Best regards, Michel [1] https://opendev.org/openstack/magnum/commit/2fd3059f3885ff4a14f7f0141016196… (see comments in the code, at line 313) [2] https://vexxhost.com/blog/cluster-api-driver-openstack-magnum/

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[manila] Bugsquash event: Jul 10th to 12th
by Carlos Silva 04 Jul '24

04 Jul '24

Hello, zorilla and interested stackers! We are going to have our first bugsquash of this cycle in the next week. For this event, we will be focusing on pursuing closure for bugs that are currently in progress. - It will start next Wednesday (July 10) and ends on Friday (July 12th). - We will have a kick-off meeting to go over the list of bugs as usual on Wednesday, 14 UTC, and work on assignments if needed. - We will use half of the next upstream weekly meeting to talk about the progress and discuss ongoing reviews. All of the details will be added to the bugsquash etherpad [1]. Looking forward to closing a lot of bugs with your help! [1] https://etherpad.opendev.org/p/manila-dalmatian-m2-bugsquash Regards, carloss

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[CloudKitty] query regarding ElasticSearch usage
by Rafael Weingärtner 04 Jul '24

04 Jul '24

Hello OpenStack community and users of CloudKitty! There have been some discussions in our bi-weekly meetings and vPTG meetings regarding the deprecation and removal of ElasticSearch support as a storage backend. Therefore, this e-mail is to consult/query users regarding ElasticSearch users. If there are no people using it anymore with CloudKitty, we are considering the alternative of removing it and maintaining only the OpenSearch support. We would like to hear back from you guys. Let me know if you are using ElasticSearch, and if you intend to stick with it. Also, do you guys feel the need to improve something in its support in CloudKitty. Thanks in advance for your feedback! -- Rafael Weingärtner

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Magnum issues http requests to other services when internal/admin endpoint is https
by Michel Jouvin 04 Jul '24

04 Jul '24

Hi, We have reconfigured our cloud with a Nginx sever handling TLS in front of every API service, as described in https://docs.openstack.org/security-guide/secure-communication/secure-refer…. Previously we used to have Magnum/Heat/Barbican endpoints using http rather than https (not good!). Since this change, we have seen problems in Magnum (starting in Antelope when we did the change but still present in Caracal) where some "internal" requests to Barbican and Heat are done in http rather than https. We worked around this defining a redirect to https on 497 status code, as documented in Nginx documentation but it is not really satisfying as it means all clients, not only Magnum service, could use http on the https port and get serviced. I remember seing an issue on Launchpad about this issue but forgot the issue number. We were wondering wether it would not be better, at least until the problem is fixed, to define the internal+admin endpoints with http rather than https. According to our tests, it fixes the problem, as expected. Thanks in advance for any thought or experience on this. Best regards, Michel

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[nova] volume information was duplicated when Live Migration failed
by Junya Noguchi (Fujitsu) 04 Jul '24

