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[all][elections][ptl] Project Team Lead Election Conclusion and Results
by Ian Y. Choi 08 Sep '21

08 Sep '21

Thank you to the electorate, to all those who voted and to all candidates who put their name forward for Project Team Lead (PTL) in this election. A healthy, open process breeds trust in our decision making capability thank you to all those who make this process possible. Now for the results of the PTL election process, please join me in extending congratulations to the following PTLs: * Barbican : Douglas Mendizábal * Blazar : Pierre Riteau * Cinder : Brian Rosmaita * Cloudkitty : Rafael Weingartner * Cyborg : Bailin Zhang * Designate : Michael Johnson * Ec2 Api : Andrey Pavlov * Freezer : ge cong * Glance : Abhishek Kekane * Horizon : Vishal Manchanda * Ironic : Iury Gregory Melo Ferreira * Kolla : Michal Nasiadka * Kuryr : Maysa de Macedo Souza * Magnum : Feilong Wang * Manila : Goutham Pacha Ravi * Masakari : Radosław Piliszek * Murano : Rong Zhu * Neutron : Lajos Katona * Nova : Sylvain Bauza * Octavia : Gregory Thiemonge * OpenStack Charms : Alex Kavanagh * Openstack Chef : Lance Albertson * OpenStack Helm : Gage Hugo * OpenStackAnsible : Dmitriy Rabotyagov * OpenStackSDK : Artem Goncharov * Quality Assurance : Martin Kopec * Rally : Andrey Kurilin * Release Management : Elod Illes * Requirements : Matthew Thode * Senlin : XueFeng Liu * Solum : Rong Zhu * Storlets : Takashi Kajinami * Swift : Tim Burke * Tacker : Yasufumi Ogawa * Telemetry : Matthias Runge * Tripleo : James Slagle * Trove : Lingxian Kong * Vitrage : Eyal Bar-Ilan * Watcher : chen ke * Winstackers : Lucian Petrut * Zaqar : wang hao Elections: * Cyborg: https://civs1.civs.us/cgi-bin/results.pl?id=E_807146df7d6a1d3b Election process details and results are also available here: https://governance.openstack.org/election/ Thank you to all involved in the PTL election process, Ian Y. Choi, on behalf of the OpenStack Technical Election Officials

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[OSSA-2021-005] Neutron: Arbitrary dnsmasq reconfiguration via extra_dhcp_opts (CVE-2021-40085)
by Jeremy Stanley 31 Aug '21

31 Aug '21

==================================================================== OSSA-2021-005: Arbitrary dnsmasq reconfiguration via extra_dhcp_opts ==================================================================== :Date: August 31, 2021 :CVE: CVE-2021-40085 Affects ~~~~~~~ - Neutron: <16.4.1, >=17.0.0 <17.2.1, >=18.0.0 <18.1.1 Description ~~~~~~~~~~~ Pavel Toporkov reported a vulnerability in Neutron. By supplying a specially crafted extra_dhcp_opts value, an authenticated user may add arbitrary configuration to the dnsmasq process in order to crash the service, change parameters for other tenants sharing the same interface, or otherwise alter that daemon's behavior. This vulnerability may also be used to trigger a configuration parsing buffer overflow in versions of dnsmasq prior to 2.81, which could lead to remote code execution. All Neutron deployments are affected. Patches ~~~~~~~ - https://review.opendev.org/806750 (Ussuri) - https://review.opendev.org/806749 (Victoria) - https://review.opendev.org/806748 (Wallaby) - https://review.opendev.org/806746 (Xena) Credits ~~~~~~~ - Pavel Toporkov (CVE-2021-40085) References ~~~~~~~~~~ - https://launchpad.net/bugs/1939733 - http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-40085 -- Jeremy Stanley

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[OSSA-2021-004] Neutron: Linuxbridge ARP filter bypass on Netfilter platforms (CVE-2021-38598)
by Jeremy Stanley 17 Aug '21

