[Openstack-security] Credentials in clear text

Clark, Robert Graham robert.clark at hp.com
Tue Apr 22 15:29:11 UTC 2014


As Bryan mentioned already, a user with access to production systems, particularly one with sudo/root access – is in an incredibly privileged position. On its own this is an auditing issue but it’s a recognised one. In most deployments subject to auditing (i.e. production) it’s likely that compensating controls such as gated access, user logging, MAC etc. are all in place to control the risk.

It’s a messy problem to deal with. I’ve seen approaches where the process and configuration file are both owned by an elevated user, once the process has loaded the configuration file it drops privs and can no longer read the file, this can be useful as a mechanism for avoiding directory traversal in web services etc I’m not sure how viable an approach this would be with something like Swift.

 

-Rob

 

From: Bryan D. Payne [mailto:bdpayne at acm.org] 
Sent: 22 April 2014 01:16
To: Adam Lawson
Cc: openstack-security at lists.openstack.org
Subject: Re: [Openstack-security] Credentials in clear text

 

This is fair.  I'm not personally familiar with Swift, so I will let others chime in on that.

-bryan

 

On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 4:47 PM, Adam Lawson <alawson at aqorn.com <mailto:alawson at aqorn.com> > wrote:

Preventing access to passwords for the purpose of preventing unauthorized access to data as another way I look at it.





Adam Lawson

AQORN, Inc.

427 North Tatnall Street

Ste. 58461

Wilmington, Delaware 19801-2230

Toll-free: (844) 4-AQORN-NOW

Direct:  <tel:%2B1%20%28302%29%20268-6914> +1 (302) 268-6914

  <http://www.aqorn.com/images/logo.png> 

 

On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 4:46 PM, Adam Lawson <alawson at aqorn.com <mailto:alawson at aqorn.com> > wrote:

My initial concern is specific to Swift and gaining global access to all data by virtue of having access to a single proxy node. It seems more than access to system resources but a flaw in how data is controlled (and passwords are controlled).





Adam Lawson

AQORN, Inc.

427 North Tatnall Street

Ste. 58461

Wilmington, Delaware 19801-2230

Toll-free: (844) 4-AQORN-NOW

Direct:  <tel:%2B1%20%28302%29%20268-6914> +1 (302) 268-6914

  <http://www.aqorn.com/images/logo.png> 

 

On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 4:41 PM, Bryan D. Payne <bdpayne at acm.org <mailto:bdpayne at acm.org> > wrote:

This would be a nice hardening step, but if you have sudo on the box there's a lot of things you can do see.  This is just the tip of the iceberg.  For example, access to the backend db?  Access to traffic on the network / unix sockets / etc?  Access to logs.

 

I am not aware of any current efforts to mask this information from the config files.  But that doesn't mean it's not happening.  If someone is aware of such an effort, I'd certainly be interested in learning more about it.

 

Cheers,

-bryan

 

 

 

On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 4:26 PM, Adam Lawson <alawson at aqorn.com <mailto:alawson at aqorn.com> > wrote:

Have .conf files containing credentials and tokens been addressed or being addressed? Seems there are a lot of keys to the kingdom clearly visible to staff who have access to systems for day-to-day admin work but don't/shouldn't be able to view them. If they have sudo access, they have everything they need to get where they don't belong. Really strikes me as an obvious audit issue...





Adam Lawson

AQORN, Inc.

427 North Tatnall Street

Ste. 58461

Wilmington, Delaware 19801-2230

Toll-free: (844) 4-AQORN-NOW

Direct:  <tel:%2B1%20%28302%29%20268-6914> +1 (302) 268-6914

  <http://www.aqorn.com/images/logo.png> 

 

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