04 Jul '24

To whom it may concern Hi. I encountered an issue with OpenStack where volume information was duplicated when Live Migration failed. Could you please provide a solution to this issue? [Issue] After a Live Migration failure, when I checked the volume where the error occurred using the 'openstack volume list' command, the following was displayed: +--------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ID | Name | Status | Size | Attached to | +--------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 9ba9734f-575e-41de-8bb4-60839388e0ad | | in-use | 10 | Attached to 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda Attached to 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda Attached to | | | | | | 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda Attached to 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda Attached to | | | | | | 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda Attached to 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda Attached to | | | | | | 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda Attached to 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda | I expect that the 'Attached to' display should only appear once as there is one volume connected, but it is duplicated for each failed attempt. The versions of OpenStack and nova are as follows: OpenStack Zed $ openstack --version openstack 6.0.0 $ nova --version nova CLI is deprecated and will be a removed in a future release 18.1.0 [Details] The volume display is duplicated under the following conditions: - When Live Migration of an instance fails If the communication between the ports required for Live Migration is closed, Live Migration will fail when executed. $ sudo netstat -tuln | grep 16509 $ The output of nova-compute.log at the time of Live Migration failure is as follows: --- 2024-02-28 17:04:32.119 2785 ERROR nova.virt.libvirt.driver [-] [instance: 521eb55f-535d-4fa7-a27e-447b0bbae9b4] Live Migration failure: unable to connect to server at 'XXXXX.com:16509': Connection refused: libvirt.libvirtError: unable to connect to server at 'XXXXX.com:16509': Connection refused 2024-02-28 17:04:32.119 2785 DEBUG nova.virt.libvirt.driver [-] [instance: 521eb55f-535d-4fa7-a27e-447b0bbae9b4] Migration operation thread notification thread_finished /usr/lib/python3.9/site-packages/nova/virt/libvirt/driver.py:10516 2024-02-28 17:04:32.607 2785 DEBUG nova.virt.libvirt.migration [-] [instance: 521eb55f-535d-4fa7-a27e-447b0bbae9b4] VM running on src, migration failed _log /usr/lib/python3.9/site-packages/nova/virt/libvirt/migration.py:432 2024-02-28 17:04:32.608 2785 DEBUG nova.virt.libvirt.driver [-] [instance: 521eb55f-535d-4fa7-a27e-447b0bbae9b4] Fixed incorrect job type to be 4 _live_migration_monitor /usr/lib/python3.9/site-packages/nova/virt/libvirt/driver.py:10330 2024-02-28 17:04:32.608 2785 ERROR nova.virt.libvirt.driver [-] [instance: 521eb55f-535d-4fa7-a27e-447b0bbae9b4] Migration operation has aborted --- After Live Migration, when I check the volume where the error occurred using the 'openstack volume list' command, the following is displayed: +--------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ID | Name | Status | Size | Attached to | +--------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 9ba9734f-575e-41de-8bb4-60839388e0ad | | in-use | 10 | Attached to 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda Attached to 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda Attached to | | | | | | 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda Attached to 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda Attached to | | | | | | 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda Attached to 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda Attached to | | | | | | 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda Attached to 73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda | '73c4c6e8-fe34-4f87-9f26-e70b4cc593ba on /dev/vda' is displayed as many times as Live Migration failed. The duplicate display did not disappear even after Live Migration was successful. Thanks,

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[kolla-ansible][letsencrypt] containers are running but not getting certificates.
by Jonathan Proulx 03 Jul '24

03 Jul '24

Hi All, I'm trying to do a test multinode deploy using 2023.2 I have letsencrypt_webserver and letsencrypt_lego contsainers running and I'm seeing random traffic in the /var/log/kolla/letsencrypt/letsencrypt-webserver-access.log so fairly confident they're plumbed through to the public internet properly, but I don't seem to be getting certificates. how can I trigger a renewal attempt so I can maybe see what I've screwed up? Thanks, -Jon -- Jonathan Proulx (he/him) Sr. Technical Architect The Infrastructure Group MIT CSAIL

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[OSSA-2024-001] OpenStack Cinder, Glance, Nova: Arbitrary file access through custom QCOW2 external data (CVE-2024-32498)
by Jeremy Stanley 02 Jul '24