17 Aug '21

=================================================================== OSSA-2021-004: Linuxbridge ARP filter bypass on Netfilter platforms =================================================================== :Date: August 17, 2021 :CVE: CVE-2021-38598 Affects ~~~~~~~ - Neutron: <16.4.1, >=17.0.0 <17.1.3, ==18.0.0 Description ~~~~~~~~~~~ Jake Yip with ARDC and Justin Mammarella with the University of Melbourne reported a vulnerability in Neutron's linuxbridge driver on newer Netfilter-based platforms (the successor to IPTables). By sending carefully crafted packets, anyone in control of a server instance connected to the virtual switch can impersonate the hardware addresses of other systems on the network, resulting in denial of service or in some cases possibly interception of traffic intended for other destinations. Only deployments using the linuxbridge driver with ebtables-nft are affected. Patches ~~~~~~~ - https://review.opendev.org/804058 (Train) - https://review.opendev.org/804057 (Ussuri) - https://review.opendev.org/804056 (Victoria) - https://review.opendev.org/785917 (Wallaby) - https://review.opendev.org/785177 (Xena) Credits ~~~~~~~ - Jake Yip from ARDC (CVE-2021-38598) - Justin Mammarella from University of Melbourne (CVE-2021-38598) References ~~~~~~~~~~ - https://launchpad.net/bugs/1938670 - http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-38598 Notes ~~~~~ - The stable/train branch is under extended maintenance and will receive no new point releases, but a patch for it is provided as a courtesy. -- Jeremy Stanley

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[OSSA-2021-003] Keystone: Account name and UUID oracles in account locking (CVE-2021-38155)
by Jeremy Stanley 10 Aug '21

10 Aug '21

=============================================================== OSSA-2021-003: Account name and UUID oracles in account locking =============================================================== :Date: August 10, 2021 :CVE: CVE-2021-38155 Affects ~~~~~~~ - Keystone: >=10.0.0 <16.0.2, >=17.0.0 <17.0.1, >=18.0.0 <18.0.1, >=19.0.0 <19.0.1 Description ~~~~~~~~~~~ Samuel de Medeiros Queiroz with Oi Cloud reported a vulnerability affecting Keystone account locking. By guessing the name of an account and failing to authenticate multiple times, any unauthenticated actor could both confirm the account exists and obtain that account's corresponding UUID, which might be leveraged for other unrelated attacks. All Keystone deployments enabling security_compliance.lockout_failure_attempts are affected. Patches ~~~~~~~ - https://review.opendev.org/790444 (Train) - https://review.opendev.org/790443 (Ussuri) - https://review.opendev.org/790442 (Victoria) - https://review.opendev.org/790440 (Wallaby) - https://review.opendev.org/759940 (Xena) Credits ~~~~~~~ - Samuel de Medeiros Queiroz from Oi Cloud (CVE-2021-38155) References ~~~~~~~~~~ - https://launchpad.net/bugs/1688137 - http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-38155 -- Jeremy Stanley

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[OSSA-2021-002] Nova: Open Redirect in noVNC proxy (CVE-2021-3654)
by Jeremy Stanley 29 Jul '21

29 Jul '21

=========================================== OSSA-2021-002: Open Redirect in noVNC proxy =========================================== :Date: July 29, 2021 :CVE: CVE-2021-3654 Affects ~~~~~~~ - Nova: <21.2.3, >=22.0.0 <22.2.3, >=23.0.0 <23.0.2 Description ~~~~~~~~~~~ Swe Aung, Shahaan Ayyub, and Salman Khan with the Monash University Cyber Security team reported a vulnerability affecting Nova's noVNC proxying implementation which exposed access to a well-known redirect behavior in the Python standard library's http.server.SimpleHTTPRequestHandler and thus noVNC's WebSockifyRequestHandler which uses it. By convincing a user to follow a specially-crafted novncproxy URL, the user could be redirected to an unrelated site under control of the attacker in an attempt to convince them to divulge credentials or other sensitive data. All Nova deployments with novncproxy enabled are affected. Patches ~~~~~~~ - https://review.opendev.org/791807 (Train) - https://review.opendev.org/791806 (Ussuri) - https://review.opendev.org/791805 (Victoria) - https://review.opendev.org/791577 (Wallaby) - https://review.opendev.org/791297 (Xena) Credits ~~~~~~~ - Swe Aung from Monash University Cyber Security team (CVE-2021-3654) - Shahaan Ayyub from Monash University Cyber Security team (CVE-2021-3654) - Salman Khan from Monash University Cyber Security team (CVE-2021-3654) References ~~~~~~~~~~ - https://launchpad.net/bugs/1927677 - https://bugs.python.org/issue32084 - http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3654 Notes ~~~~~ - The stable/train branch is under extended maintenance and will receive no new point releases, but a patch for it is provided as a courtesy. -- Jeremy Stanley

