Open Stack

Yes, applied them manually. Let's wait a few hours, and check for new spam
content / user accounts.

M.
JP Maxwell <jp at tipit.net> (időpont: 2016. febr. 27., Szo, 13:50) ezt írta:

> Cool. Are these applied? Any indication it has stopped the spam? Should we
> clear out these non launchpad accounts from the DB?
>
> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
> On Feb 27, 2016 6:47 AM, "Marton Kiss" <marton.kiss at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> And the mobile frontend will be disabled permanently with this patch:
>> https://review.openstack.org/285672 Disable mobile frontend
>>
>> M.
>>
>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 1:39 PM Marton Kiss <marton.kiss at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I made some investigation, and it seems to be that the spam pages are
>>> created by accounts registered with password accounts, and the launchpad
>>> openid auth is not affected at all.
>>>
>>> So the spam script is creating accounts like this:
>>> mysql> select * from user where user_name = 'CedricJamieson'\G;
>>> *************************** 1. row ***************************
>>>                  user_id: 7494
>>>                user_name: CedricJamieson
>>>           user_real_name: Cedric Jamieson
>>>            user_password:
>>> :pbkdf2:sha256:10000:128:Mlo9tdaP+38niZrrEka7Ow==:jEVnrTclkwIpE1RzJywDlrSvkY5G3idYwOwYRkv5O0J/MSHjY+gdhtKmArQ53v6/w7o8E1wXb2QOR6HdL5TPfOI1bswS/fYXVVYjPjkEEdxqZ8q9L5p2f3N6rEYpMfT5tk+wDiy+j5aimrHrGSga44hndAHgX9/SnqUyxlutDVY=
>>>         user_newpassword:
>>>        user_newpass_time: NULL
>>>               user_email: balashkina.evdokiya at mail.ru
>>>             user_touched: 20160227052454
>>>               user_token: 7c39e44e849fb0e2bfae8790d6cc1379
>>> user_email_authenticated: NULL
>>>         user_email_token: be963ac3bd43e70ff2f323063c61e320
>>> user_email_token_expires: 20160305052441
>>>        user_registration: 20160227052441
>>>           user_editcount: 2
>>>    user_password_expires: NULL
>>>
>>> The user_password field is always filled with a value, meanwhile this
>>> field of non-infected user accounts with openid logins is empty.
>>> We have 423 total accounts with passwords:
>>> mysql> select count(*) from user where user_password != '';
>>> +----------+
>>> | count(*) |
>>> +----------+
>>> |      423 |
>>> +----------+
>>> 1 row in set (0.00 sec)
>>>
>>> Mediawiki logs-in the newly created users without any preliminary email
>>> confirmation, right after the registration. I disabled the standard user
>>> login page, as described here:
>>> https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Manual:Special_pages#Disabling_Special:UserLogin_and_Special:UserLogout_pages
>>>
>>> And I made this patch to make it permanent:
>>> https://review.openstack.org/285669 Disable standard password based auth
>>>
>>> Just for the record, the last spam user account:
>>> 7536 | EarthaChester22
>>>
>>> Marton
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 8:31 AM Marton Kiss <marton.kiss at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> I created the following patch, infra cores must approve that:
>>>> https://review.openstack.org/285641 Add ssh key of JP Maxwell to
>>>> wiki.o.o
>>>>
>>>> Marton
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 6:41 AM JP Maxwell <jp at tipit.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Marton has SSH access and applied a patch earlier today.  It appears
>>>>> the spam continues to flow:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/40_Thoughts_Of_Using_Open_Shelves_On_A_Kitchen
>>>>>
>>>>> Marton let me know if you can look at it some more or Infra if you
>>>>> want to give me SSH I'll do so as well in the morning (public key
>>>>> attached).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ssh-rsa
>>>>> AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEA2b5I7Yff9FCrtRmSjpILUePi54Vbc8zqJTbzrIAQZGFLBi3xd2MLlhV5QVgpDBC9H3lGjbdnc81D3aFd3HwHT4dvvvyedT12PR3VDEpftdW84vw3jzdtALcayOQznjbGnScwvX5SgnRhNxuX9Rkh8qNvOsjYPUafRr9azkQoomJFkdNVI4Vb5DbLhTpt18FPeOf0UuqDt/J2tHI4SjZ3kjzr7Nbwpg8xGgANPNE0+2pJbwCA8YDt4g3bzfzvVafQs5o9Gfc9tudkR9ugQG1M+EWCgu42CleOwMTd/rYEB2fgNNPsZAWqwQfdPajVuk70EBKUEQSyoA09eEZX+xJN9Q==
>>>>> jpmaxman at tipit.net
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> J.P. Maxwell / tipit.net <http://www.tipit.net>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 12:09 PM, Jimmy McArthur <jimmy at openstack.org>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Super thankful for all the folks that have jumped in over the last
>>>>>> couple of days to help with the puppetization, etc... I just feel like
>>>>>> we're taking a very wrong approach here.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Paul Belanger wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Right, and I don't have an issue with that approach.  Based on the work we did
