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On 12/11/2012 08:06 AM, David Chadwick wrote:
> Hi Mark
>
> I am finding it difficult to understand your use case. Can you help me 
> please. If Nova is the compute service, then surely it is able to 
> upload any images that it wants to, otherwise how can they run? Isnt 
> it the case that Nova is the service provider, which has a policy that 
> says who is entitled to upload images to it? Someone, say the 
> deployer, sets this policy. So say the policy is "role X can upload 
> images", then any user who can authenticate to Keystone and be 
> assigned role X is able to upload images. Doesnt this provide the 
> functionality you need?

David, if I understand what he is asking, he only wants Nova to be able 
to upload the images; a user can't upload any old image, just the ones 
somehow gated by Nova.   But the image should still be owned by the user 
that triggered the upload.Its an interesting use case, but not something 
we would be able to support in the Grizzly time frame, and not something 
that I would put under explicit impersonation, but rather something of 
the nature of policy enforcement.  They might be able to do it built on 
trusts if they had a policy that requires the token have the additional 
value of "trustee=nova"

>
> regards
>
> David
>
>
> On 10/12/2012 21:12, Mark Washenberger wrote:
>>>> I must be missing something. Thanks in advance for correcting me!
>>>
>>> Why would the user not have the role?
>>
>> The idea behind this feature is that the user is not authorized to
>> upload an image, but Nova is authorized to upload an image on the
>> user's behalf. This feature would not be turned on by default, but it
>> should be available at a deployer's discretion.
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 12:14 PM, Adam Young <ayoung at redhat.com> wrote:
>>> On 12/10/2012 02:41 PM, Mark Washenberger wrote:
>>>>
>>>> So, in the case of this feature, the trustor (end user) is going to
>>>> delegate to the trustee (Glance) a role that the trustor himself does
>>>> not have? (Namely, some role that allows image uploads.) That seems to
>>>> violate the spirit of the the spec.
>>>
>>> Nope.  The user needs to have the role in the first place.
>>>
>>>> I must be missing something. Thanks in advance for correcting me!
>>>
>>> Why would the user not have the role?
>>>
>>>>
>>>> markwash
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:56 AM, Yee, Guang <guang.yee at hp.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I think the current trust BP should cover your use case.
>>>>>
>>>>> http://wiki.openstack.org/Keystone/Trusts
>>>>>
>>>>> In your case, the trustee would be Image Service or endpoint.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Guang
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: Mark Washenberger [mailto:mark.washenberger at markwash.net]
>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 10, 2012 10:36 AM
>>>>> To: OpenStack Development Mailing List
>>>>> Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [Keystone] Trusts and Explicit 
>>>>> Impersonation
>>>>>
>>>>> David, Adam, (other Trusts/Auth folks. . .),
>>>>>
>>>>> Any thoughts on this?
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks!
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>> From: Mark Washenberger [mailto:mark.washenberger at markwash.net]
>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, December 07, 2012 8:53 PM
>>>>>>> To: OpenStack Development Mailing List
>>>>>>> Subject: [openstack-dev] Trusts and Explicit Impersonation
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi auth guys!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As we continue to make progress towards large service providers
>>>>>>> exposing
>>>>>>> their Glance deployments as public services, one critical 
>>>>>>> feature we
>>>>>>> need
>>>>>
>>>>> to
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> support is the ability to limit certain actions (mostly image 
>>>>>>> uploads,
>>>>>
>>>>> also
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> possibly image downloads) to use by Nova or other trusted 
>>>>>>> services, and
>>>>>>> restrict users from taking those actions directly. Of course, this
>>>>>
>>>>> feature
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> would only be turned on by configuration, and not likely by 
>>>>>>> default.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I had figured we could do this using some features piggy-backed on
>>>>>>> keystone pki, and documented the use case in this blueprint:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> https://blueprints.launchpad.net/keystone/+spec/keystone-explicit-impersonat 
>>>>>
>>>>> ion
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I've been following the discussion of Keystone Trusts with 
>>>>>>> interest,
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> some questions have presented themselves. Is there some way we 
>>>>>>> could
>>>>>>> manipulate the Trust mechanism to provide the auth feature Glance
>>>>>>> needs?
>>>>>>> Another (scarier for me) question: does the Trusts proposal 
>>>>>>> conflict
>>>>>>> with
>>>>>
>>>>> my
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> feature request?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Mark
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
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