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[OSSA-2021-001] Neutron: Anti-spoofing bypass for Open vSwitch networks (CVE-2021-20267)
by Jeremy Stanley 12 Jul '21

12 Jul '21

============================================================= OSSA-2021-001: Anti-spoofing bypass for Open vSwitch networks ============================================================= :Date: July 12, 2021 :CVE: CVE-2021-20267 Affects ~~~~~~~ - Neutron: <16.3.3, >=17.0.0 <17.1.3, =18.0.0 Description ~~~~~~~~~~~ David Sinquin with Gandi.net reported a vulnerability in Neutron's default Open vSwitch firewall rules. By sending carefully crafted packets, anyone in control of a server instance connected to the virtual switch can impersonate the IPv6 addresses of other systems on the network, resulting in denial of service or in some cases possibly interception of traffic intended for other destinations. Only deployments using the Open vSwitch driver are affected. Patches ~~~~~~~ - https://review.opendev.org/777873 (Queens) - https://review.opendev.org/791470 (Queens) - https://review.opendev.org/777786 (Rocky) - https://review.opendev.org/791469 (Rocky) - https://review.opendev.org/777872 (Stein) - https://review.opendev.org/791500 (Stein) - https://review.opendev.org/777785 (Train) - https://review.opendev.org/791468 (Train) - https://review.opendev.org/777784 (Ussuri) - https://review.opendev.org/791467 (Ussuri) - https://review.opendev.org/777783 (Victoria) - https://review.opendev.org/791465 (Victoria) - https://review.opendev.org/776599 (Wallaby) - https://review.opendev.org/791464 (Wallaby) - https://review.opendev.org/783743 (Xena) Credits ~~~~~~~ - David Sinquin from Gandi.net (CVE-2021-20267) References ~~~~~~~~~~ - https://launchpad.net/bugs/1902917 - http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-20267 Notes ~~~~~ - The stable/train, stable/stein, stable/rocky, and stable/queens branches are under extended maintenance and will receive no new point releases, but patches for them are provided as a courtesy. -- Jeremy Stanley

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OpenStack Wallaby is officially released!
by Herve Beraud 14 Apr '21

14 Apr '21

Hello OpenStack community, I'm excited to announce the final releases for the components of OpenStack Wallaby, which concludes the Wallaby development cycle. You will find a complete list of all components, their latest versions, and links to individual project release notes documents listed on the new release site. https://releases.openstack.org/wallaby/ Congratulations to all of the teams who have contributed to this release! Our next production cycle, Xena, has already started. We will virtually meet April 19-23, 2021, for the Xena Project Teams Gathering. More details can be found on the PTG site: https://www.openstack.org/ptg Thanks, Hervé Beraud and the Release Management team -- Hervé Beraud Senior Software Engineer at Red Hat irc: hberaud https://github.com/4383/ https://twitter.com/4383hberaud -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- wsFcBAABCAAQBQJb4AwCCRAHwXRBNkGNegAALSkQAHrotwCiL3VMwDR0vcja10Q+ Kf31yCutl5bAlS7tOKpPQ9XN4oC0ZSThyNNFVrg8ail0SczHXsC4rOrsPblgGRN+ RQLoCm2eO1AkB0ubCYLaq0XqSaO+Uk81QxAPkyPCEGT6SRxXr2lhADK0T86kBnMP F8RvGolu3EFjlqCVgeOZaR51PqwUlEhZXZuuNKrWZXg/oRiY4811GmnvzmUhgK5G 5+f8mUg74hfjDbR2VhjTeaLKp0PhskjOIKY3vqHXofLuaqFDD+WrAy/NgDGvN22g glGfj472T3xyHnUzM8ILgAGSghfzZF5Skj2qEeci9cB6K3Hm3osj+PbvfsXE/7Kw m/xtm+FjnaywZEv54uCmVIzQsRIm1qJscu20Qw6Q0UiPpDFqD7O6tWSRKdX11UTZ hwVQTMh9AKQDBEh2W9nnFi9kzSSNu4OQ1dRMcYHWfd9BEkccezxHwUM4Xyov5Fe0 qnbfzTB1tYkjU78loMWFaLa00ftSxP/DtQ//iYVyfVNfcCwfDszXLOqlkvGmY1/Y F1ON0ONekDZkGJsDoS6QdiUSn8RZ2mHArGEWMV00EV5DCIbCXRvywXV43ckx8Z+3 B8qUJhBqJ8RS2F+vTs3DTaXqcktgJ4UkhYC2c1gImcPRyGrK9VY0sCT+1iA+wp/O v6rDpkeNksZ9fFSyoY2o =ECSj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[OSSN-0089] Missing configuration option in Secure Live Migration guide leads to unencrypted traffic
by Josephine Seifert 13 Apr '21

