Open Stack

Maybe it will be useful to use Ovirt guest agent as a base.

http://www.ovirt.org/Guest_Agent
https://github.com/oVirt/ovirt-guest-agent

It is already working well on linux and windows and has a lot of functionality.
However, currently it is using virtio-serial for communication, but I think it can be extended for other bindings.

Vladik

----- Original Message -----
> From: "Clint Byrum" <clint at fewbar.com>
> To: "openstack-dev" <openstack-dev at lists.openstack.org>
> Sent: Tuesday, 10 December, 2013 4:02:41 PM
> Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] Unified Guest Agent proposal
> 
> Excerpts from Dmitry Mescheryakov's message of 2013-12-10 12:37:37 -0800:
> > >> What is the exact scenario you're trying to avoid?
> > 
> > It is DDoS attack on either transport (AMQP / ZeroMQ provider) or server
> > (Salt / Our own self-written server). Looking at the design, it doesn't
> > look like the attack could be somehow contained within a tenant it is
> > coming from.
> > 
> 
> We can push a tenant-specific route for the metadata server, and a tenant
> specific endpoint for in-agent things. Still simpler than hypervisor-aware
> guests. I haven't seen anybody ask for this yet, though I'm sure if they
> run into these problems it will be the next logical step.
> 
> > In the current OpenStack design I see only one similarly vulnerable
> > component - metadata server. Keeping that in mind, maybe I just
> > overestimate the threat?
> > 
> 
> Anything you expose to the users is "vulnerable". By using the localized
> hypervisor scheme you're now making the compute node itself vulnerable.
> Only now you're asking that an already complicated thing (nova-compute)
> add another job, rate limiting.
> 
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