June 2021 - openstack-discuss - lists.openstack.org

It's time to submit your OpenStack User Survey
by Allison Price 19 Aug '21

19 Aug '21

Hi everyone, Here’s my annual email requesting you complete the OpenStack User Survey [1] and share with your local communities / community friends who are operating OpenStack. Anonymous reposes and aggregated data from the User Survey are shared with the OPenStack PTLs and overall community to help understand operator software requirements. If you have never taken it before, please do! We welcome your feedback and I am happy to answer any questions you may have. If you are one of the many who have, all of your previous information should be stored, so you will just need to provide updates where relevant and re-save. Thank you all! Cheers, Allison [1] https://www.openstack.org/user-survey/survey-2021 <https://www.openstack.org/user-survey/survey-2021> Allison Price Director of Marketing & Community OpenInfra Foundation e: allison(a)openstack.org <mailto:allison@openstack.org>

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[masakari] Compute service with name XXXXX not found.
by at 19 Aug '21

19 Aug '21

Hi, I have some problem with masakari. I can create segment (from CLI and Horizon), but can't create host (the same result from Horizon and CLI). openstack segment host create XXXXX COMPUTE SSH segment_id returns BadRequest: Compute service with name XXXXX could not be found. XXXXX is the name which Horizon suggest, and it's a name of compute host. openstack compute service list returns proper list with state up/enabled on compute hosts (zone nova) Maybe I misunderstood some parameters of host create? As "type" I use COMPUTE, what value should it be? From "Binary" column of openstack compute service list? What is "control_attributes" field, because documentation lacks preceise information what value should be there and what is it use for. Tried to found some info on this error but I haven't found anything... Thanks in advance for any help. Best regards Adam Tomas

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[interop][cinder] review of next.json (part 2)
by Brian Rosmaita 09 Aug '21

09 Aug '21

Hello Interop WG, The Cinder team completed its discussion of what capabilities should be added as advisory in next.json at yesterday's weekly cinder meeting [0]. The tldr; is that we don't have anything to propose for inclusion in next.json at the present time. The team does have some general questions that would help us determine the suitability of some proposed capabilities. We'd like to invite someone from the Interop WG to the cinder xena R-9 virtual midcycle (Wednesday 4 August 2021, 1400-1600 UTC) so we can discuss this "live". So if someone could put 1400 UTC 4 August on their schedule for a 20 minute discussion, that would be very helpful. cheers, brian [0] http://eavesdrop.openstack.org/meetings/cinder/2021/cinder.2021-05-12-14.00…

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Re: [neutron-vpnaas][kolla-ansible][victoria] Growing memory consumption with only one VPN connection
by at 09 Aug '21

09 Aug '21

Hi, 1. There is only one, bidirectional vpn connection between project networks in two regions 2. there is no (or almost no) traffic on this vpn link 3. second region is on one host (kolla all-in-one) and situation looks the same- with vpn service enabled there is excessive Memory use (growing also about 5-6MB/ minute and forcing the system to use swapfile) there is no big cpu usage (ofcourse also due to no traffic inside VPN) It's the same case even if there's no vpn connection configured. Best regards Adam Tomas Wysłane z iPhone'a > Wiadomość napisana przez Vinh Nguyen Duc <vinhducnguyen1708(a)gmail.com> w dniu 29.06.2021, o godz. 11:04: > > > Hi Adam, > Do you think the VPN connection is use CPU and memory to encrypt the VPN traffic? > > On Mon, Jun 28, 2021 at 14:30 Adam Tomas <bkslash(a)poczta.onet.pl <mailto:bkslash@poczta.onet.pl>> wrote: > Hi, > I have problem with neutron vpnaas - after enabling vpnaas plugin everything was ok at first. I was able to create VPN connection and communication is correct. But after a week of running vpnaas (only one VPN connection created/working!) I’ve noticed, that neutron-vpnaas takes more and more memory. I have 5 processes on each controller (there should be always five? Or it is changing dynamically?): > > 42435 1545384 0.6 8.6 5802516 5712412 ? S Jun15 110:50 /var/lib/kolla/venv/bin/python3.8 /var/lib/kolla/venv/bin/neutron-server --config-file /etc/neutron/neutron.conf --config-file /etc/neutron/plugins/ml2/ml2_conf.ini --config-file /etc/neutron/neutron_vpnaas.conf > 42435 1545389 0.6 8.5 5735832 5645856 ? S Jun15 112:16 /var/lib/kolla/venv/bin/python3.8 /var/lib/kolla/venv/bin/neutron-server --config-file /etc/neutron/neutron.conf --config-file /etc/neutron/plugins/ml2/ml2_conf.ini --config-file /etc/neutron/neutron_vpnaas.conf > 42435 1545378 0.5 8.5 5734192 5643620 ? S Jun15 108:09 /var/lib/kolla/venv/bin/python3.8 /var/lib/kolla/venv/bin/neutron-server --config-file /etc/neutron/neutron.conf --config-file /etc/neutron/plugins/ml2/ml2_conf.ini --config-file /etc/neutron/neutron_vpnaas.conf > 42435 1545372 0.5 8.5 5731128 5641436 ? S Jun15 109:07 /var/lib/kolla/venv/bin/python3.8 /var/lib/kolla/venv/bin/neutron-server --config-file /etc/neutron/neutron.conf --config-file /etc/neutron/plugins/ml2/ml2_conf.ini --config-file /etc/neutron/neutron_vpnaas.conf > 42435 1545369 0.6 8.4 5637084 5547392 ? S Jun15 114:21 /var/lib/kolla/venv/bin/python3.8 /var/lib/kolla/venv/bin/neutron-server --config-file /etc/neutron/neutron.conf --config-file /etc/neutron/plugins/ml2/ml2_conf.ini --config-file /etc/neutron/neutron_vpnaas.conf > > now neutron_server takes over 27G of RAM on each controller: > > neutron_server running 10.2 27.2G > > After stopping all neutron containers and starting it again neutron takes a lot less memory: > > neutron_server running 0.5 583M > > but memory usage keeps growing (about 5-6 M every minute). > What’s wrong? When I disable vpnaas globally there’s no problem with excessive memory usage, so it’s vpnaas for sure… > > Best regards > Adam Tomas