13 Apr '21

Missing configuration option in Secure Live Migration guide leads to unencrypted traffic -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ### Summary ### The guide to enable secure live migration with QEMU-native tls on nova compute nodes missed an important config option. Without this option a hard-coded part in nova is triggerd which sets the default route to TCP instead of TLS. This leads to an unecrypted migration of the ram without throwing any kind of Error. ### Affected Services / Software ### Nova / Victoria, Ussuri, Train, Stein (might also be affected: Rocky, Queens, Pike, Ocata) ### Discussion ### In the OpenStack guide to setup secure live migration with QEMU-native tls there are a few configuration options given, which have to be applied to nova compute nodes. After following the instructions and setting up everything it seems to work as expected. But after checking that libvirt is able to use tls using tcpdump to listen on the port for tls while manually executing libvirt commands, the same check for live migration of an instance through openstack fails. Listening on the port for unencrypted tcp-traffic shows that OpenStack still uses the unencrypted TCP path instead of the TLS one for the migration. The reason for this is a patch from Ocata which adds the calculation of the live-migration-uri in code: https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/nova/+/410817/ The config parameter ``live_migration_uri`` was deprecated in favor of ``live_migration_scheme`` and the default set to tcp. This leads to the problem that if none of these two config options are set, libvirt will always use the default tcp connection. To enable QEMU-native TLS to be used in nova one of them has to be set so that a TLS connection can be established. Currently the guide does not show that this is necessary and there was no other documentation indicating that these config options are important for the usage of QEMU-native TLS. As there is no documentation which recognizes this and it is hard to find this problem as the migration happens even without those config option set - not stating that it is still unencrypted, it might have been unrecognized in various deployments, which followed the guide. ### Recommended Actions ### For deployments using secure live migration with QEMU-native TLS: 1. Check the config of all nova compute nodes. The ``libvirt`` section needs to have either ``live_migration_uri`` (deprecated) or ``live_migration_scheme`` configured. 2. If neither of those config options are present, add ``live_migration_scheme = tls`` to enable the use of the tls connection. #### Patches #### The guide for secure live migration was updated to reflect the necessary configuration options and now has a note, which warns users that not setting all config options may lead into a seemingly working deployment, which still uses unencrypted traffic for the ram-migration. Master(Wallaby): https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/nova/+/781030 Victoria: https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/nova/+/781211 Ussuri: https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/nova/+/782126 Train: https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/nova/+/782430 Stein: https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/nova/+/783199 ### Contacts / References ### Author: Josephine Seifert, secustack GmbH This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0089 Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/1919357 Mailing List : [Security] tag on openstack-discuss(a)lists.openstack.org OpenStack Security Project : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg

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[OSSN-0088] Some of the Glance metadef APIs likely to leak resources
by Abhishek Kekane 09 Mar '21

