[Openstack-security] [Bug 1074087] Re: XenApi migration driver should use execvp

Euan Harris euan.harris at citrix.com
Mon Jun 24 14:20:41 UTC 2013


** Changed in: nova
     Assignee: (unassigned) => Euan Harris (euanh)

** Summary changed:

- XenApi migration driver should use execvp
+ XenApi migration driver should not use shell=True with Popen

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1074087

Title:
  XenApi migration driver should not use shell=True with Popen

Status in OpenStack Compute (Nova):
  Triaged

Bug description:
  The XenApi drivers split a string to create an array for
  subprocess.Popen, rather than passing an array directly. This invites
  the potential for command injection / manipulation.

  There is no clearly valid reason to use string splitting here when
  arguments can be passed, as elsewhere, directly into Popen.

  The behavior here is present in current Trunk, Folsom, and Essex.  Per
  Trunk and Folsom, _rsync_vhds calls plugins.utils.subprocess to
  perform the splitting.  In Essex, this behaviorism was present
  directly in migration/transfer_vhd.py, rather than in utils.py.
  Earlier releases have not been evaluated.

  I am not certain if this is directly exploitable. The user field is
  inserted into the generated strings used for command-line execution,
  and it does seem that Keystone allows usernames to contain arbitrary
  tokens/characters such as spaces.  It is not clear to me if the user
  field directly matches that in Keystone, if the user field is
  otherwise validated in the API, etc.  Other fields inserted into the
  command string seem to be internally generated.

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