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[nova][neutron][deployment-projects] Re secbug #1734320
by Radosław Piliszek 03 Aug '21

03 Aug '21

Hello Folks! I am writing this because a recent patch proposed to DevStack [1] mentioned "when using ml2/ovs vif isolation should always be used to prevent cross tenant traffic during a live migration" which is related to secbug #1734320 "Eavesdropping private traffic" [2]. However, I've found that none of the publicly-available deployment projects seem to be using ``isolate_vif``. [3] [4] Should this be corrected? PS: I used the deployment-projects tag as a collective tag to avoid mentioning all the projects (as it is too long to write :-) ). I hope that relevant people see this if need be or someone passes the information to them. For now, I am curious whether this should actually be enforced by default with ML2/OVS. [1] https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/devstack/+/796826 [2] https://bugs.launchpad.net/neutron/+bug/1734320 [3] https://codesearch.opendev.org/?q=%5Cbisolate_vif%5Cb&i=nope&files=&exclude… [4] https://github.com/search?p=1&q=isolate_vif&type=Code -yoctozepto

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[horizon][stable] [release] Proposal to make stable/queen as EOL
by vishal manchanda 16 Jul '21

16 Jul '21

Hi all, As discussed in the last horizon weekly meeting[1] on 2021-06-23, I would like to announce that the horizon team decided to make stable/queen branch as EOL. Consider this mail as an official announcement for that. I would like to know if anyone still would like to keep this branch to be open otherwise, I will purpose an EOL patch for this branch. Thanks & Regards, Vishal Manchanda [1] https://meetings.opendev.org/meetings/horizon/2021/horizon.2021-06-23-15.00…

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[nova][stable] Adding nova-core to nova stable branches
by Stephen Finucane 13 Jul '21

13 Jul '21

Happy Friday (again), Following on from my earlier email regarding os-vif stable branch permissions, I'd like to once again propose that we add nova-core to the list of teams with +2 rights on nova stable branches. Unlike the os-vif change, this has been discussed extensively in the past, most recently during the Victoria PTG [1] (search for "Can we add nova-core to nova-stable-maint") and therefore carries a little more baggage with it. Last time we discussed this, there were concerns from some existing stable cores that not all of nova-core were sufficiently well acquainted with stable branch policy and it was suggested that review velocity was sufficient. However, the stable team has remained pretty stable (heh) over the last couple of cycles and is staffed with developers with ample experience of both nova itself and the backport policies of nova and OpenStack as a whole. In addition, we continue to have a long tail of open stable reviews [2] from various people. The stable branches are increasingly important for users and organizations alike, and a faster, smoother backport policy encourages people to have an upstream-first mentality when it comes to maintaining a product built on these branches. The alternative is to handle these backports in a downstream-first or downstream- only manner, which results in duplication of effort and, over the long-term, potential difficulties keeping downstream and upstream in-sync. I think the time has long since passed where we should remove the artificial barrier that exists here. I expect all nova cores will have the maturity and sensibility to ask questions where uncertainty exists and only approve backports that they are confident and knowledgeable about. I do not expect existing stable cores will be sidelined either. Far from it, in fact. Existing stable cores will continue to be valuable both for their reviews and knowledge of the intricacies of stable policy. I proposed a waiting period of one week before making changes to os-vif permissions, but given the history around changes to nova stable core, I think we would benefit from some additional time to assuage any concerns that may still exist. I propose that we come to a decision by 09-Aug, or two weeks from now. If necessary, we can discuss this in real-time during the nova team meeting next Tuesday. Cheers, Stephen [1] https://etherpad.opendev.org/p/nova-victoria-ptg [2] https://review.opendev.org/q/project:openstack/nova+NOT+branch:master+is:op…