09 Mar '21

Some of the Glance metadef APIs likely to leak resources ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ### Summary ### Metadef APIs are vulnerable and potentially leaking information to unauthorized users and also there is currently no limit on creation of metadef namespaces, objects, properties, resources and tags. This can be abused by malicious users to fill the Glance database resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) condition. ### Affected Services / Software ### Glance ### Discussion ### There is no restriction on creation of metadef namespaces, objects, properties, resources and tags as well as it could also leak the information to unauthorized users or to the users outside of the project. By taking advantage of this lack of restrictions around metadef APIs, a a single user could fill the Glance database by creating unlimited resources, resulting in a Denial Of Service (DoS) style attack. Glance does allow metadef APIs to be controlled by policy. However, the default policy setting for metadef APIs allows all users to create or read the metadef information. Because metadef resources are not properly isolated to the owner, any use of them with potentially sensitive names (such as internal infrastructure details, customer names, etc) could unintentionally expose that information to a malicious user. ### Recommended Actions ### Since these fundamental issues have been present since the API was introduced, the Glance project is recommending operators disable all metadef APIs by default in their deployments. Here is an example of disabling the metadef APIs in the deployments for current stable OpenStack releases either in policy.json or policy.yaml. ---- begin example policy.json/policy.yaml snippet ---- "metadef_default": "!", "get_metadef_namespace": "rule:metadef_default", "get_metadef_namespaces": "rule:metadef_default", "modify_metadef_namespace": "rule:metadef_default", "add_metadef_namespace": "rule:metadef_default", "get_metadef_object": "rule:metadef_default", "get_metadef_objects": "rule:metadef_default", "modify_metadef_object": "rule:metadef_default", "add_metadef_object": "rule:metadef_default", "list_metadef_resource_types": "rule:metadef_default", "get_metadef_resource_type": "rule:metadef_default", "add_metadef_resource_type_association": "rule:metadef_default", "get_metadef_property": "rule:metadef_default", "get_metadef_properties": "rule:metadef_default", "modify_metadef_property": "rule:metadef_default", "add_metadef_property": "rule:metadef_default", "get_metadef_tag": "rule:metadef_default", "get_metadef_tags": "rule:metadef_default", "modify_metadef_tag": "rule:metadef_default", "add_metadef_tag": "rule:metadef_default", "add_metadef_tags": "rule:metadef_default" ---- end example policy.json/policy.yaml snippet ---- To re-enable metadef policies to be allowed to be admin only, operator(s) can make a change in respective policy.json or policy.yaml as shown below; (assuming all metadef policies are configured to use rule:metadeta_default as shown in above example) ---- begin example policy.json/policy.yaml snippet ---- "metadef_default": "rule:admin", ---- begin example policy.json/policy.yaml snippet ---- Operators with users that depend on metadef APIs may choose to leave these accessible to all users. In that case, education of users about the potential for information leakage in the resource names is advisable so that vulnerable practices can be altered as mitigation. To re-enable metadef policies to all users, operator(s) can make a change in respective policy.json or policy.yaml as shown below; (assuming all metadef policies are configured to use rule:metadeta_default as shown in above example) ---- begin example policy.json/policy.yaml snippet ---- "metadef_default": "", ---- begin example policy.json/policy.yaml snippet ---- ### Contacts / References ### Author: Abhishek Kekane, Red Hat Author: Lance Bragstad, Red Hat This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0088 Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance/+bug/1545702 Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance/+bug/1916926 Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance/+bug/1916922 Mailing List : [Security] openstack-security(a)lists.openstack.org OpenStack Security Project : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg Thanks & Best Regards, Abhishek Kekane

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[OSSN-0087] Ceph user credential leakage to consumers of OpenStack Manila
by gouthampravi＠gmail.com 16 Dec '20

