[OSSA-2025-002] OpenStack Keystone: Unauthenticated access to EC2/S3 token endpoints can grant Keystone authorization (CVE PENDING)
========================================================================= OSSA-2025-002: Unauthenticated access to EC2/S3 token endpoints can grant Keystone authorization ========================================================================= :Date: November 04, 2025 :CVE: PENDING Affects ~~~~~~~ - Keystone: <26.0.1, ==27.0.0, ==28.0.0 Description ~~~~~~~~~~~ kay reported a vulnerability in Keystone’s ec2tokens and s3tokens APIs. By sending those endpoints a valid AWS Signature (e.g., from a presigned S3 URL), an unauthenticated attacker may obtain Keystone authorization (ec2tokens can yield a fully scoped token; s3tokens can reveal scope accepted by some services), resulting in unauthorized access and privilege escalation. Deployments where /v3/ec2tokens or /v3/s3tokens are reachable by unauthenticated clients (e.g., exposed on a public API) are affected. Patches ~~~~~~~ - https://review.opendev.org/966073 (2024.2/dalmatian(keystone)) - https://review.opendev.org/966067 (2024.2/dalmatian(swift)) - https://review.opendev.org/966071 (2025.1/epoxy(keystone)) - https://review.opendev.org/966064 (2025.1/epoxy(swift)) - https://review.opendev.org/966070 (2025.2/flamingo(keystone)) - https://review.opendev.org/966063 (2025.2/flamingo(swift)) - https://review.opendev.org/966069 (2026.1/gazpacho(keystone)) - https://review.opendev.org/966062 (2026.1/gazpacho(swift)) Credits ~~~~~~~ - kay (CVE PENDING) References ~~~~~~~~~~ - https://launchpad.net/bugs/2119646 Notes ~~~~~ - While the indicated Keystone patches are sufficient to mitigate this vulnerability, corresponding changes for Swift are included which keep its optional S3-like API working. - MITRE CVE Request 1930434 has been awaiting assignment since 2025-09-24, but once completed will result in an errata revision to this advisory reflecting the correct CVE ID. If any other CNA has assigned a CVE themselves in the meantime, please reject it so that we don't end up with duplicates. -- Jeremy Stanley OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team https://security.openstack.org/vmt.html
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Jeremy Stanley