02 Jul '24

======================================================================= OSSA-2024-001: Arbitrary file access through custom QCOW2 external data ======================================================================= :Date: July 02, 2024 :CVE: CVE-2024-32498 Affects ~~~~~~~ - Cinder: <22.1.3, >=23.0.0 <23.1.1, ==24.0.0 - Glance: <26.0.1, ==27.0.0, >=28.0.0 <28.0.2 - Nova: <27.3.1, >=28.0.0 <28.1.1, >=29.0.0 <29.0.3 Description ~~~~~~~~~~~ Martin Kaesberger reported a vulnerability in QCOW2 image processing for Cinder, Glance and Nova. By supplying a specially created QCOW2 image which references a specific data file path, an authenticated user may convince systems to return a copy of that file's contents from the server resulting in unauthorized access to potentially sensitive data. All Cinder deployments are affected; only Glance deployments with image conversion enabled are affected; all Nova deployments are affected. Patches ~~~~~~~ - https://review.opendev.org/923247 (2023.1/antelope(cinder)) - https://review.opendev.org/923277 (2023.1/antelope(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923278 (2023.1/antelope(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923279 (2023.1/antelope(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923280 (2023.1/antelope(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923281 (2023.1/antelope(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923282 (2023.1/antelope(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923283 (2023.1/antelope(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923288 (2023.1/antelope(nova)) - https://review.opendev.org/923289 (2023.1/antelope(nova)) - https://review.opendev.org/923290 (2023.1/antelope(nova)) - https://review.opendev.org/923281 (2023.1/antelope(nova)) - https://review.opendev.org/923246 (2023.2/bobcat(cinder)) - https://review.opendev.org/923266 (2023.2/bobcat(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923267 (2023.2/bobcat(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923268 (2023.2/bobcat(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923269 (2023.2/bobcat(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923270 (2023.2/bobcat(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923271 (2023.2/bobcat(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923272 (2023.2/bobcat(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923284 (2023.2/bobcat(nova)) - https://review.opendev.org/923285 (2023.2/bobcat(nova)) - https://review.opendev.org/923286 (2023.2/bobcat(nova)) - https://review.opendev.org/923287 (2023.2/bobcat(nova)) - https://review.opendev.org/923245 (2024.1/caracal(cinder)) - https://review.opendev.org/923259 (2024.1/caracal(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923260 (2024.1/caracal(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923261 (2024.1/caracal(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923262 (2024.1/caracal(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923263 (2024.1/caracal(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923264 (2024.1/caracal(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923265 (2024.1/caracal(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923273 (2024.1/caracal(nova)) - https://review.opendev.org/923274 (2024.1/caracal(nova)) - https://review.opendev.org/923275 (2024.1/caracal(nova)) - https://review.opendev.org/923276 (2024.1/caracal(nova)) - https://review.opendev.org/923244 (2024.2/dalmatian(cinder)) - https://review.opendev.org/923248 (2024.2/dalmatian(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923249 (2024.2/dalmatian(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923250 (2024.2/dalmatian(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923251 (2024.2/dalmatian(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923252 (2024.2/dalmatian(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923253 (2024.2/dalmatian(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923254 (2024.2/dalmatian(glance)) - https://review.opendev.org/923255 (2024.2/dalmatian(nova)) - https://review.opendev.org/923256 (2024.2/dalmatian(nova)) - https://review.opendev.org/923257 (2024.2/dalmatian(nova)) - https://review.opendev.org/923258 (2024.2/dalmatian(nova)) Credits ~~~~~~~ - Martin Kaesberger (CVE-2024-32498) References ~~~~~~~~~~ - https://launchpad.net/bugs/2059809 - http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-32498 Notes ~~~~~ - Due to the scope of the problem and complexity of the resulting fixes, regressions and additional bypasses were reported in the original bug by downstream stakeholders during the coordinated disclosure period. As a result, our initially chosen publication date was rescheduled, which put the advisory four days past our promised ninety day maximum embargo length. Additional revised patches and regression fixes were supplied to stakeholders as soon as possible, but we understand the unfortunate timing of these last-minute changes resulted in a lot of additional work for everyone involved. -- Jeremy Stanley OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team

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[Cinder] Extending Specs Freeze Deadline to Jun 7
by Jon Bernard 02 Jul '24

02 Jul '24

Hello, As discussed in the last cinder meeting [1] we are extending the cinder specs freeze deadline to June 7. The previous week contains holidays for some on our team, so the weekend days are added to make sure everything that needs to merge has sufficient time to do so. Please make sure your specs are updated before the new deadline. [1]: https://meetings.opendev.org/meetings/cinder/2024/cinder.2024-06-26-14.00.l… Thanks, -- Jon

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any idiomatic testtools / stestr patterns for asyncio?
by Mike Bayer 02 Jul '24

02 Jul '24

hey gang - I'm adding asyncio support to oslo.db. Fairly major block hit, which I can work around, is that testtools / stestr do not seem to have any provision for asyncio present. An initial attempt working with it gracefully looked like this (using oslotests base, which is the testtoolsTestBase): import unittest from oslotest import base class MyTestSuite(unittest.IsolatedAsyncioTestCase, base.BaseTestCase): # ... but that didn't work because the degree to which testtools modifies the run() method of unittest.TestCase prevents IsolatedAsyncioTestCase from running awaitable test cases. Next attempt is this, remove testtools / oslotest from the class hierarchy (which is bad, because we lose all of our testtools patterns): class MyTestSuite(unittest.IsolatedAsyncioTestCase): # ... this runs, however stestr sends into the test suite a Result object that is not a subclass of unittest.result.TestResult, it's a "subunit.test_results.AutoTimingTestResultDecorator" that does not TestResult in its MRO; unittest shows a warning that there is no addDuration() method on the result object. final workaround, patch one on, here's my base: class BaseAsyncioCase(unittest.IsolatedAsyncioTestCase): def run(self, result=None): # work around stestr sending a result object that's not a # unittest.TestResult result.addDuration = lambda test, elapsed: None return super().run(result=result) now I can run asyncio tests. But only by ditching testtools entirely. What would be the correct approach to introducing asyncio support in our test suites given our dependency on testtools?

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