>>>>>> yesterday, anybody can do that via our workflow. Please submit a patch to
>>>>>> puppet-mediawiki[1] and ping an infra-root in #openstack-infra IRC.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What I'm proposing is the workflow is really meant for software, not
>>>>>> for web applications. It's tedious and time consuming when what's needed
>>>>>> here is a set of tests on the server. Submitting a patch, waiting for a +1,
>>>>>> then getting on IRC to find someone with access (and time) to paste the
>>>>>> logs is a pretty time consuming process for what should be a series of
>>>>>> rapid-fire changes/fixes on the server. Especially when we're dealign with
>>>>>> an active attack.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can then have somebody look at the logs.  I think it is more about scheduling
>>>>>> the task since more infra-root as travling back from the mid-cycle last night
>>>>>> and today.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Right, this is my point. This has been going on for 3 weeks (or
>>>>>> more). Tom Fifeldt was asking for help without response. And here we are
>>>>>> through another week and no closer to stemming the flow.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm fully aware what I'm proposing goes against what Infra and the
>>>>>> OpenStack workflow is all about, but I'd ask you all to look at this from a
>>>>>> web development perspective instead of a software development perspective.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jimmy
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Last email from me, just on a plane.  Will follow up when I land.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [1] https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack-infra/puppet-mediawiki
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net [http://tipit.net] | fibercove.com
>>>>>> [http://www.fibercove.com]
>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:25 AM, Paul Belanger <pabelanger at redhat.com> <pabelanger at redhat.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:08:18AM -0600, Jimmy McArthur wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Given the state of the wiki a the moment, I think taking the quickest path
>>>>>> to get it fixed would be prudent. Is there a way we can get JP root access
>>>>>> to this server, even temporarily? We get 25% of our website traffic (2
>>>>>> million visitors) to the wiki. I realize we're all after the same thing,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> but
>>>>>>
>>>>>> spammers are not going to hit the dev environment, so there's really no
>>>>>>
>>>>>> way
>>>>>>
>>>>>> to tell if teh problem is fixed without actually working directly on the
>>>>>> production machine. This should be a 30 minute fix.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am still unclear what the 30min fix is. If really 30mins, then it
>>>>>> shouldn't be
>>>>>> hard to get the fix into our workflow. Could somebody please elaborate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If we are talking about deploying new versions of php or mediawiki manually,
>>>>>> I
>>>>>> not be in-favor of this. To me, while the attack sucks, we should be working
>>>>>> on
>>>>>> 2 fronts. Getting the help needed to mitigate the attack, then adding the
>>>>>> changes into -infra workflow in parallel.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I realize there is a lot of risk in giving ssh access to infra machines,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> but
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think it's worth taking a look at either putting this machine in a place
>>>>>> where a different level of admin could access it without giving away the
>>>>>> keys to the entire OpenStack infrastructure or figuring out a way to set
>>>>>>
>>>>>> up
>>>>>>
>>>>>> credentials with varying levels of access.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As a note, all the work I've been doing to help with the attack hasn't
>>>>>> require
>>>>>> SSH access for me to wiki.o.o. I did need infra-root help to expose our
>>>>>> configuration safely. I'd rather take some time to see what the fixes are,
>>>>>> having infra-root apply changes, then move them into puppet.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It also has been discussed to simply disable write access to the wiki if we
>>>>>> really want spamming to stop, obviously that will affect normal usage.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jimmy
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Paul Belanger wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 10:12:12AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But if you wanted to upgrade everything, remove the mobile view
>>>>>>
>>>>>> extension,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> test in a dev/staging environment then deploy to production fingers