16 Dec '20

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Ceph user credential leakage to consumers of OpenStack Manila - ------------------------------------------------------------- ### Summary ### OpenStack Manila users can request access on a share to any arbitrary cephx user, including privileged pre-existing users of a Ceph cluster. They can then retrieve access secret keys for these pre-existing ceph users via Manila APIs. A cephx client user name and access secret key are required to mount a Native CephFS manila share. With a secret key, a manila user can impersonate a pre-existing ceph user and gain capabilities to manipulate resources that the manila user was never intended to have access to. It is possible to even obtain the default ceph "admin" user's key in this manner, and execute any commands as the ceph administrator. ### Affected Services / Software ### - - OpenStack Shared File Systems Service (Manila) versions Mitaka (2.0.0) through Victoria (11.0.0) - - Ceph Luminous (<=v12.2.13), Mimic (<=v13.2.10), Nautilus (<=v14.2.15), Octopus (<=v15.2.7) ### Discussion ### OpenStack Manila can provide users with Native CephFS shared file systems. When a user creates a "share" (short for "shared file system") via Manila, a CephFS "subvolume" is created on the Ceph cluster and exported. After creating their share, a user can specify who can have access to the share with the help of "cephx" client user names. A cephx client corresponds to Ceph Client Users [2]. When access is provided, a client user "access key" is returned via manila. A ceph client user account is required to access any ceph resource. This includes interacting with Ceph cluster infrastructure daemons (ceph-mgr, ceph-mds, ceph-mon, ceph-osd) or consuming Ceph storage via RBD, RGW or CephFS. Deployment and orchestration services like ceph-ansible, nfs-ganesha, kolla, tripleo need ceph client users to work, as do OpenStack services such as cinder, manila, glance and nova for their own interactions with Ceph. For the purpose of illustrating this vulnerability, we'll call them "pre-existing" users of the Ceph cluster. Another example of a pre-existing user includes the "admin" user that is created by default on the ceph cluster. In theory, manila's cephx users are no different from a ceph client user. When a manila user requests access to a share, a corresponding ceph user account is created if one already does not exist. If a ceph user account already exists, the existing capabilities of that user are adjusted to provide them permissions to access the manila share in question. There is no reasonable way for this mechanism to know what pre-existing ceph client users must be protected against unauthorized abuse. Therefore there is a risk that a manila user can claim to be a pre-existing ceph user to steal their access secret key. To resolve this issue, the ceph interface that manila uses was patched to no longer allow manila to claim a pre-existing user account that didn't create. By consequence this means that manila users cannot use cephx usernames that correspond to ceph client users that exist outside of manila. ### Recommended Actions ### #. Upgrade your ceph software to the latest patched releases of ceph to take advantage of the fix to this vulnerability. #. Audit cephx access keys provisioned via manila. You may use "ceph auth ls" and ensure that no clients have been compromised. If they have been, you may need to delete and recreate the client credentials to prevent unauthorized access. #. The audit can also be performed on manila by enumerating all CephFS shares and their access rules as a system administrator. If a reserved ceph client username has been used, you may deny access and recreate the client credential on ceph to refresh the access secret. No code changes were necessary in the OpenStack Shared File System service (manila). With an upgraded ceph, when manila users attempt to provide share access to a cephx username that they cannot use, the access rule's "state" attribute is set to "error" because this operation is no longer permitted. ### Patches ### The Ceph community has provided the following patches: Ceph Octopus: https://github.com/ceph/ceph/commit/1b8a634fdcd94dfb3ba650793fb1b6d09af65e05 Ceph Nautilus: https://github.com/ceph/ceph/commit/7e3e4e73783a98bb07ab399438eb3aab41a6fc8b Ceph Luminous: https://github.com/ceph/ceph/commit/956ceb853a58f6b6847b31fac34f2f0228a70579 The fixes are in the latest releases of Ceph Nautilus (14.2.16) and Ceph Octopus (15.2.8). The patch for Luminous was provided as a courtesy to possible users of OpenStack Manila, however the Ceph community no longer produces releases for Luminous or Mimic as they are end of life. See `here for information about ceph releases. <https://docs.ceph.com/en/latest/releases/general/>`_ ### Contacts / References ### Author: - - Pacha Ravi, Goutham gouthamr(a)redhat.com (Red Hat) Credits: - - Garbutt, John john(a)johngarbutt.com (StackHPC) - - Babel, Jahson jahson.babel(a)cc.in2p3.fr (Centre de Calcul de l'IN2P3) This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0087 Original LaunchPad Bug : https://launchpad.net/bugs/1904015 Mailing List : [Security] tag on openstack-discuss(a)lists.openstack.org OpenStack Security Project : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg CVE: CVE-2020-27781 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- wsFcBAEBCAAGBQJf2raCAAoJENJP32eYWZR3mREP/ij+So0KHK7dD3WAdcVK 0JdGzwOjX2Bc4/7g5RPzn4RaxZKicsBOWqESCTTBl94oG4XvTax3fW0E6VlL L6XoV+At1cEvptONDoZ0faCSHfTng1J73rHMo9v+cmxmOuEwXReghArS86tS KIeRWviW9hyNmZfhJxuAC9ICR0HglhT5VHqNtAjL5WzoFGMtC4VeJ7e8rf8r PLjvYGOPzNDj8wAn5UvTnJgkT1tbbIZQai4o+QlDJK5eEuEQnwGTUQ/umx/a z2DeuCnDDxJeOFcWEgkDzTQsE6e7dO4FvoIIsZ3u5pA0Rhw31QfpupUsLAYH WhAjt7cImKRTfza/zVuS7PAko2fMmuNHyHEQQh2Y80S4nkdo/WAfUaBft8eO vdNlvunBQA2E7mlK6oxNF22k/pX49N47vVqGttPFA1kNPFg2qLcc8mJIxpjf V4sJVfMO/DuQaU1zTH/P9KsYm/hlyVzLELEvDR43jmWg4p4btZT8Z2OVD80r 9/dRMcbRQl3yq1C2L7yyKVOc6Pw9HJ90ixXpgv7ZT6TbwAPzFe/euITmA6H0 EGzinRg7JmfFFnf/9FBEZJRL46/idMLVNRo2XioA6+o2kngkwSsD+uJTlMFG XQJINZwrbL1xpuh3VGaOI44yCimsQwNGURH2NmZ7uFBKy6CHYXX42ydnQk51 w9qp =o0Lx -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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