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placement service issue (placement-status upgrade check failure)
by Deepak Mohanty 12 Jul '21

12 Jul '21

I need your help with installation of placement service on Ubuntu 20.04. I have followed the steps in: https://docs.openstack.org/placement/wallaby/install/install-ubuntu.html I am facing the following issue when I try to verify the installation: $ placement-status upgrade check Error: Traceback (most recent call last): File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/oslo_upgradecheck/upgradecheck.py", line 196, in run return conf.command.action_fn() File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/oslo_upgradecheck/upgradecheck.py", line 104, in check result = func_name(self, **kwargs) File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/oslo_upgradecheck/common_checks.py", line 41, in check_policy_json policy_path = conf.find_file(conf.oslo_policy.policy_file) File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/oslo_config/cfg.py", line 2543, in find_file raise NotInitializedError() oslo_config.cfg.NotInitializedError: call expression on parser has not been invoked I did a bit of debugging and found that the policy file is: policy.json. I could not find any policy.json on my machine. I created an empty policy.json at: /etc/placement/policy.json (user and group = placement). That too did not work. I have followed the steps in the install guide twice, deleting the placement database and other resources and recreating them. I continue to see the same issue. Thank you for your time.

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[ patrole ] Understanding RBAC Permission Exceptions
by darumaseye 12 Jul '21

12 Jul '21

Hello, I am a researcher studying security of the Openstack's Policies. I'm very interested in the Patrole project and I would like to ask you some questions. In the documentation it is stated that Patrole compares two different types of results: - an expected one ( derived from oslo.policy ) - an actual one ( derived from an actual request to the API ). Given that, Patrole's tests can return 3 different values: 1) "Success" if actual result and expected result are both True or both False; 2) "RbacOverPermissionException" if actual result is True but expected result is False; 3) "RbacUnderPermissionException" in the other case. I can't understand in which cases the tests can return a value different from "Success". As far as I know, an API call should always be validated internally by oslo.policy's rules, before being allowed. So, in order for an API call to be accepted, oslo.policy's rules must allow that API call. It seems to me that the "expected" result ( derived from oslo.policy ) is always included in the actual result. Hoping that everything I said is correct, I would like to ask you: What issue is allowing such a strange behavior in Openstack APIs ? Why the expected results can be different from the actual ones? Are there publicly available examples showing "Failure" values? In general, are there any publicly available test cases that i can study to understand this? I Would like to thank you very much in advance; Best Regards, Jacopo

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[all][infra][qa] Retiring Logstash, Elasticsearch, subunit2sql, and Health
by Clark Boylan 09 Jul '21

09 Jul '21

Hello everyone, Xenial has recently reached the end of its life. Our logstash+kibana+elasticsearch and subunit2sql+health data crunching services all run on Xenial. Even without the distro platform EOL concerns these services are growing old and haven't received the care they need to keep running reliably. Additionally these services represent a large portion of our resource consumption: * 6 x 16 vcpu + 60GB RAM + 1TB disk Elasticsearch servers * 20 x 4 vcpu + 4GB RAM logstash-worker servers * 1 x 2 vcpu + 2GB RAM logstash/kibana central server * 2 x 8 vcpu + 8GB RAM subunit-worker servers * 64GB RAM + 500GB disk subunit2sql trove db server * 1 x 4 vcpu + 4GB RAM health server To put things in perspective, they account for more than a quarter of our control plane servers, occupying over a third of our block storage and in excess of half the total memory footprint. The OpenDev/OpenStack Infra team(s) don't seem to have the time available currently to do the major lifting required to bring these services up to date. I would like to propose that we simply turn them off. All of these services operate off of public data that will not be going away (specifically job log content). If others are interested in taking this on they can hook into this data and run their own processing pipelines. I am sure not everyone will be happy with this proposal. I get it. I came up with the idea for the elasticsearch job log processing way back at the San Diego summit. I spent many many many hours since working to get it up and running and to keep it running. But pragmatism means that my efforts and the team's efforts are better spent elsewhere. I am happy to hear feedback on this. Thank you for your time. Clark

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