>>>>>> crossed, I think that would be a valid approach as well.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Current review up[1]. I'll launch a node tonight / tomorrow locally to
>>>>>>
>>>>>> see
>>>>>> how
>>>>>>
>>>>>> puppet reacts. I suspect there will be some issues.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If infra-roots are fine with this approach, we can use that box to test
>>>>>>
>>>>>> against.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [1] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/285405/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>>>>>> On Feb 26, 2016 10:08 AM, "JP Maxwell"<jp at tipit.net> <jp at tipit.net> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Plus one except in this case it is much easier to know if our efforts
>>>>>>
>>>>>> are
>>>>>>
>>>>>> working on production because the spam either stops or not.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>>>>>> On Feb 26, 2016 9:48 AM, "Paul Belanger"<pabelanger at redhat.com> <pabelanger at redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 09:18:00AM -0600, JP Maxwell wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I really think you might consider the option that there is a
>>>>>>
>>>>>> vulnerability
>>>>>>
>>>>>> in one of the extensions. If that is the case black listing IPs will
>>>>>>
>>>>>> be
>>>>>>
>>>>>> an
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ongoing wild goose chase.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think this would be easily proven or disproven by making the questy
>>>>>> question impossible and see if the spam continues.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We'll have to let an infra-root make that call. Since nobody would be
>>>>>> able to
>>>>>> use the wiki. Honestly, I'd rather spend the time standing up a mirror
>>>>>>
>>>>>> dev
>>>>>>
>>>>>> instance for us to work on, rather then production.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> J.P. Maxwell | tipit.net | fibercove.com
>>>>>> On Feb 26, 2016 9:12 AM, "Paul Belanger"<pabelanger at redhat.com> <pabelanger at redhat.com>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 08:10:34PM -0800, Elizabeth K. Joseph wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 6:35 AM, Jeremy Stanley<fungi at yuggoth.org> <fungi at yuggoth.org>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 2016-02-25 02:46:13 -0600 (-0600), JP Maxwell wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Please be aware that you can now create accounts under the mobile
>>>>>> view in the wiki native user table. I just created an account for
>>>>>> JpMaxMan. Not sure if this matters but wanted to make sure you
>>>>>> were aware.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Oh, yes I think having a random garbage question/answer was in
>>>>>>
>>>>>> fact
>>>>>>
>>>>>> previously preventing account creation under the mobile view. We
>>>>>> probably need a way to disable mobile view account creation as it
>>>>>> bypasses OpenID authentication entirely.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So that's what it was doing! We'll have to tackle the mobile view
>>>>>>
>>>>>> issue.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Otherwise, quick update here:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The captcha didn't appear to help stem the spam tide. We'll want to
>>>>>> explore and start implementing some of the other solutions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I did some database poking around today and it does seem like all
>>>>>>
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>
>>>>>> users do have launchpad accounts and email addresses.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, I have a few hours before jumping on my plane and checked into
>>>>>>
>>>>>> this.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We are
>>>>>> using QuestyCaptcha which according to docs, should almost be
>>>>>>
>>>>>> impossible
>>>>>>
>>>>>> for
>>>>>> spammers to by pass in an automated fashion. So, either our captcha
>>>>>>
>>>>>> is too
>>>>>>
>>>>>> easy, or we didn't set it up properly. I don't have SSH on wiki.o.o
>>>>>>
>>>>>> so
>>>>>>
>>>>>> others
>>>>>> will have to check logs. I did test new pages and edits, and was
>>>>>>
>>>>>> promoted
>>>>>>
>>>>>> by
>>>>>> captcha.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As a next step, we might need to add additional apache2
>>>>>>
>>>>>> configuration
>>>>>>
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>
>>>>>> blacklist IPs. I am reading up on that now.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Elizabeth Krumbach Joseph || Lyz || pleia2
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>>>
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>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>
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